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ABSTRACT 
The metropolitan region of São Paulo, Brazil experienced an unprecedented drought 
between 2013-2015, putting millions of people at risk of water shortages.  The impending 
water crisis brought into question both the reliability of water supplies and the adaptive 
management capacity of the institutions in charge of the region’s water.  The problem is 
not unique to São Paulo.  The Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) framework is an international effort to promote adaptive governance in water 
policy, and Brazil is one of the proponents of IWRM’s principles of decentralized, 
integrated, and participatory management capacities to deal with water conflicts.  This 
work examines the technical and non-technical challenges in São Paulo and explores 
how combining computer models with stakeholder engagement can build water 
governance.  A mixed-method approach is used including interviews, meeting 
attendance, analysis of technical documents, and quantitative methods with the 
construction of a mock collaborative model. The objectives are: 1) Examine 
computer models used for stakeholder engagement in water resources 
management and characterize the mechanisms that make them effective participatory 
decision tools; 2) Chronicle and critically examine drought response and water 
management in São Paulo; 3) Develop a collaborative modeling framework of São 
Paulo’s water system to analyze system performance and propose contingency plans 
for improved response. 
To structure the analysis, Chapter 2 explores the five dimensions of participation and 
the complexity of creating models that are timely, flexible, transparent, and relevant 
to the 
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stakeholder engagement process.  Chapters 3 and 4 provide different perspectives on São 
Paulo’s water crisis: Chapter 3 explores the institutional challenges, which were 
exacerbated by a history of increasing water demands in the region, while Chapter 4 is a 
technical analysis of system performance and alternative drought plans.  
São Paulo’s drought and the ensuing water allocation process expose the conflicting 
objectives of the IWRM framework.  Furthermore, the analysis of system performance 
identifies inconsistencies between public statements concerning risks and system 
vulnerabilities and the actual situation during the drought.  Despite existing plans and 
technical know-how, the drought revealed a stressed water system whose reliability has 
been diminished by 20 years of increasing demand. The São Paulo case study 
demonstrates the need for a more collaborative approach that brings transparent and open 
dialogue to water resources management.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem statement 
Human activities such as agriculture, urbanization, industrialization, land use, and large-scale 
engineering schemes directly impact water resources and have greatly stressed the world’s 
freshwater systems [Rockström, 2009; Rockström et al., 2009; Vörösmarty et al., 2010].  
Even today, an estimated 1.8 billion people lack access to a safe and reliable drinking water 
source [WHO, 2016].  The water problem cannot be reduced to a question of scarcity; even in 
places of water abundance, lack of governing institutions, poor management, and uneven 
geographical and seasonal distribution of water resources can lead to water conflicts.  These 
recognized threats prompted the search for an international framework to protect the health 
of the environment and of people [UN-Water, 2008], and motivated an international effort 
by “expert networks” to promote the principle of Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) [Conca, 2006].  Despite widespread adoption, IWRM has fallen 
short of its promise [Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006].  Science, technology, and engineering have 
long been proposed as part of the solution.  However, water experts today also 
recognize the need to better understand the institutions and organizations that manage 
water.  
In 1969, Dr. Abel Wolman assembled selected writings into his seminal book, Water, 
Health, and Society.  He wrote about the need for new structures and a new generation 
of water professionals that could approach multidisciplinary problems in water 
with less compartmentalized expertise and in a more unified manner.  His paper “Water
—Economics and Policy,” reflects on the success and failures of planned objectives by 
asking: “Has 
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planning in the water resource field been panacea or delusion?” I would pose the same 
question today about IWRM.  Of course, such a stark dichotomy does not really exist.  
Instead, the question is intended to force scientists and engineers – who play an important 
role in informing policy and public perception – to reflect on the current state of water 
management and planning and on its future.  The JHU Department of Geography and 
Environmental Engineering (DoGEE) was founded based on the appreciation that a new 
generation of engineers were needed to address the environmental problems of our time. 
Hence, it seems appropriate that coming from DoGEE, my research strives to stand at the 
intersection of engineering and policy.  A multidisciplinary education has the vantage point 
of bringing new perspectives to old problems.  As society evolves and new demands and 
values are infused into the decision-making process, a new generation of professionals 
will be needed to navigate the changing field of water resources management.  These 
professionals will be asked to transition smoothly between disciplines and work 
outside traditional boundaries, just as Dr. Abel Wolman predicted nearly 50 years ago. 
At first glance, water management problems seem to fit nicely into a systems analysis 
problem where stakeholders’ objectives are assessed and translated into a multi-objective 
analysis and optimal solutions (Pareto frontier) for allocating the available water resources. 
However, the field of water resource management has changed, and the need for greater 
participation has required the tools for analysis to change as well. The participatory process 
requires an analysis that goes beyond a prescriptive model for dealing with competing 
demands.  Changes in the United States became most apparent at the turn of the twentieth 
century, but have become more persistent and widely spread in the last 60 years [Boland et 
3 
al., 2009].  One such change was the expansion of the water resources management 
(WRM) dialogue to include a multiplicity of actors and disciplines who entered the 
playing field as IWRM came into focus around 1994.  Thus, water resource planning and 
management went from being “primarily the province of engineers, with occasional inputs 
from economists” 2  [Boland and Baumann, 2009, p.1] to being an interdisciplinary, 
international dialogue.  The inclusion of such diverse actors resulted in a surge of new 
perspectives and opinions on how water should be governed and managed.  Equally 
importantly, the change also sparked criticism, resistance, frustration, and incompatible 
perspectives concerning the direction in which the WRM dialogue should proceed.  
Interestingly, a similar complication emerged within IWRM when it proposed to shift 
decision-making from a centralized, government-led, albeit fragmented, 3 process to a 
decentralized, integrative, and participatory process that included diverse stakeholders. These 
stakeholders were not homogeneous nor were their interests and objectives similar or 
compatible.  Complicating matters, experts have pointed out that water is among the first 
means by which climate change is already affecting humans [Karl et al., 2009; Sadoff and 
Muller, 2009], and whether it is felt as drought or floods, it will mean adaptation to a new 
environment.  How then are computer models useful in this multi-layer, complex context? 
Governments, institutions, and ultimately people need to understand and act on technical 
information in order to adapt.  It is not self-evident, however, how scientific and technical 
2 Boland and Baumann’s chapter The Evolution of Water Resource Planning and Decision Making is also 
paraphrasing from the introductory to the Design of Water-resource Systems by Maass et al. (1962). 
3 These are not contradictory statements since decisions can be made within a federal or State planned 
framework but in different agencies and for different sectors of water. 
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knowledge will inform those decisions.  One can see today that in questions of resource 
management, what was once a relatively straightforward matter handled by engineers and 
government agencies has become a complicated and arduous process with new actors and 
different interest pushing diverse agendas at the proverbial negotiating table.  
1.2 Research question and study objectives 
At the core of this study are questions of how computer models support decision-making, 
how technical knowledge can be translated into policy, and whether model building can 
strengthen adaptive governance.  With changing water governance regimes came the need for 
greater participation of pluralistic actors, and models needed to be accessible to non-technical 
participants.  To do so, computer models needed to incorporate new aspects of decision-
making: a) to include more diverse set of values and objectives, b) to account for institutional 
and sociopolitical differences that can translate to conflicting problem definitions, c) to 
define the purpose and expectations of a decision process, and d) to help improve decision 
mechanisms.  
For a long time, traditional WRM tended to overlook or minimize the role of governance 
under the prescription that optimizing for economic efficiency and rational behavior would 
lead to better decisions.  More recently, under IWRM, new concepts of participation, 
decentralization, and integration have emerged, paving the way for new power relations and 
decision-making mechanisms [Conca, 2006; Molle, 2009].  In this new paradigm, river basin 
councils and the governance challenges they face in exercising their role as decision-making 
units have become an interesting topic of study.  
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The study objectives are:  
Objective 1. Identify the characteristics that make computer models effective at engaging 
stakeholders in a participatory policy process. 
Research questions addressed in Chapter 2: 
1. How has the field of water resource management worked to improve public participation?
2. What role do computer models play in bridging technical knowledge to the public policy
process?
3. What mechanisms make computer models effective as participatory decision tools?
4. How can participatory computer models be designed and evaluated on their technical and
non-technical aspects of informing policy?
Objective 2. Examine the case study of joint water management in the Cantareira system in 
São Paulo, Brazil to identify the institutional challenges to achieving improved participation 
and water governance.  
Research questions addressed in Chapter 3: 
1. What role did technical information play in the state’s response to the drought?
2. What aspects of politics and power exacerbated the natural drought event?
3. What major impediments to collaboration exacerbated São Paulo’s drought?
4. What are the institutional challenges in building water governance?
Objective 3. How can collaboratively developed computer models support a formal and 
disciplined approach to drought planning that incorporates stakeholders’ concerns?  Given 
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São Paulo’s unprecedented drought, how could drought planning have been more transparent 
if a collaborative modeling framework had been possible? 
Research questions addressed in Chapter 4: 
1. How could Cantareira system operations be managed to mitigate the reliability of the
system and the costs to users and the utility company? 
2. How can we assess system performance measures of the Cantareira under different
drought indicators, triggers, and actions to create alternative plans? 
3. How can drought planning be improved in a collaborative manner to minimize the
drought’s negative impacts?  
To answer these questions, this study made use of a mixed-method approach including 
qualitative and quantitative methods.  Qualitative tools were used in interviews, meeting 
attendance, and content analysis of technical documents, which were the basis for developing 
the case study in São Paulo, Brazil.  Quantitative methods were used to help develop a 
participatory model of the Cantareira water supply system that was presented at two public 
workshops in May 2014 and March 2015.  The qualitative methods informed decision to 
present at the two workshops a collaborative modeling framework for the region that 
incorporates the challenges and opportunities identified by local stakeholders through 
interviews.  Appendix B provides a methodological note on the interviews and meetings. 
The thesis is organized as follows: The remainder of this chapter provides background 
information on the major concepts in the changing field of water resource management.  It is 
meant as a foundation to understand the complexity of the topic.  Chapter 2 explores the five 
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dimensions of participation and the complexity of creating models that are more timely, 
flexible, transparent, and relevant to the needs of the public.  Chapters 3 and 4 provide 
different perspectives on São Paulo’s water crisis: Chapter 3 documents the historic drought 
that affected São Paulo and analyzes the institutional challenges to participation despite a 
history of active institutions in the study region, while Chapter 4 is a technical analysis of 
system performance and post-workshop analysis on participatory drought planning.  Finally, 
Chapter 5 concludes with the implications and impacts of the present study on water resource 
management and outlines how this interdisciplinary perspective on models and the policy 
process can be applied in the context of IWRM.  This research is relevant to engineers who 
strive to build computer models that can improve decisions through increased transparency, 
access to information, and representative stakeholder engagement.    
1.3 Theoretical frameworks 
At the nexus of models, participatory water resources management, and governance, there 
are interdisciplinary questions that challenge not only how problems are defined but also the 
guiding assumptions.  Consequently, this research draws on several disciplines in order to 
provide a broad understanding of the theory and practice of participatory modeling as it 
applies to improving the policy process.  
1.3.1 Definition and origin of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
On the international stage, where discussions on how to manage global water resources are 
underway, IWRM is what Conca [2008] refers to as “the discursive framework of 
international water policy.”  The most frequently cited definition of IWRM comes from the 
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Global Water Partnership (GWP):4 “IWRM is defined as a process which promotes the 
coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to 
maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.”  The UN describes IWRM as the 
“approach that has now been accepted internationally as the way forward for efficient, 
equitable and sustainable development and management of the world’s limited water 
resources and for coping with conflicting demands” [UN-Water, 2008, p.1].     
 
It should be noted, however, that the concept of integrative management was thriving as far 
back as the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933 [Viessman et al., 2009].  Experts in the field 
of WRM had recognized the need for comprehensive plans with less fragmented policies 
many years before the term “IWRM” was coined, and they fostered frameworks such as 
“integrative river basin management” and  “comprehensive river basin planning.”  The 
difference is that these frameworks emphasized the technical and managerial characteristics 
of WRM.  With time, WRM has been overshadowed by the growing popularity of IWRM.  
Lautze et al. [2011] observed that once IWRM emerged in the international dialogue in the 
mid-1990, the terms “water management” and “IWRM” began to be used interchangeably, 
and water management grew “increasingly moot as use of the term is frequently supplanted 
by IWRM” [2011, p.5].  
 
                                                 
4 The GWP is a partnership between the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. It promotes the implementation of IWRM. 
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Those experts familiar with WRM did not have to change much in practice in order to adopt 
the IWRM dialogue.  The discourse of IWRM is vague and leaves much room for 
interpretation [Conca, 2006; Abers and Keck, 2013].  It is unclear if this discourse has 
translated into actual operational changes [Priscoli, 2004].  What is clear is that: 1) IWRM 
emerged at the international level as a discourse on how to manage the world’s water 
resources; 2) the framework of IWRM was embraced by multiple actors and organizations, 
even without an agreed-upon definition; 3) IWRM language resembles that of WRM, 
although its legitimization was not confined to the WRM community; 4) the concept of 
IWRM eventually rose to dominate the field of WRM. 5   Unpacking IWRM and its 
operational challenges requires a broader disciplinary perspective.  
Environmental issues entered the international water agenda in the 1970s and have grown in 
prominence ever since.  A few notable international events include the United Nations (UN) 
Water Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina in 1977, the UN General Assembly in 1980 
that marked the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, and the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (termed the "Earth Summit") in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992.  IWRM surfaced from such discussions [Conca, 2006; Orlove and Caton, 
2010].  The main guiding tenets of IWRM were described in the Dublin Principles drafted 
months prior to the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992 [UN, 1992]: 
a. Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development,
and the environment.
b. Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach,
involving users, planners, and policy makers at all levels.
5 For a full history of the development of IWRM, significant accounts already exist by Conca (2006), Varady et 
al. (2009), Varady & Iles-shih (2005), Rahaman & Varis (2005), Biswas (2004), and Mukhtarov (2009). 
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c. Women play a central part in the provision, management, and safeguarding of water. 
d. Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an 
economic good. 
 
In summary, IWRM established water as an economic good with multiple, and often 
competing, uses that needs to be managed in a holistic and participatory manner in order to 
maximize the economic and social welfare of its users. 
 
1.3.2 Critiques and shortcomings 
Despite the international acceptance and legitimization of IWRM among water experts, and 
despite the fact that a number of countries have written IWRM principles into their water 
law, the IWRM framework has also been met with controversy.  IWRM is not a concept with 
a static definition; it is a “living discourse” [Mukhtarov, 2009, p.4] that assumes different 
expressions and forms, sometimes for the benefit of those pushing a particular agenda.  A 
number of social and political scientists point out the plurality of agents acting within the 
human-environmental systems in question.  They argue that the people and objectives being 
modeled are neither a homogenous nor collective group of stakeholders.  Communities have 
also protested, often contending the persistently exclusive nature of the decision-making 
process.  Even the meaning of words such as “integrative” and “participatory,” central to the 
IWRM principles, varies widely among experts and according to context.  A doctoral 
dissertation on the hegemony of IWRM explains IWRM as follows: 
Despite its sweeping popularity, there is little agreement on what IWRM actually 
constitutes. There is an on-going debate on the basic meaning, scope and nature of 
IWRM. Over thirty IWRM definitions can be found in the literature. This diversity is 
not surprising per se; what is striking is that despite being vaguely defined and 
lacking proof of effectiveness on the ground, IWRM became very popular on the 
international water policy arena. [Mukhtarov, 2009, p4] 
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These critiques point to the inconsistencies and incongruent narratives within IWRM.  For 
example, participatory processes can result in unsustainable outcome if those involved 
choose their own benefit over environmentally sustainable options.  Yet, IWRM remains the 
most disseminated framework on sustainable water management.  IWRM has been promoted 
as an ideal framework in which all stakeholders (and to an extent all actors in the water 
dialogue) could reach common ground.  It is of little surprise, then, that IWRM has not lived 
up to its promise; it seems its list of promises grew at every step.  This in part explains why 
the IWRM paradigm has mostly remained a normative theory on what ought to be done 
without concrete policies or plans for how to carry it out [Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006; Medema 
et al., 2008].   
1.4 The eras of water resources management 
The focus of this section is to understand the emerging trends in management and theories 
that have informed water resource practice.  It is helpful to consider the recent history of 
water resources management as a series of eras. 
1.4.1 Era of large engineered infrastructure 
The large infrastructure era was marked by “heroic engineering feats” through the 
manipulation of rivers and other water sources by damming, diverting, and dredging [Conca, 
2006].  These projects were organized with a very centralized, top-down approach. There are 
roughly 800,000 dams spread across the globe, of which slightly over 40,000 are considered 
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large dams.6  These large dams include roughly 300 major dams7 such as Aswan, Hoover, 
and Itaipu [Oud and Muir, 1997; Conca, 2006].  River manipulation has been “vastly larger 
and more aggressive” in the twentieth century [Sabatier et al., 2005, p.45] compared to 
earlier time periods.  Of the existing 40,000 large dams, most were built in the second half of 
twentieth century.   
 
For much of this era, management was a process dictated by the state, and more specifically 
by the technocrats who were in charge of “command-and-control” engineering plans.  
Economic development played an important role in the construction of dams and other major 
infrastructure projects, and the prevailing objective was generally to increase water supplies.  
In fact, for many regions water has often been the “key to growth,” and once an area 
developed its water resources, “it acted to protect its development with political muscle 
commensurate with its increased wealth” [Ingram, 1969, p.10].  The era of dam building 
peaked in the 1970s, and the rate of construction has been decreasing since [Oud and Muir, 
1997; Conca, 2006]. 
 
1.4.2 Era of “soft” path and multi-objectives  
In the past 50 years, water management has undergone a “quiet revolution” [Sabatier et al., 
2005, p.33].  Today most water experts recognize the importance of institutional 
                                                 
6 Large dams are defined by International Commission on Large Dams as waterfalls with heights larger than 15 
meters high.  
7 Major dams are defined by International Commission on Large Dams as dams that meet one or more of the 
following criteria greater than 150meters height, greater than 15 million m3 volume, greater than 25 billion m3 
reservoir volume, or greater than 1000MW electric generating capacity.  
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arrangements and effective governance for making technical solutions possible. This change 
has meant an increased acknowledgement that human systems and freshwater ecosystems are 
inevitably entwined.  
 
As with any change of this magnitude, the paradigm shift did not occur overnight.  It was a 
gradual progression.  In the US, however, most water experts can point to a specific year that 
marked the start of the new era of water management.  In 1969, the Senate Select Committee 
on Water Resources made broad recommendations and approved the initiation of “radically 
new policy directions” by the Executive Branch [Viessman et al., 2009, p.27].  The decade 
predating these changes was characterized by a wave of environmental concerns and public 
demands that environmental quality be included in federal- and state-level evaluation of 
projects.  This period also witnessed changes in project evaluation methods, with more 
refined tools for informing policy and decision-making as federal government began to favor 
multi-objective management and comprehensive planning over single-purpose or individual 
projects.   
 
The changes marked by the Senate recommendations came at a time when environmental 
topics were being debated and a convergence of other interests pushed for more action from 
the government.  This climate produced several environmental milestones in the US, 
including a number of laws and regulations that mandated public involvement: the National 
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of 1969, the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the 
Principles and Standards of 1973.  NEPA, for example, requires Environmental Assessments 
or Environmental Impact Statements for federal water decisions that significantly affect the 
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environment, and further requires the opportunity for public review and comment on these 
documents.  This was the era of full disclosure, but stakeholder and regulatory agency 
involvement still came at the end of the process, when plans could not be changed 
significantly.  At least in the United States, the paradigm shift after 1969 was a significant 
push forward for stakeholder inclusion, even if only on paper, in management and decision 
practices. 
 
The steady change in US water policy that marked those 50 years also included the 
emergence of “soft” path solutions to water management, such as mathematical models and 
systems analysis.  Water expert Peter Gleick [2003] talks about a “changing water paradigm” 
that progresses from “hard” path solutions, which tend to focus solely on infrastructure (such 
as dam construction), to “soft” path solutions that also emphasize people, technologies, and 
efficient use of water.  Peter Loucks has further characterized this paradigm shift as a change 
from a supply-side increase to efficiencies in demand-side management [Loucks, 2000].  
Systems analysis is the formal mathematical modeling that has been employed to optimize 
water supplies and improve water planning and management decisions [Loucks, 2000].  
Systems analysis as a field has grown to include analytical tools beyond optimization and 
operations research,8 and its methods have permeated disciplines from industrial engineering 
and engineering management to economics and finance, to name but a few. What these fields 
have in common, and what systems analysis provides, is clear and concise deliberation 
                                                 
8 Operations Research and Systems Engineering disciplines are traced to the development of linear 
programming by two central figures: Koopmans in the U.K. and Kantorovich in former U.S.S.R. In 1947, 
George Dantzig showed how to solve Koopmans’ problem with a practical simplex algorithm as applied to a 
U.S. Air Force research program. Prof. Abraham Charnes is credited with pushing the first applications of OR 
and LP in civil and environmental engineering (ReVelle et al. 2004). 
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between multiple alternatives.  However, as Charles ReVelle points out: “Of all the 
environmental areas to adopt systems methodology, probably the most active applications 
have taken place in water resources and water quality management” [ReVelle et al., 2004, 
p.13].
The convergence of system analysis and hydrology as a method to study water resources was 
pioneered by the Harvard Water Program (HWP), which in 1955 began combining “advances 
in probability theory, statistics, operations research and welfare economics” to inform 
management practices [Boland et al., 2009, p.93].  The HWP’s research purpose was to 
improve methods for designing water resources systems. The HWP was also the first to study 
complex river basin systems by incorporating aspects of social science, making one of its 
principal goals “to improve the methodology of systems design by joining engineering and 
economics more effectively than has been done in the past” [Maass and et al., 1962].  The 
methodology involved identifying design objectives, translating objectives into design 
criteria, optimizing specific water systems, and evaluating the consequences of development 
plans [Reuss, 2003; Maass et al., 1962].  There is no question that the HWP and subsequent 
academic and research institutions contributed significantly to the field of water resource 
management and planning.  In U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Senior Historian Michael 
Reuss’ words:  
Clearly, the multi-objective analysis and computer simulations pioneered at Harvard 
anticipated the interdisciplinary approach that today dominates watershed 
planning…The papers and discussion in the Harvard seminar directly led to the 
publication of Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating 
Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning (Maass et 
al., 1962). Professors and students shared in writing the chapters. The topics included 
mathematical models, computer simulations, economic concepts and evaluation, the 
political process, and operating procedures for water systems. The book remains a 
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landmark in the attempt to integrate social science and engineering variables to 
develop the optimal water resources system. [Reuss, 2003, p.358]  
Other important intellectual forces that added to the economic analysis of WRM during this 
era were Resources for the Future and the RAND Corporation. These and other academic 
contributions and controversies from the economic perspective are recounted by Boland and 
Baumman (2009) in “Evolution of Economic Analysis through a Historical Lens.”  
1.4.3 Emergence of water governance under IWRM 
Another important event on the international stage that facilitated the spread and uptake of 
IWRM was the emergence of the global environmental governance concept [Johal and Ulph, 
2002; WRI, 2003].  This thesis focuses on water governance, but the concept of water 
governance does not exist in a vacuum.  Rather, it fits into a larger international movement 
for environmental governance.  Consequently, environmental and water issues started to be 
discussed internationally as idealized global strategies for decades to come. 
In practice, water governance remains a difficult concept to define and implement because 
problems are poorly defined and multi-layer in nature, and decision-making roles are fluid 
and involve multiple stakeholders.  Yet we see that prior to the emergence of water 
governance, most natural resource management analysts assumed the existence of a single 
decision maker [Mendoza and Martins, 2006].  Traditional methods for decision-making 
were criticized for their lack of flexibility to deal with the challenges that new and diverse 
participants brought to the decision-making process.  The assumptions in traditional 
(computer) modeling limited its application to situations in which problems were well 
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defined, involving organizational structures in which participants had a defined role and 
where perspectives, and priorities were not widely divergent [Churchman, 1967; Ackoff, 
1979; Checkland, 1983; Rosenhead, 2006; Mingers, 2009].  As the principles of IWRM gain 
traction at all levels of the water dialogue, a better understanding of water governance is 
needed.  The frequent attempt to depoliticize water problems and gloss over water 
governance has real implications for how water is allocated.  
1.5 Contribution 
This research explores the relationship between computer models, stakeholder participation, 
and adaptive governance within water resource institutions. “IWRM, the centerpiece of 
world debate on water policy, cannot be achieved without participatory processes” [Priscoli, 
2004, p.226].  Yet IWRM defines participation in vague terms, leaving it open to 
interpretation. This research aims to strengthen adaptive governance capacities within 
institutions adopting the IWRM paradigm by finding effective ways to engage the public in a 
collaborative modeling process.  
IWRM can seem like an elusive concept, but Brazil’s water reform and current drought 
experience provides concrete evidence of the different ways that participation can take place 
in the deliberation process. This evidence highlights the importance of stakeholder inclusion 
in model building and understanding of technical knowledge.  How interactions are 
orchestrated makes a significant difference. This work, and the analysis of case studies 
therein, is particularly relevant as countries who have turned to the IWRM framework 
scramble to figure out how to include a diverse set of actors in the deliberation process.   
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At the core of this study are questions of how and when computer models support decision 
making; how scientific knowledge gets incorporated into policy (if it does at all); and 
whether meaningful participation can strengthen the modeling, decision, and institutional 
building process.  Conventional wisdom holds that models are relevant to decision making 
because better information leads to better decisions.  However, the relationship of models to 
a technically informed public is not straightforward, and the rules of engagement (who, 
when, why, how) make a significant difference in whether information gets used to 
democratize or insulate decisions in the policy processes. Chapter 2 on participatory models 
and their interdisciplinary nature shows mechanisms to improve the role of models in 
stakeholder engagement.  The case study presented in Chapters 3 and 4 elucidates the 
institutional and socio-political realities that are important drivers in water management 
decisions, but are often glossed over within the IWRM technical discourse.   
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 AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR PARTICIPATORY MODELING 




A fundamental challenge in natural resource management is the integration of both technical 
information and effective public participation, a key component in democratic decision-
making [NRC, 2008].  While it is generally accepted that technical knowledge can lead to 
more informed and effective decisions, empirical studies also show that the “difference 
between democratization and insulation rests on the rules of engagement of stakeholders and 
the practices regarding the availability and accessibility of knowledge” [Lemos, 2008, p.253].  
The empirical evidence highlights the need to improve practices for engaging stakeholders 
and using scientific and technical information in democratic processes that support open 
debates about alternatives.  This chapter discusses the role of computer models in addressing 
these challenges.  
 
In the US, public participation in Water Resources Management (WRM) dates to the 1920s 
[Creighton and Langsdale, 2009].  In the second half of the twentieth century, decentralized 
and participatory management increased when project funding responsibilities shifted to state 
and local governments [Priscoli, 1989, 2004].  At the same time, the US’s landmark 
environmental laws greatly expanded the rights of citizens to participate in public decision-
                                                 
9 An abridged version of this chapter has been accepted to the Journal of Water Resource Research, Falconi, 
S.M., and Palmer, R.N. (2017).  Falconi wrote initial and revised drafts of the paper and of this present chapter. 
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making [Davis et al., 1975; Ertel and Koch, 1976; Ertel, 1979].  These important laws and 
regulations included the National Environmental Protection Act (1969), the Federal Clean 
Water Act (1972), the Endangered Species Act (1973), and a policy document, Principles and 
Standards for Planning (1973).  Increased public participation resulted in conflicts and public 
interest lawsuits that eventually prompted federal agencies to invest in alternative dispute 
resolution techniques to improve stakeholder involvement.  
 
Efforts to secure stakeholder involvement are not limited to the United States.  Emphasis on 
stakeholder participation is a prominent feature of the European Water Framework Directive 
[Commission of the European Communities, 2000], as well as in the international discourse 
on water policy known as Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) [UN-Water, 
2008].  Moreover, the guiding tenets of the Dublin Principles on Water and Sustainable 
Development, which served as the basis for Agenda 21 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 
1992, placed participation at the center of discussions on environmental management [UN 
1992; Jønch-Clausen, 2004].  IWRM emerged as the dominant paradigm for managing water 
worldwide through the democratization of water management. It emphasizes three pillars:  
efficiency, sustainability, and equity [UN-Water, 2008; Mukhtarov, 2009].  The Global Water 
Partnership echoed the USA’s Principles and Standards for Planning (1973) when it defined 
IWRM as “a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of 
water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social 
welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.”  
As interest in IWRM has grown, the question of how to best engage stakeholders to improve 
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adaptive management and institutional capacity remains [Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006; Medema 
et al., 2008].  
 
The field of participatory modeling (PM) emerged from the need to integrate stakeholder 
engagement in an open and transparent discussion facilitated by structured processes that 
address the needs and objectives of collaborative decision-making [Dreyer and Renn, 2011].  
Different disciplines have coined varying names for PM, and their various origins suggest 
important differences in their approach.  For example, integrated assessment professionals 
use the term “participatory modeling,” while the system dynamics community refers to 
“group model building” or “collaborative modeling” processes.  The operations research 
disciplines use the term “decision support systems” for interactive models that may be used 
for stakeholder engagement [Loucks et al., 1985; Vennix et al., 1999; Van Asselt and 
Rotmans, 2002; Stave, 2003; Cockerill et al., 2006; Langsdale et al., 2009] and “shared 
vision planning” when planning is combined with stakeholder involvement [Palmer et al., 
2013].  Regardless of what it is called, the defining feature of PM is that it engages 
participants in the development of a computer model that facilitates some aspect of 
collaborative dialogue and negotiations in environmental and water resource management 
[Bourget, 2011]. 
 
This chapter identifies mechanisms to improve the effectiveness of such models in 
participatory efforts.  The unique contribution of this chapter is a two-stage analysis 
framework derived from five empirical case studies.  This framework first characterizes the 
five dimensions of participation (stage 1) and then evaluates participatory models based on 
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the concept of “boundary objects” (stage 2).  Boundary objects are defined as translation 
devices at the interface of different organizations or groups that can act as bridges to 
facilitate mutual understanding and cooperation [Huvila et al., 2014].   In the case of 
participatory modeling, the boundary object is the computer model that is constructed during 
the participatory process, and which ideally wins the trust of stakeholders from many 
different backgrounds.  The goal of our analysis framework is not to evaluate the outcome(s) 
of participatory modeling, nor is it to identify the characteristics of the “best” models and 
modeling approaches in a participatory context. Instead, our objective is to propose and 
categorize common mechanisms that promote model effectiveness across a wide range of 
participatory decision-making contexts, forms of participation, and types of computer 
models. Mechanisms are combinations of activities, processes, and characteristics that 
together form the means by which intermediate outcomes come about. These concepts will 
be developed in greater depth over the course of this chapter.  We argue that a structured 
vocabulary and a multi-dimensional, interdisciplinary evaluation framework can improve 
both the design and the documentation of participatory models in water resources conflicts. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 outlines challenges in evaluating 
participatory models and reviews evaluation methods; Section 2.3 provides a motivation for 
the proposed framework; Section 2.4 outlines stage one of our framework and characterizes 
the five dimensions of participation as they relate to models; Section 2.5 presents the concept 
of models as boundary objects, describes characteristics of effective PM, and lays out 
corresponding criteria for stage two of the evaluation framework; Section 2.6 uses the two-
stage process to evaluate five case studies; Section 2.7 provides lessons from the case studies 
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and evaluation framework; Section 2.8 summarizes and concludes the analysis on 
participation in WRM. 
 
2.2  Evaluating participatory models  
2.2.1 Challenges 
The combination of public participation and models presents several challenges for the 
evaluation of PM efforts.  WRM problems have often been referred to as “wicked,” given 
their tendency to present unclear problem statements, diverse stakeholders, contentious 
and/or multiple objectives, and negotiated solutions [Rittel and Webber, 1973; Liebman, 
1976; Pidd, 1999; Xiang, 2013].  Indeed, the complexity of WRM requires the 
interdisciplinary critical thinking and problem-solving skills that have been identified as 
necessary to address other environmental problems [Wolman, 1977].   
 
Thirty years ago, in a landmark paper, Rogers and Fiering [1986] presented an analysis of the 
infrequent application of systems models in government and real-world projects, concluding 
that “models are not usually concerned with what decision-makers care about” [Rogers and 
Fiering, 1986, p.149].  They argued for more practical models with greater flexibility in both 
assumptions and applications.  Their assessment remains relevant today. Several studies have 
tried to evaluate the benefits of participation and the benefits of using models in participatory 
efforts.  However, designing an evaluation process has proved difficult, as real water 
conflicts have uncontrollable variables and do not allow a “with” and “without” model 
comparison, so determining the effectiveness of participatory models requires careful 
interpretation of model use in past decision-making efforts.  Furthermore, as mentioned 
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previously, a plurality of participatory modeling approaches are used across different 
disciplines.  This diversity of existing approaches to participatory modeling complicates both 
evaluation of individual models and comparative evaluations that may help advance the field 
of PM.  Previous evaluations of participatory models have emphasized the assessment of 
processes, intermediate outcomes, and resources outcomes.  The distinction between these 
three stages is presented below. 
 
Creighton & Langsdale [2009] review twenty-one water supply and drought case studies for 
efficacy and identify PM characteristics that are critical to the participation process.  They 
recognize the limitations of documented case studies and recommend future research on how 
the level and method of stakeholder involvement affect:  1) the credibility and adequacy of 
the computer model, 2) the political acceptance of the recommendations, and 3) the 
stakeholders’ ability to participate in the model building exercise.   
 
Michaud [2009] provides methods for analysts to evaluate outcomes of PM efforts based on 
participant interviews and surveys. Michaud’s evaluation method relies on the similarity of 
the comparative case studies, but his conclusions do not provide a structure for characterizing 
the purpose or nature of the participatory effort.  
  
Carr et al. [2012] provide an extensive evaluation of participation (without models) in 
natural resource management assessments, in which they classify processes, intermediate 
outcomes, and resource management outcomes.  We discuss these classifications in more 
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detail in the following subsections, since their distinctions are critical in building our 
evaluation framework. 
 
2.2.2 Process  
Process in this case refers to the series of actions or events (e.g., ground rules, representation, 
deadlines, access to information) that lead to a given outcome, but the process is not the 
outcome itself.  Hence, participatory process evaluations focus on how participation was 
conducted in terms of factors like participant accountability, agenda, facilitation, and clear 
ground rules, under the assumption that processes that do well on those factors are more 
likely to yield good outcomes.  Past studies have proposed several instruments for evaluating 
processes, most notably surveys, interviews, questionnaires, and performance measures.   
 
2.2.3 Resource management outcomes evaluations 
Outcomes evaluations gauge how well the ultimate objective was achieved.  They are 
retrospective in nature.  Carr et al. [2012] offer five examples of ultimate outcomes, as well 
as evaluation criteria for each.  These outcomes include ecological and economic 
improvement, human health outcomes, implementation of plans, and reduced conflict. 
 
Evaluations based on resource management outcomes can be more challenging and more 
limited than evaluations based on process or on intermediate outcomes for several reasons. 
First, there is usually no control against which to measure the results (e.g., drought, 
environmental damage).  Second, criteria for assessment are often narrowly defined, and may 
therefore miss other important impacts. Finally, a number of uncontrollable factors external 
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to the participatory process could influence ultimate outcomes (e.g., changes in regulatory or 
political climate).  Ultimate outcomes are not limited to those from the five-point typology of 
Carr et al. [2012]: they also include decisions/actions taken with regards to resource 
management.  In the long-term, ultimate outcomes can also include such features as 
consistent recommendations or adaptive management capacities that resulted from the 
original participatory exercise.  
 
2.2.4 Intermediate outcomes  
Intermediate outcomes are the incremental benefits of participation, often unplanned, that can 
build trust, communication, networks, agreements, institutional capacity, and other intangible 
outcomes.  For the purposes of our study, intermediate outcomes are arguably the most 
interesting, since they are directly indicative of the participatory process and are more 
accessible and readily documented than resource management outcomes.  Carr et al. [2012] 
provide intermediate outcome examples such as: agreements, network development, shared 
knowledge and end to stalemate.  They argue that while these are often overlooked because 
their benefits may be hard to measure, intermediate outcomes should still play a more 
significant evaluative role because their benefits are short- or medium-term and become 
visible before ultimate outcomes.  
 
Taken together, Creighton and Langsdale [2009], Michaud [2009], and Carr et al., [2012] 
provide evidence of the value of intermediate outcomes and the need to look beyond ultimate 
outcomes when evaluating participatory modeling efforts.  These studies demonstrate the 
need to evaluate PM despite the diversity in PM approaches, the wide range of goals of PM, 
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and other inherent challenges mentioned above.  In response, we propose PM evaluation 
criteria based on process mechanisms and on their relation to intermediate outcomes.  These 
criteria are outlined in Section 2.5. 
 
2.3 Motivation and contributions 
Public participation, an inherently social concept, has been interpreted inconsistently within 
IWRM [Conca, 2006; Abers and Keck, 2013]. As democratization and public participation 
brought new actors to the negotiating table, new modeling tools and methods were required 
to incorporate diverse knowledge and perspectives into the mathematical language and 
formal logic of models [Palmer et al., 2013].  The disciplinary differences and the variety of 
participatory contexts in which models are applied posed specific challenges in creating 
systematic evaluations.  As a result, evaluation of these models cannot be based on a single 
disciplinary metric. 
 
The novel contribution of the proposed two-stage evaluation framework is three-fold.  First, 
the framework is uniquely designed to incorporate the technical and social nature of PM, 
based on a five-dimensional characterization of participation (stage 1) and on the concept of 
models as effective boundary objects (stage 2).  Second, the criteria we have developed 
extend beyond the existing process- and outcome-based evaluations to focus instead on 
mechanisms.  Consequently, mechanisms are the means by which models facilitate dialogue 
and resolution or the transformation between process instruments and desirable outcome.  
Third, the framework allows flexibility to evaluate a wide range of cases, even in studies 
where the stated objectives for participation are quite different in scope or discipline.  As 
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discussed in section 2.4.3, the goals of public participation can be diverse.  They may, for 
example, seek to establish priorities in funding, to solicit risk acceptance, or to actually 
empower participants in a negotiation process.  Our framework for evaluation of a 
participatory model is based on both the model itself and the model’s impact in the 
participatory context, without attempting to separate the “success” of the model from the 
“success” of public participation. 
 
2.4 Stage one: Dimensions of participation 
The National Resource Council [NRC, 2008] identified five dimensions of public 
participation in environmental decision-making: 
1. Who is involved? 
2. At what stage in the planning process are the participants involved? 
3. What is the degree and effort of involvement of the participants and the organizer? 
4. What extent of power and/or influence do the participants have in the decision 
process? 
5. What are the goals and purposes guiding the participation process? 
 
The following sections explore how to characterize each of these dimensions and their 
relationship to modeling (Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 2.1 Summary of Five Dimensions of Participation 
 
2.4.1 Dimensions 1 and 2: Identifying stakeholders and stages of participation 
Defining the appropriate participants in public decision process is often challenging and 
rarely straightforward.  The goals of participation (see Section 2.4.3) typically suggest which 
participants are essential if these goals are to be met (e.g., technical experts, civil society, 
interest groups).  For example, gaining political acceptance requires engaging diverse groups 
that may need to reach consensus.  Public participation is an iterative process that can take 
significant commitment and effort from everyone involved.  Organizing public meetings at 
the initial stages of the planning process is effective in identifying appropriate stakeholders.  
However, analysts must be aware that stakeholder inclusion or exclusion may foster 
sociopolitical polarization that can affect the long-term impacts and success of the planning 
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There is no definitive prescription for identifying and engaging stakeholders because those 
selections depend on the problem at hand.  However, suggested methods exist to aid in 
balancing between inclusiveness and maintaining effective group size.  Grimble and Wellard 
[1997] and Colfer et al. [1999] suggest methods for formally identifying, selecting, and 
engaging appropriate stakeholders.  Herath [2004] provides a systematic stakeholder 
selection process through focus groups and demographic analysis combined with a snowball 
effect where early stakeholders suggest the subsequent stakeholders.  
 
The timing of stakeholder and decision-maker engagement must also be defined.  Simple 
classifications (such as a priori, during, and a posteriori participation) have been suggested 
[Mendoza and Martins, 2006], along with more detailed classifications based on the five 
stages of participatory model development [Hare, 2011]:  
1) Data collection—collect or provide existing data on the system 
2) Model definition—individual engagement (e.g., structured and unstructured interviews) or 
collective engagement (e.g., cognitive mapping exercises) to identify important 
components of the system to be modeled.  
3) Model building and construction—use of causal diagrams or influence diagrams during 
group model exercises that are then used in the model building process. 
4) Model verification and validation—engage in the verification and/or validation of the 
model’s content or results. This can be done through questionnaires or focus groups. 
5) Model application—make use of the model in a structured manner such as direct use, 
role-playing games, use-by-demand, etc.    
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In practice, PM stages such as the five described by Hare [2011] are often combined or 
blurred.  In the literature, models are used to inform stakeholders about the system and the 
interactions between system components [Gilbert and Bankes, 2002; Barreteau et al., 2010].  
Models are also used as scenario-analysis tools for policymakers [Rajan and Shibasaki, 
2000; Verburg et al., 2004; Ligtenberg et al., 2009; Webler et al., 2011].  Occasionally 
participants are involved in all five stages, and researchers co-generate model inputs, 
structure, and results [Bousquet et al., 1998; Hare et al., 2003; Lynam et al., 2007].  The 
problem is that descriptions of model development in the literature frequently omit specifics 
about when stakeholders were engaged. Instead, researchers commonly use the term 
“participatory modeling” in a generic manner without clarifying when or how participation 
took place [for example see Vennix et al., 1999].   
 
2.4.2 Dimensions 3 and 4: Degree of involvement and extent of influence  
Degree of involvement and extent of influence are constructed scales of how participants’ 
engagement translates into influence on decisions. For example, Arnstein's ladder of 
participation [1969] ranks various forms of public participation on an eight-step ladder from 
least to most influential.  Other analogous continuums (e.g., formative participation and 
objective-driven participation) also measure engagement on constructed scales [Cornwall, 
2008].  Generally speaking, Arnstein's ladder and other scales rank the degree of involvement 
and the extent of influence of stakeholder participation.  However, these two factors are not 
easily separable, because the degree and effort of involvement by participants and organizers 
sometimes determines how much stakeholders influence decisions.   
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This research applies the International Association for Public Participation’s characterization 
of influence and involvement to discuss these dimensions.  These characteristics are deemed 
appropriate for this context, because the different levels of participation may be applied 
across different resource management problems since the characteristics relate to other 
constructed scales without ranking them (Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1 Levels of involvement and extent of influence in public participation (Adaptation 
from [International Association for Public Participation, 2005]) 
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In our review of over 55 studies, many lacked explicit statements on these participatory 
dimensions.  This omission is problematic given that greater involvement and influence in 
the decision process is precisely what makes stakeholders interested in participating.  Even 
though it is true that researchers do not always control how participants are involved or their 
influence on final decisions; it may be that a project’s timeframe is too short to observe 
involvement and influence.  None-the-less, researchers should report on the degree of 
involvement and extent of influence to the best of their abilities.  Stating explicit targets for 
the stakeholder engagement process will both facilitate studies’ (self) assessment and help 
study organizers set clear expectations for all participants.  The degree of involvement and 
extent of influence (Table 2.1) are different from the purpose of participation, which is 
presented next. 
 
2.4.3 Dimension 5: Goal and purpose of participatory modeling 
The main goals or purposes of public participation in modeling can range from simply 
informing stakeholders to supporting meaningful dialogue that drives the decision-making 
process.  Objectives are also influenced by the unique context of each case.  Models cannot 
be expected to support processes for which they are not designed; hence, each case should be 
evaluated relative to its stated purpose.  Empirical PM studies show the importance of 
creating an initial clear purpose, because poorly designed approaches can result in actions 
that address contradictory objectives [Dreyer and Renn, 2011].   
 
Renn [2008] notes that participatory objectives are not consistent among different disciplines 
and that “conflicts about the best structure of a participatory process arise from overt or latent 
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adherence to one or another concept [or approach]” [2008, p.144].  An anthropologist, 
economist, sociologist, and/or engineer may have different perspectives on the central 
objectives and whether they are outcome- or process-driven objectives.  For example, in a 
functionalist economic and engineering approach, the main evaluation criterion is often an 
improved outcome, such as better water quality.  In contrast, in a process-based, 
anthropological approach, the main objective under evaluation might be an increase in 
participant diversity, dissemination of empowering knowledge, or improved options for the 
less privileged.  (These might be ends in and of themselves, or they may be believed to be 
valuable because they contribute to improved ultimate outcomes.)  Renn’s [2008] analysis 
provides significant insight into the disciplinary and theoretical underpinnings of: 1) how 
problems are formulated, 2) who is considered an important stakeholder, and 3) what the 
objectives and rationales for participation are. These disciplinary perspectives and 
methodological paradigms impact the objectives of PM.  Ultimately a “researcher’s 
perception predetermines which problems are perceived, how they are perceived, and 
approaches towards the research” [Prell et al., 2007].  Since disciplinary perspectives impact 
problem definition, “the choice of a modeling paradigm might result in the exclusion of 
many relevant bodies of learning” [Hisschemöller et al., 2001].  The diverse motivations of 
different disciplines generate a wide range of participatory efforts which, as stated before, 
makes it difficult to design standard evaluation criteria for participatory models.  
 
2.5 Stage two: Mechanisms for participatory success 
2.5.1 Models as boundary objects 
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As introduced in Section 2.1 boundary objects are translation devices that sit at the interface 
of different organizations or groups and act as bridges to facilitate mutual understanding and 
cooperation [Huvila et al., 2014].  Boundary objects were first proposed by Star and 
Griesemer [1989] to address the “central tension in science between divergent viewpoints 
and the need for generalizable findings” and to provide bridges for cooperation by essentially 
translating different worldviews among scientists [1989, p.387].  Maps are often cited as a 
boundary object since they are easily recognized, and yet convey concrete information (e.g., 
local fauna, rivers, landmarks) that can enhance communication and facilitate cogeneration 
of new knowledge [Star and Griesemer, 1989; Cash et al., 2003].  Other examples of 
boundary objects in a collaborative resource management context include spreadsheets and 
diagrams that allow participants to identify facts and modify seemingly disparate concepts 
into agreed upon positions [Fuller, 2009]. 
 
We analyze models as boundary objects in order to identify and evaluate mechanisms by 
which models can enable participants to converge on an understanding, a vision or a 
management strategy in water management conflicts.  Previous research on boundary objects 
establishes their role in helping users to 1) establish a shared syntax or language; 2) identify 
differences, concerns, and relationships clearly; and 3) transform current collective 
knowledge into agreed-upon facts through discussion, negotiation, and careful scrutiny of 
what users know [Star and Griesemer, 1989; Carlile, 2002].  Previous research has shown 
that boundary objects employ diverse types of knowledge in problem solving [Star, 1989], in 
innovation [Carlile, 2002], in cooperation and consensus building [Fuller, 2009], and in 
collective solutions to environmental problems [Bacic et al., 2006].  When applied to 
 37 
sustainability sciences, Cash et al. [2003] describe boundary objects as bridges between 
diverse groups and bodies of knowledge.  
 
2.5.2 Attributes of successful participatory models 
In this chapter, criteria are derived from boundary objects research and applied to illustrate a 
novel approach to the evaluation of participatory models.  Table 2.2 summarizes these three 
criteria.  Based on research in the sustainability sciences, Cash et al. [2003] provide three 
metrics of success for boundary objects in public policy, these reflect the boundary objects’ 
ability to convey scientific knowledge: 1) credibility, 2) salience, and 3) legitimacy.  While 
these metrics are derived from characteristics described by Cash et al. [2002, 2003], these 
ideas are also present in the list of intermediate outcomes (referenced as “products of 
process”) given by Carr et al. [2012].  In the present study, we expand these characteristics 
into actual criteria.  Each is addressed in the subcategories of metrics that we developed (see 
below) based on extensive reading of other case studies and their relative success.   
 
Mechanisms are related to intermediate outcomes: they are the means by which those 
intermediate outcomes occur.  Here they are defined as a combination of activities that 
interact to move a situation from one state to another, in this case, to achieve the desired 
attributes of credibility, salience, and legitimacy.  The mechanisms presented are not 
intended to be an exhaustive list, but are provided as a descriptive guide.  Each criterion is 
described and justified below, and the five metrics are used to gauge the success of a case 
study in meeting each criterion.  
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C1 Identifies knowledge gaps, crucial issues, and discrepancies in problem understanding 
C2 Builds shared understanding of facts and language as the starting point for discussions 
C3 Uses data/information derived from trusted sources 
C4 Provides means for stakeholder inclusion in relevant dialogues 
C5 Promotes communication, enhanced credibility and accountability of 
information, and bridges gaps in new perspectives 





S1 Builds effective and frequent communication channels in a two-way dialogue  
S2 Translates information and technology results to address end-user needs 
S3 Incorporates diverse knowledge from a range of users 
S4 Results in a single-text document as an agreement on a set of facts and a platform for co-production  
S5 Helps link relevant questions to end users to answers model can accurately provide 







L1 Provides open and transparent criteria for decisions and rules of conduct 
L2 Allows real-time criticisms, feedback and update mechanisms 
L3 Accommodates new information/preferences through model flexibility and acts as educational tool to users  
L4 Analyzes alternative scenarios to create a collaborative environment and converge on solutions 
L5 Elucidates decision process through forum, provides insights rather than "optimal" solutions 
 
The concept of credibility [Cash et al., 2002] is related to the quality of information.  Here 
we develop the idea of credibility specifically for models in the context of PM.  A model that 
fails to capture a system with an appropriate level of accuracy, precision, unambiguity, 
completeness, and complexity will be judged to be less credible.  Discussing a model’s 
credibility will uncover knowledge gaps, identify crucial issues, and reveal any discrepancies 
in the way stakeholders have defined a particular problem.  A model’s credibility is based on 
its contents being derived from trusted sources.  If judged to be credible, models can provide 
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participants with a common language for detailed discussions of the system under study, 
enhance and deepen stakeholders’ dialogue, and encourage identification of which 
information is considered reliable and which is less reliable.  We synthesize these 
considerations into five novel metrics to assess the mechanism for improving the credibility 
of computer models in participatory process (see Table 2.2, C1-C5).  
 
The concept of salience [Cash et al., 2002] is related to the relevance of information – in this 
context, information that is provided by a model – to the needs of stakeholders and decision 
makers.  In the context of PM, we assert that a model is salient when co-production between 
stakeholders and analysts allows stakeholders to use the model to improve their 
understanding of the system and articulate the questions they want the model to answer.  
Salient models build effective and frequent communication channels between the 
stakeholders and allow diverse user to interact.  A salient model ideally provides a platform 
where information can be co-produced by stakeholders and model builders, so that the model 
becomes a repository for agreed-upon facts, described as a “single-text negotiation 
document” [Bourget, 2011].  Based on our analysis of salience in the context of PM, we 
propose five novel metrics to assess mechanisms for increasing saliency of models (see Table 
2.2, S1-S5). 
 
The concept of legitimacy [Cash et al., 2002] involves participants’ trust in the neutrality of 
information, organizations, and/or processes.  Translating the concept into the context of 
models used in participatory exercises, legitimacy involves participants’ trust in the neutrality 
of model outputs.  A legitimate model must be fair in its treatment of stakeholders’ opposing 
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views and divergent values, and unbiased in its representation of preferences and interests.  
Legitimate models provide transparent and clear assumptions.  Such models are highly 
flexible, allowing for real-time changes and feedback, and can easily change assumptions and 
algorithms.  Legitimate models are capable of serving as educational tools for stakeholders 
and policy makers because they were co-generated with analysts and not constructed in 
isolation.  They also generate insights such as new understanding of the system, not just 
answers.  Lack of confidence in a model by participants is not uncommon until participants 
can see the potential and value of models as analytical tools.  Confidence in a model comes 
from understanding the process and confirming outputs with intuition or past experience 
rather than what may seem “magical answers.”  We propose five novel metrics to assess the 
mechanisms for improving legitimacy of models (see Table 2.2, L1-L5). 
 
By establishing fifteen metrics, stage two of our framework transforms the previously 
identified characteristics of credibility, saliency, and legitimacy into three evaluation criteria 
that may be used to capture “success.”  Success is judged by how well a model increases 
understanding across disciplines, enables two-way dialogue, enhances legitimacy of 
decisions, and builds cooperation in its various forms (e.g., consensus, shared vision, end to 
stalemate). These are components important in building trust, a key factor in institutional 
cooperation and governance in the Common Pool Resource10 literature [Ostrom, 1999].  
 
2.6 Case studies  
                                                 
10 Common Pool Resources in economics are goods (often natural resources) that benefit a group of people but 
cannot totally exclude beneficiaries. They provide diminishing benefit if each individual seeks his or her own 
self-interest. As a result, common pool resources are different from public and exclusionary goods.   
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2.6.1 Methods and case selection 
Evidence from case studies has several advantages given the depth of insights it provides on 
the underlying drivers, even though broad conclusions are limited by the small sample size of 
comparative studies [Srinivasan et al., 2012].  The five cases that follow are not intended to 
be representative of all participatory model types; the focus is limited to well-recognized, 
structured, quantitative models within systems analysis methods [Rogers, 1978; Rogers and 
Fiering, 1986].  Of the 55 cases reviewed from the literature, the following selection criteria 
were applied to choose cases to analyze:  
1) Case studies needed to have at least one peer-reviewed research paper published 
(though, supplementary material could be published, gray literature, internal working 
papers, or personal communication with authors);  
2) Preference was given to real planning studies based on realistic scenarios that made 
use of a computer model;  
3) The set of cases for analysis showed one study representing each of the five degrees 
of involvement (inform, consult, involve, collaborate, empower),  
4) Case studies needed to document stakeholder involvement in enough detail,11 with 
reporting that was not limited to model outputs.   
The five case studies analyzed met the selection criteria and had a breadth of modeling 
approaches and diversity in participatory context (geographical setting, stakeholder group 
size, problem setting, institutional structures, cultural context) that revealed wide variation in 
the effects we expected to observe among PM approaches.  
                                                 
11 Appendix A provides a spectrum on the “Rigor of Evidence” we used to assess the methods presented by the 
authors to substantiate their claims.  Each case is assessed so that the reader can understand the rigor and 
limitations of the evidence provided. 
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The discussion of each case study is organized as follows:  First, we present background for 
each case study and a description of the participatory dimensions and model characteristics.  
Then, we evaluate the relative merits of each model and the summary of the two-stage 
evaluation based on the evidence provided. 
 
2.6.2 Limitations of the methodology based upon published case studies 
This study assumes, as per the premise of IWRM and the laws and regulations identified in 
Section 2, that inclusive participation is beneficial and desired in resource management.  
However, while there is no conclusive evidence against participation to suggest outcomes are 
worse because of it, there is ongoing debate on the value and capacity of participation in 
resource management [Lubell, 2004; Koontz and Thomas, 2006; Muro and Jeffrey, 2008; 
Reed, 2008].  
 
Our analysis is based on studies published in peer-reviewed journals and on the evidence and 
assertions presented by the authors.  This introduces a bias towards cases that are published, 
which may be both more likely to have been successful and less likely to present applications 
of this sort of modeling to real-world decision-making since applied work often goes 
unpublished.  Moreover, a dependence on reports of existing studies also reproduces any 
biases that may be present in the information as reported by the publication’s authors, 
including those authors’ own biases of experience and interpretation.  There are obviously 
incentives to burnish the description of methods and outcomes so as to increase the 
likelihood of publication and citation; unfortunately, without an objective, third-party 
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evaluation of the process, it is impossible to determine whether the authors resisted those 
temptations.  Published cases are also written from one point of view, which may or may not 
reflect the opinions of participants.  For example, authors’ optimistic perspectives on the 
benefits of participation can influence reporting [Carr et al., 2012].  
 
For most of the case studies, with some exceptions noted in the next paragraph, the 
conclusions drawn about each case study’s participatory dimensions, model effectiveness, 
and study merit and shortfalls are based upon our interpretation of the authors’ self-reports.  
Most authors did not provide any documentation of surveys or other evaluation instruments 
administered by them or third parties to the participants and clients of the study that would 
provide independent confirmation (to a lesser or greater degree) of their self-reports and 
assertions.  Thus, in most cases, we had no basis to confirm or contradict the authors’ 
statements upon which we base this assessment. 
 
Lastly, the papers documenting the case studies selected in this chapter were not prepared for 
the purpose of our analysis.  As a result, some information relevant to our evaluation may be 
missing or unavailable to us. We acknowledge that this limits our analysis and conclusions, 
but nonetheless there is a good deal of information from which it is possible to draw some 
conclusions with confidence.  Indeed, the lack of standardized data, documentation, and 
reporting practices concerning models used in PM is the basic motivation for this study.  
Conclusions are naturally limited to the three boundary object criteria we evaluated.  Despite 
these limitations, important documented evidence from published case studies provides 
valuable insights into the mechanisms for tackling real world resource problems [Srinivasan 
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et al., 2012].  As will be presented next, the proposed framework provides a consistent and 
flexible way to derive such insights from a wide variety of studies. 
 
To minimize, to the extent practicable, the above identified biases that result from relying on 
self-reports and incomplete publications, we searched for additional resources as available.  
Hence, in addition to the one published paper per case study, other evidence used for these 
assessments falls under three categories, not all of which were available for every study: 1) 
self-evaluations in separate papers (published or working papers), 2) third-party evaluations, 
and 3) direct contact with the authors.  Below we summarize the other evidence we were able 
to obtain for the five studies: 
1. The ACT-ACF case study has been the subject of a separate evaluation based on the 
authors’ experience and observations of the case [Leitman, 2008; Leitman and Kiker, 
2015].  
2. The authors of the Zimbabwe Forestry, Solomon Islands, and Senegal Delta case 
studies had conducted separate evaluations of their own work [Mendoza and Prabhu, 
2002; Hoverman et al., 2011; D’Aquino and Papazian, 2014].  The methods used will 
be noted in each case study.   
3. Authors of the Zimbabwe, Las Vegas, and ACT-ACF case studies were contacted for 
additional information and resources.  Through personal communication by e-mail, 
authors of the Zimbabwe and ACT-ACF case studies provided written documentation 
of additional reports or working papers that were not available online.  No additional 
information was available for the Las Vegas case study, and it was learned from the 
study author after repeated requests that no assessment had been done.     
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2.6.3 Community-based forest management in Zimbabwe 
2.6.3.1 Case background 
The first case study is a community-based, forest management study in the midlands of 
Zimbabwe. It combines participation with traditional optimization methods using multi-
criteria decision analysis (MCDA) techniques [Mendoza and Prabhu, 2005].  Although this 
is not a water resources study, it was chosen as one of the five case studies for this chapter 
because forestry shares many similarities with water resources in terms of common resources 
that require users’ cooperation.  
 
Organizers from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign held six meetings with district-
level government personnel from varied backgrounds who had at least ten years of 
knowledge of the problem. The researchers led the problem-structuring phase (preference 
and value elicitation) using cognitive mapping and influence diagrams and the problem-
solving phase using MCDA prioritization techniques.  The model was not a physical 
representation of the forest (e.g., tree growth rates) but of the management factors and 
strategies influencing total revenue.    
 
MCDA was used to obtain diverse participant knowledge, to elicit participant preferences, 
and to aggregate individual choices to evaluate, prioritize, and aggregate the indicators 
identified by participants.  Soft-systems methods involved the Collaborative Vision 
Exploration Workbench (Co-View) software that involves a simulation framework for 
integrating objectives and other components of strategic planning, mainly indicators of 
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT).  Co-View allowed for a 
scenario-based analysis of the problem, giving participants an appreciation for the model’s 
potential as an analytical tool to compare various policies.  The authors claimed that 
participants developed a level of trust for the model, perceiving it as a transparent tool 
capable of “generating insights rather than magical answers” [Mendoza and Prabhu, 2005].   
 
2.6.3.2 Participatory dimensions and effective model characteristics 
According to the authors, the purpose of the participatory model was to create transparency 
within participatory processes as a means to build trust, confidence, and integrity in the 
planning process.  More specifically, transparency and trust came from a model built with 
stakeholders to evaluate openly the cumulative impact of proposed management action plans.  
Mendoza and Prabhu led the organizing team.  The core participants were six district-level 
government personnel, including two district foresters, one agricultural extension officer, one 
social scientist, and an expert on gender issues who was also a provincial officer.  
 
Participants were engaged in three stages: model formulation and structuring, model 
building, and model use.  Participants identified problems, prioritized preferences using 
MCDA techniques, and quantified process indicators via SWOT.  The degree of involvement 
was moderate but the level of influence was to “consult” based on the typology described in 
Table 2.1.  The MCDA was used to involve participants’ diverse contributions, elicit 
preferences, and aggregate individual choices. However, absent any statement as to its role – 
if any – in actual management decisions, the end result is unclear.  
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In building credibility, the analyst began engagement with a free-thinking exercise on 
cognitive mapping to get stakeholders to frame the problem in terms relevant to them. The 
group then used the model to narrow the scope.  The model allowed participants to iteratively 
test and discuss how each management plan met agreed-upon purposes and specific goals.  
The iterative process had two positive effects that improved the model’s saliency.  First, it 
clarified ideas and helped focus the debate.  Second, model runs generated rapport as 
participants gained appreciation for the trade-offs between goal optimization and costs of 
executing plans.  The low and medium scores were given because despite the title—which 
proposes a “community-based forest management” – all the stakeholders were government 
personnel. Consequently, stakeholder inclusion and diverse knowledge, among other criteria, 
are rated Medium or Low to reflect the limited reach of the participatory process.  
 
The model served as an organizing platform where ideas, opinions, and divergent views were 
debated and validated by those participating so that the exchange of ideas was mutual and 
instructive.  The plans designed in a collaborative environment proved central to 
strengthening legitimacy.  The participants recognized the benefits and value of the model’s 
‘what-if’ and ‘if-then’ features for analyzing policies, because they allowed them to develop 
a realistic and insightful perspective that built their trust in the model.  Scores and evidence 
for this case study are listed in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3 Score on criteria for Zimbabwe community-based forest management case study 
Criteria Score Evidence 
C1 High Authors' assertion  
C2 High Article provides evidence 
 48 
C3 Med Authors' assertion but limited 
C4 Med Implied, not stated 
C5 Med Authors' assertion  
   S1 High Authors' assertion and some evidence 
S2 Med Authors' assertion but implied to be limited 
S3 Low Article provides evidence  
S4 High Article provides evidence 
S5 Med Supplemental material  
   L1 High Authors' assertion  
L2 High Supplemental material  
L3 High Authors' assertion  
L4 High Article provides evidence 
L5 High Authors' assertion 
 
2.6.3.3 Evaluation of relative merits and shortfalls of PM effort 
Acknowledging the multiple objectives in resource management, this case used MCDA to 
encourage a systematic arrangement of criteria and decisions by organizing priorities and 
evaluating the multiple objectives.  MCDA quantified each element that influenced the 
decisions, and generated insight into desirable and undesirable strategies and action plans.  
 
The case study avoided two common pitfalls to optimization, at least partially.  First, a 
common criticism of optimization is that the ‘best’ optimal solution is determined by an 
analytical structure that may not fully capture the complexity of the actual problem under 
investigation.  Second, optimization models can be particularly compatible with problems 
dominated by economic objectives and the assumptions of rational choice theory 
[Hisschemöller et al., 2001; Rogers et al., 2009].  The authors, hence, adapted the 
optimization model to prioritize and aggregate options but integrated the modeling process 
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with cognitive mapping to engage stakeholders early on during the problem-structuring 
phase, and elicited from the participants’ assessments qualitative and semi-quantitative 
indicators.     
 
These adaptations resulted in a mixed model that was useful for stakeholders’ purposes and 
interests since they had contributed to the assumptions of the modeling framework and the 
criteria by which action plans would be assessed.  During the Co-View simulations, decision 
elements demanded surrogate measures (i.e., quantifiable values) so that improved plans 
could be judged based on the final management goal of “increased total revenue.”  MCDA 
techniques were used to evaluate and eliminate bad choices.  That information was combined 
with the Co-View model that simulated how the chosen criteria affected the ultimate goal of 
“total revenue” for the community.  In this case, stakeholders chose to quantify revenue for 
community members and compare the model results with the on-the-ground reality – a 
situation of harvesting with little management that evoked the “tragedy of the commons.”  
The authors recognized that this revenue optimization was a simplification that made the 
analysis tractable and that using a strictly qualitative final indicator of success would have 
posed significant challenges.  Nevertheless, the integrated methods allowed participants to 
assess and gain insights into the plan strategies. In the end, with assistance from the model, 
participants understood the delicate balance between achieving an objective and its costs.   
 
The two-stage evaluation was limited given the insufficiency of the records characterizing 
this work.  The study authors were contacted for supplementary material.  They answered our 
questions and provided an additional working paper [Mendoza and Prabhu, 2002] reporting 
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on a valuation process they had carried out with 20 participants after the completion of the 
initial study.  Six core participants responded individually to a set of questions using what the 
authors refer to as a voting system.  Their answers were tallied to derive a hierarchy of 
preferences.  Based on the valuation and on direct contact with a larger group of participants, 
the authors were able to assert that the intended purpose of building trust through a 
transparent process had been achieved.  Authors also asserted that another observed 
advantage was the ability to introduce flexibility to balance analytical solutions with other 
important end-user concerns.  However, the documentation and available material lacked 
specificity about whether the model influenced any management decisions. 
  
2.6.4 Shared Vision Model for the water conflict in the ACT-ACF river basin  
2.6.4.1 Case background 
The Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa and Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACT-ACF) river 
basins made use of a Shared Vision Model (SVM) as part of a Shared Vision Planning (SVP) 
process to co-develop simulation models by representatives of federal and state government 
[Palmer, 1998].  To avoid a federal court lawsuit initiated by the state of Alabama over water 
allocations made by the state of Georgia, the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the 
states of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia adopted a Memorandum of Agreement to conduct a 
$13.5 million, six-year, comprehensive study.  A direct consequence of the Comprehensive 
Study, and its most notable legacy, was an interstate water compact ratified by the US 
Congress and signed into law by the governors of the three states and the US president.  
 
 51 
SVP includes three processes: 1) traditional water resources planning, 2) structured public 
participation, and 3) collaborative computer modeling [Bourget, 2011; Werick and Palmer, 
2011; Palmer et al., 2013].  The SVM was a systems dynamic model (SDM) built in 
STELLA that simulated a complex network of rivers and the services they provide, including 
navigation, flood control, environmental services, and Atlanta’s growing water demand from 
Lake Lanier.  Five models were developed and modified over time to improve 
communication and build rapport between the core participants and the research team.  The 
final model allowed the working group to evaluate and formulate new alternatives.  The 
model’s user interface was constructed to allow modification of control variables and 
parameters.  This feature gave participants freedom to formulate, evaluate, and refine 
alternatives, including combined operating features, which resulted in a new set of options 
not previously considered [Hamlet et al., 1996].  
 
2.6.4.2 Participatory dimensions and effective model characteristics 
The broad purpose of the study was to solve a multi-state/federal conflict over water 
management by identifying innovative reservoir operating policies that met the needs of the 
region.  More specific goals included:  1) create a catalog and repository for important data 
(hydrologic information, demand/supply data, etc.), 2) characterize the physical features of 
the basin, 3) document the system’s operating policies, 4) evaluate alternatives, 5) illustrate 
trade-offs between system objectives and seek compromise solutions, and 6) expand the 
number of people who understand the system’s operation.   
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The models were built by researchers from the University of Washington in consultation with 
representatives of the states of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, and the USACE Institute of 
Water Resources.  The core participants of the study were members of an Executive 
Coordinating Committee created for the long-term planning of the interstate watershed, 
composed of two representatives from each of the state governors and two representatives 
from the USACE. There was also a separate committee composing the Technical 
Coordination Group (TCG) composed of four members, one from each of the state agencies 
and the USACE.  
 
The study was originally commissioned to avoid a lawsuit between the study partners. A 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) was used in staying the lawsuit, and the participants 
were engaged in all five stages of participation as part of the MOU.  This meant that from 
the problem definition, to data gathering during model construction, to running simulations 
for model validation, participants were actively engaged in attempting to reach an agreement. 
 
There was a high degree of involvement by participants, categorized as collaborative.  
Initially, the TCG defined large scopes of the work but failed to agree on overarching 
measures of performance for reservoir operating rules and water allocation policies.  Over 
time, instead of formulating specific reservoir operations, they requested a more flexible 
SVM that could facilitate the analysis of new alternatives.  Participants had very high 
involvement in model building and could make recommendations, but their influence was 
low since final decisions were the purview of the governors and legislators.  
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The model was widely accepted as an accurate and credible representation of the system, but 
only after a series of tests to compare the reservoir levels and estimated flows.  Comparative 
tests were conducted between the STELLA model and the HEC5 model previously used.  
The STELLA model proved to be more accurate and better suited to account for multi-
reservoir operating rules.  The research team emphasized active participation, incorporating 
stakeholder critiques in new versions of the model.  This resulted in a SVM that was salient, 
and some members of the TCG became skilled in modifying the assumptions of the model in 
order to answer their questions.  
 
The model was widely recognized for its legitimacy among stakeholders.  These stakeholders 
included the primary management agencies and expert consulting agencies such as the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service and the Nature Conservancy (TNC).  Another example of the 
improved collaborative environment is TNC’s effort to develop metrics that supported the 
ranking of alternative reservoir operating policies making use of the SVM in partnership with 






Table 2.4 Score on criteria for ACT-ACF Tri-State water conflict case study 
Criteria Score Evidence 
C1 High Third Party Assessment 
C2 High Direct Communication 
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C3 High Article provides evidence 
C4 High Implied, not stated 
C5 High Third Party Assessment 
   S1 High Internal Report 
S2 High Third Party Assessment 
S3 Med Internal Report 
S4 High Compact signed 
S5 High Internal Report 
   L1 Med Third Party Assessment 
L2 High Internal Report 
L3 High Third Party Assessment 
L4 High Third Party Assessment 
L5 High Direct Communication 
 
2.6.4.3 Evaluation of relative merits and shortfalls of PM effort 
SDMs create platforms for enriching discussion between analysts and users based on visual 
interfaces that clarify the relationships among variables, alternative future scenarios, and the 
possible trade-offs.  Modern SDMs have evolved from the early 1960s when FORTRAN was 
the modeling language of choice, to object-oriented environments (e.g., STELLA, 
POWERSIM, VENSIM) and programming languages designed specifically for making 
dynamic simulations more accessible. Accessibility leads to significant consequences.  In this 
case, dynamic use of the model clarified that, contrary to widespread belief, increasing water 
use in Atlanta would not substantially reduce base flow to other major rivers (the Flint 
River).  While STELLA is object oriented, it does require basic programing skills.  Thus, the 
STELLA model was integrated with an easy-to-use Excel interface, which allowed 
stakeholders to participate in characterizing the problem and defining appropriate feedback 
loops while also tailoring model outputs through Excel.  
 55 
 
Much of the information for the ACT-ACF study was accessible through direct 
communication with the organizing team given my professional collaboration with Palmer 
and Werick.  The case was also the first of its kind in the southeastern United States, and it 
has been well documented [Wolf et al., 1999; Leitman, 2008]. The two-stage evaluation was 
based on our assessment of supplemental material and on personal communication with the 
authors.  It shows the SVM was not an effective boundary object for its intended long-term 
management purpose.  While the insights generated by the SVM built consensus, the process 
also managed to insulate the core participants from influencing decisions because their role 
was seen as advisory rather than decision-making.  The model was effective in achieving the 
more moderate research goals.  Despite some initial resistance, the SVM modeling platform 
contributed to improved dialogue as core participants engaged in repeated testing of 
hypotheses and virtual experimentation, making the SVM widely trusted.   To some extent, 
the SVM is still used today [Leitman, 2008; Leitman and Kiker, 2015].  Although 
participants joined to determine a common purpose, the effort did not anticipate that the 
interstate Compact would establish water allocation agreements outside the Comprehensive 
Study, effectively turning the core participants into mere advisors who were unable to decide 
or execute plans when key actors and political tides shifted.  
 
2.6.5 Water management alternatives in Las Vegas, Nevada 
2.6.5.1 Case background  
The third case study is the development of a model to evaluate alternatives to extend the life 
of the water supply for the city of Las Vegas [Stave, 2003].  The research team developed an 
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SDM to compare the relative merits of different policy options.  The SDM engaged 
participants and allowed them to re-evaluate the starting conditions or change their 
preferences in an open exploration of policy options.  During ten workshops the team tested 
the effectiveness of the SDM.  Different alternatives for water conservation (indoor/outdoor 
use, hotel use, etc.) were modeled, and, as the stakeholders gained confidence, they made 
suggestions on new hypotheses to test.  The results provided several insights counter to 
stakeholders’ intuitions.  For example, casino and hotel water use was not as significant as 
residential use, and small changes in per capita demand were as effective as large supply 
increases.  
2.6.5.2 Participatory dimensions and effective model characteristics 
The primary purpose of the model was to test the effectiveness of an SDM to support 
stakeholder learning and discussions but was not intended as a decision support tool.  During 
workshops, participants were engaged in evaluating the relative merits of extending the year 
in which demand would outstrip supply (denoted as the “crossing-point”) based on the given 
policy options available.   
 
The study organizers included researchers at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas in 
consultation with the Southern Nevada Water Authority and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.  
The core participants were recruited for research purposes and comprised 83 community 
members and residents who ranged widely in age and profession.  The author does not report 
the selection criteria for participants.  The stages of participation were compartmentalized.  
In the first two stages, experts provided data and defined the problem, but they did not take 
part in the subsequent workshops.  Then, participant groups were involved in model 
 57 
validation and analysis of acceptable policy options.  All ten workshops featured different 
participants each time.  
 
The degree of involvement and extent of influence in this case study were intentionally low.  
The degree of involvement falls in the inform category, given that the workshops were two-
day events that featured new attendees each time.  This is in contrast with other case studies 
presented, which attempted to maintain the same core participants throughout the duration of 
the study.  Participants were engaged in the later stages of the model’s use to learn about 
policies that changed future demand/supply outcomes.  The model thus served as a tool for 
communicating with the public, and the participants’ engagement was not intended to change 
any policy decisions.  
 
The model built credibility by providing a shared language and starting point for discussion.  
However, it was not inclusive because it did not reflect stakeholders’ engagement in problem 
definition or in alternative generation.  The model demonstrated poor saliency because its 
design did not allow participants to apply their knowledge in defining alternatives or 
addressing questions/problems relevant to their specific situation.  Instead, participants were 
given a predefined problem to solve and five policy options to solve it; two options were new 
alternative supplies and three options addressed water demand reduction or conservation.  
 
The simplicity of the model contributed to its legitimacy: participants quickly grasped the 
effects of changing parameters, trade-offs, and policies to move the supply/demand crossing 
point.  The model’s success in building legitimacy was self-reinforcing. As participants 
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gained confidence, trust in the usefulness and results of the model increased and fueled 
greater interest and engagement from participants.  When the model challenged their views 
on the problem, they saw this as an incentive to ask more questions and make new 
suggestions.  Legitimacy was reduced, however, by the inability to introduce stakeholder-
designed alternatives.  Scores and evidence for the Las Vegas case study are provided in 
Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 Scores on criteria for the Las Vegas water management alternatives case study 
Criteria Score Evidence 
C1 Med Author's assertion  
C2 High Article provides evidence 
C3 High  Author's assertion  
C4 Low Author's assertion  
C5 Med  Author's assertion  
   S1 Low Direct Communication 
S2 Med Direct Communication 
S3 Low Article provides evidence 
S4 Med Author's assertion  
S5 Low Article provides evidence 
   L1 High Author's assertion  
L2 High Article provides evidence 
L3 High Article provides evidence 
L4 High Article provides evidence 
L5 Med Author's assertion  
 
 
2.6.5.3 Evaluation on relative merits and shortfalls of PM effort  
Simulation models are favored in stakeholder engagement because of their ability to co-
validate model building and to structure and improve the content and timing of discussions 
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[Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994; Dwyer and Stave, 2008].  Several SDM platforms use 
object-oriented environments and are more visual in nature. These effective characteristics of 
simulation models have led to their growing application in resource management.  Such 
studies include Nandalal and Simonovic [2003] who use system dynamics in water conflict 
resolution for a hypothetical collaborative decision-making case; Palmer et al. [1999] on 
river-basin planning; Stave [2002] on public participation in transportation and air quality 
management decision making; and Bolson and Broad [2012] on a South Florida regional 
water management model.  Winz et al. [2009] present an in-depth review of theoretical and 
practical developments of SDMs in the past 40 years, which, along with other cited authors 
herein, suggests that SDMs are particularly suitable for stakeholder participation and 
represent a favored method among analysts.   
 
In the Las Vegas case, participants were presented with visuals of the decision variables, 
parameters, constraints, feedback loops, and outputs that enriched the discussion.  Stave 
suggests that the model altered the participants’ understanding of the fundamental drivers of 
water conflicts.  Participants were surprised with the finding that solely increasing supply 
was not the best policy option.  The simulations provided several counterintuitive results that 
made for lively discussions.  Consequently, the opportunity surfaced among participants to 
reconcile their disparate starting assumptions and to become receptive to possible solutions 
that were not deemed acceptable before.  
 
Supplemental material for the Las Vegas case study was very scant.  The author was 
contacted to verify the assertions that were made in the article.  It took several attempts to get 
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a response: the study had been a pilot study with Nevada State authorities and there was no 
follow-up evaluation.  Consequently, all conclusions drawn here are based on author 
statements in the original article. 
 
The two-stage evaluation shows that the Las Vegas SDM was able to achieve its modest 
purpose, but any larger impact was limited by a narrow scope of engaging participants in a 
proof of concept.  Our conclusion is congruent with follow-up communication with the 
author.  The primary published paper states explicitly that participation in the modeling 
process was opened to community participants at the last stage of policy analysis and not in 
earlier stages such as problem definition or model construction.  The goal was to inform 
participants by engaging them in the modeling effort to understand how different policies 
affected the crossing-point of demand and supply.  The model’s simple and intuitive nature 
helped participants understand the problem of demand/supply from a new perspective and 
appreciate the results even when they did not align with their own paradigm.   The author 
attests to this new appreciation and understanding to the model.  We find evidence in support 
of this assertion in the participants’ ability to engage and in the fact that they proposed new 
testing scenarios in real-time, which implies that they had developed some understanding of 
the system.  While the model was credible, participants had no influence on decisions or 
policies, and experts rather than stakeholders determined the relevant model and the policy 
options. Thus, the legitimacy and saliency were affected. 
 
2.6.6 Water resource allocation in the Solomon Islands 
2.6.6.1 Case background  
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In the Solomon Islands case, local managers of the Kongulai water catchment made use of a 
water resource allocation model constructed to support decisions [Chan et al., 2010].  The 
catchment is approximately 50 km2, is located upstream of the capital city Honiara, and 
provides about 60% of the capital’s water supply.  Study participants included landholders, 
local government officials, and donor and non-governmental organizations.  There was a 
history of conflict between the clans living in the catchment and the Solomon Island Water 
Authorities (SIWA), including protests over inadequate or late royalty payments and 
sabotage of the water infrastructure by the landowners.  SIWA’s past community 
engagement efforts were limited and unsuccessful.  Over the two-and-a-half-year study, the 
research team engaged participants in an inclusive and culturally sensitive manner to avoid 
resurfacing of past tensions.    
 
Stakeholder groups were first invited to participate separately to describe their challenges.  
The research team used these descriptions to build conceptual diagrams which participants 
reviewed before analysts built the Bayesian model.  Emphasis was initially placed on 
problem formulation.  Then, a Bayesian Network (BN) was used to generate and analyze 
defensible scenarios informing catchment management planning.  Five months later, a small 
representative group of participants (about one third of original group) met for second time to 
edit, verify, and comment on the final BN.  The organizers recruited a cultural guide to 
facilitate workshops.  Also, to be culturally sensitive and promote inclusion, several of the 
workshops were divided into groups based on clans and gender. 
 
2.6.6.2 Participatory dimensions and effective model characteristics 
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The purpose of this study was to improve information and data collection on water use so as 
to prioritize potential management actions.  The model was not intended to address 
negotiations over previous conflicts regarding resource royalty payments.  The project was 
organized by researchers from two different Australian Universities in collaboration with the 
Solomon Water Authority, the Australian Water Resources Facility, and the AusAID 
research initiative within the International Water Centre.  The core participants included 
community landowners (two sub-clans living within and below the catchment area), 
government agencies, and donor and non-governmental organizations.  A cultural guide who 
also served as an interpreter was recruited to help conduct the participatory research within 
the appropriate context.  
 
The stages of participation in this case were fragmented.  The first stage emphasized 
engaging participants in building conceptual diagrams based on their problem definition.  
However, to avoid the resurfacing of past tensions, stakeholder groups were engaged 
separately by local community representatives, government representatives, and donor and 
non-governmental organizations.  Subsequently, the diagrams were merged to build a BN. 
Then a smaller, yet representative, group of participants was asked to join in a second 
iteration for editing, verifying, and commenting on the final BN model.   
 
The degree of involvement can be generally characterized as involved, in general, with some 
groups invited to be collaborative given the level of information elicited from those 
participants.  Participants were engaged to define important stages like establishing the 
problem and “common terms of reference”, and, for a smaller group, evaluating policy 
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alternatives.  This case study was different in how it involved stakeholders in a more 
fragmented manner, effectively separating who was involved in model inputs and outputs.  
As a result, the extent of influencing decisions is different for managers and all other 
stakeholders.  Managers were expected to remain with the model after the research team left, 
so their engagement and influence was important.  The model enabled managers to prioritize 
interventions.  The same influence cannot be stated for the community groups and NGOs; 
they used the model at a conceptual level as an information tool rather than a decision tool.   
 
The deliberate inclusiveness in the early stages positively impacted the credibility of the 
model.  Despite past acrimonious relations, diverse stakeholders were able to engage in 
constructive dialogue and establish common ground on the facts.  The fragmented nature of 
the stages of participation, however, left some doubts about the extent of inclusion of 
participants in relevant and influential dialogue later on. 
 
Saliency was judged on how well the model captured diverse knowledge and relevant 
questions.  In this respect, the ability to bring people together to communicate and agree on 
facts showed that given the right environment and platform, participants found common 
ground to overcome differences to collaborate in new and unexpected ways.  
 
The model’s legitimacy also ranked high in most criteria, since providing transparency and 
accountability in the process improved relationships.  The model created a “shared vision” 
over water plans and played a role in establishing interventions and priorities in 
infrastructure, making catchment and supply management decisions, and, to some extent, 
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influencing the behavior of the water users.  These positive participant relationships 
reinforced themselves and made the modeling effort more legitimate.  Table 2.6 provides 
scores and evidence for the Solomon Islands case. 
 
 
Table 2.6 Scores on criteria for the Solomon Islands water resources allocation case study 
Criteria Score Evidence 
C1 High Article provides evidence 
C2 High Quotes from interviewees 
C3 High Authors' assertion 
C4 Med Implied, not stated 
C5 High Interviews 
   S1 Med Interviews 
S2 High Article provides evidence 
S3 High Assertions and interviews 
S4 Med Provided evidence and interview 
S5 High Interviews 
   L1 High Description 
L2 Med Implied, not stated 
L3 Med Interviews 
L4 High Interviews 
L5 High Interviews 
 
 
2.6.6.3 Evaluation of relative merits and shortfalls of PM effort 
BN modeling has found many applications in participatory ecological risk assessment 
because of its graphical representations and its ability to integrate stakeholders’ conceptual 
diagrams of the problem definition.  Castelletti and Soncini-Sessa [2007] and Uusitalo 
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[2007] provide other examples of BN modeling in environmental applications. BN models 
are graphical models that represent probabilistic systems operating under uncertainty. They 
have the ability to automate probability updates with new observations, providing improved 
model accuracy with new iterations.  Another advantage is the low formal data requirement 
of BNs, which makes them suitable in data-limited contexts like this one.  In this case study, 
the limited availability of data, the high uncertainty, and the initially incomplete 
understanding of the system persuaded researchers to use a BN model.   
 
Initially, a “staged knowledge-building process” was used to elicit knowledge and views 
from participants, which were later combined with quantitative data about the physical 
characteristics of the catchment area. The concept diagrams developed separately from 
different groups and perspectives were later merged to create one comprehensive network 
diagram.  In subsequent sessions, the analysts introduced perspectives from previous groups 
for comparison and to underscore common views.  This step proved to be a significant 
challenge; however, once progress was made in individual groups, the groups were reunited 
in a follow-up session to simplify the model within smaller representative subgroups.  In the 
final workshop, a small group of water professionals with technical backgrounds was 
summoned to determine the initial conditional probabilities.  The model was crucial in 
creating a single-text document agreeing on the set of facts.  However, the fragmented nature 




The two-stage evaluation showed that BN modeling effort was successful at meeting its 
purpose of enabling managers to prioritize interventions.  A separate publication [Hovernman 
et al., 2011] by the authors that evaluated the participatory effort provides several examples 
and direct quotes as evidence of their success.  The benefit of the participatory model showed 
that it was possible to bring transparency and accountability to the process, resulting in 
improved credibility and legitimacy of the model.  Though not an original study goal, an 
independent forum composed of the same participants came together to deliberate on logging 
issues indirectly related to water.  Government agents facilitated the forum and requested 
model outputs prior to making decisions.  The unexpected outcomes of the study (i.e., the 
creation of an independent group that used the model for other deliberations) are a testament 
to the saliency and legitimacy brought by the model building process, whereby people 
learned to work creatively and collaboratively in new and unexpected ways.  
 
2.6.7 Regional planning in the Senegal River Valley 
2.6.7.1 Case background  
The fifth study was set in the Senegal River Delta and applied the Common-pool Resources 
and Multi-Agent Systems (CORMAS) modeling platform that had been previously 
developed by the CIRAD Center (Cooperation Internationale en Recherche Agronomique 
pour le Développement).  CORMAS uses direct and extensive stakeholder engagement 
workshops [Le Page et al., 2012] and provides a framework for developing simulation 
models of cooperation among agents and institutions that manage Common Pool Resources 
(CPR) [Bousquet et al., 1998]. The CORMAS modeling tool arose from a rich literature 
developed by CIRAD researchers in the 1990s [Le Page et al., 2012].  In the most cited 
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CORMAS case study, D’Aquino et al. [2002] used a modeling platform to integrate 
participants’ knowledge and stimulate collective learning by having participants build a 
“shared” model of land-use problems and possible solutions.  Three study sites spanning 
2,500 km2 and with a combined population of 40,000 in the Senegal River Delta made use of 
role-playing games and an agent-based model (ABM) to develop sustainable land-use 
management strategies.  
 
Model-building took two years and involved several three-day workshops with local 
communities.  The entire project spanned 10 years.  Local community representatives (i.e., 
farmers, hunters, fisherman, breeders, etc.) and public institutions were engaged in several 
workshops led by the CIRAD team.  Researchers allowed stakeholders to play the role of an 
agent (e.g., farmer, breeder, etc.) who could actively deliberate and decide on each stage of 
the model building process (e.g., fisherman focusing on fishing).  In later planning stages, 
role-playing games were modeled and made into an ABM with geographical information 
systems (GIS) tools.  The ABM provided quick and systematic assessments of management 
options, while GIS created a visual representation of input and output data.  The self-design 
process elicited from participants the most crucial elements and stakeholders to include in the 
analysis, and they identified the incentives, constraints, and challenges faced by each 
stakeholder.  This consensus meant that later in the process these elements would be more 
difficult to contest when tensions or conflict over actions escalated.  As stakeholders 
designed new self-governing rules for monitoring and regulating, access to and use of 
resources was more widely understood.     
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2.6.7.2 Participatory dimensions and effective model characteristics 
The purpose of participation was to create autonomous and empowered communities that 
could improve land-use planning by means of stakeholder-driven, bottom-up simulations of 
decisions and self-governing regulation alternatives.  CORMAS’ programming language is 
object-oriented, and it creates visual models to improve the use, access, and transfer of 
technical information in land-use problems.  Organizers included the CIRAD research team 
in collaboration with one rural community council.  The intended core participants were 
public institutions and local community representatives, including farmers, hunters, and 
fisherman, all from various ethnic groups. 
 
Since this model was a self-designed model, the stakeholders were engaged in all five stages 
of participation. This included development of the problem definition and model building 
through the role-playing games, as well as model validation and use during scenario based 
analysis.  The degree of involvement was characterized as high with goals of empowering 
participants to make decisions and self-govern over agreed upon rules.  However, the extent 
of influence was moderate and small-scale at first.  The community felt empowered to design 
and regulate their own land-use rules.  In later years, community members had the ability to 
create and negotiate land-use plans.  Eventually, an assessment carried out a decade later 
showed that even these small successes led to the adoption of self-design models (e.g., 
CORMAS) for other national level projects and laws.  
 
Credibility was judged high based on the consensus built through the modeling efforts.  The 
stakeholder meetings and self-design model resulted in a formal proposal, drafted based on 
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model results with agreed-upon recommendations and management actions, that acts as a 
single-text document.  The ABM effort built rapport by eliciting locals to share their values, 
water use, risk tolerance, and risk aversion.  Model saliency also scored high based on the 
ability to translate the modeling platform into an agreement on facts despite diverse 
knowledge.   
 
Table 2.7 Scores on criteria for the Senegal River Valley regional planning case study 
Criteria Score Evidence 
C1 High Authors' assertion and photographs 
C2 High Authors' assertion and evidence 
C3 High Authors' assertion  
C4 High Authors' assertion and photographs 
C5 High Authors' assertion and sustained participation 
   S1 Med Authors' assertion  
S2 Med Authors' assertion and sustained participaton 
S3 High Authors' assertion and photographs 
S4 High Provided document 
S5 High Authors' assertion  
   L1 High Authors' assertion  
L2 High Authors' assertion and photographs 
L3 Med Evidence from Role-playing games  
L4 High Evidence from Role-playing games  
L5 High Authors' assertion  
 
The model’s legitimacy was judged based on participants’ ability to create new rules for 
access to resources, design innovative collective rules, and organize in order to monitor new 
land-use regulations.  These changes also helped achieve the principle goals of the study.  
Unique to this modeling platform was the level of autonomy given to participants to 
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determine priorities based on their interactions.  This is reflected in the high scores given in 
credibility, saliency, and legitimacy criteria. Table 2.7 provides scores and evidence for the 
Senegal River Valley case. 
 
2.6.7.3 Evaluation of relative merits and shortfalls of PM effort 
An ABM is defined by an individualistic, as opposed to systemic, approach to modeling.  
ABMs are composed of autonomous agents, their environment, and the properties that 
emerge from their complex and dynamic interactions [Bonabeau, 2002].  As this case study 
shows, ABM simulations take advantage of a flexible model structure to create stakeholder-
driven, bottom-up modeling platforms.  ABM makes no assumptions of “rationality”—there 
are no assumptions of homogeneous actors, perfect information, or perfect economic 
efficiency [Parker et al., 2003; Gerst et al., 2013].  Instead, ABMs are well suited to 
represent heterogeneous and bounded rational agents who are autonomous in their decisions 
and interactions [Bonabeau, 2002; Yang et al., 2009; Gerst et al., 2013].  Also evident from 
this case is the model flexibility that allows agents’ behaviors and environments to be 
influenced by affiliations, interactions or feedback mechanisms that cause them to learn and 
evolve.  This has made ABM popular in the common-pool resource literature, which 
embraces more nuanced representations of physical-social interactions [Bousquet and Le 
Page, 2004; Janssen and Ostrom, 2006].  These and other characteristics of ABMs have 
expanded their application in the last 20 years to a wide range of disciplines including 
anthropology, economics, ecology, engineering, and natural resource management 
[Bonabeau, 2002; Niazi and Hussain, 2011].  
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The flexibility of ABMs is beneficial in answering questions related to the “institutional rules 
[that] may direct individuals to act in the benefit of the collective” [Parker et al., 2003].  In 
this project, CORMAS became a tool for exploring collective actions since each participant 
represented an agent and they learned about the emergent characteristics of effective self-
governing institutions [Ostrom, 1993, 1999; Janssen and Ostrom, 2006].  By engaging 
participants in a simulation of month-to-month decisions based on alternatives to meet 
individual needs, the ABM revealed their preferences, risk tolerance, and motives for their 
decisions, and it allowed the participants to discuss these factors openly.  Since ABMs are 
built from the perspective of agent units, they can learn and adapt through a heuristic 
decision process.  The CORMAS model was used as an exploratory tool to develop a testing 
technique for alternative hypotheses or candidate explanations.  During initial workshops, 
organizers used the agent unit approach to capture more realistic agent behaviors through 
role-playing games.  Each participant was associated with a constituent unit in the model that 
made decisions based on needs, preferences, and motives [Bousquet and Le Page, 2004; 
Castella et al., 2005; Yang et al., 2009].  The project’s scope, however, was limited by the 
lack of local technical involvement that left the finished model an orphaned tool.  It was 
unclear who would use it after the organizing team was gone.  
 
The primary research paper provides the authors’ assertions about the performance of the 
process and its outcomes.  The paper documents (via photographs, computer model screen-
shots, and RPG material) how stakeholders were engaged.  We collected additional evidence 
from two subsequent self-evaluations by the authors carried out 10 and 11 years later 
[D’Aquino and Bah, 2013; D’Aquino and Papazian, 2014].  Our two-stage evaluation shows 
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the project purpose was achieved successfully (subject to the caveats offered in Section 2.6.2 
about the limitations of author self-reports).  Despite an initial moderate level of influence, 
engagement was sustained in the long-term, and a survey carried 10 years later showed that 
the model enabled members to build capacity and autonomy in future dealings at regional 
and national levels.  The Senegal Delta study’s greatest benefit came from the “dynamic” 
discussions and “wide-ranging analysis” of collective decisions rather than numerical results.  
Stakeholders were learning how to manage and self-regulate.  The greatest strengths and 
shortfalls both came from the self-design method.  The strengths lay in the autonomous 
nature of the model that allowed participants to establish the agenda and priorities, providing 
opportunities for change as new perspectives from other constituents were included.  
Furthermore, the process generated collaborative solutions that had not seemed viable or 
favorable before.  Conversely, the project’s focus on self-design meant that no technical 
experts were included, and the influence of the project was initially limited and would only 





2.7 Lessons from case studies evaluation framework  
Table 2.8 Summary of five dimensions characterizing each participatory efforts and two-
stage evaluation 





Successful: Creation o     




foresters, one agricultural extension officer, one social scientist, and one 
provincial officer who is also an expert on gender issues  
saliency  
Organizing team: University research team and a facilitator  
Stages of Participation—Model formulation, problem definition and 
identification, model building and use, model validation by quantifying 
SWOT and process indicators 
Satisfactory: Model w     
consensus and achievi      
unclear if or how this   
Degree of Involvement—Consultation and moderate  
Level of Influence—No indication that any decisions were influenced 
Needs Improvement: P     
record and documenta      
term benefits of the ef  Purpose—Broad process goal: reach consensus on action plans based on 




Table 2.9 Summary of five dimensions characterizing each participatory efforts and two-
stage evaluation (cont.) 








Successful:  The mode      
core members became     
assumptions of the mo       
questions.  To some ex       
today. 
Stakeholders: Representatives from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and 
USACE 
Organizing team: University research team and Institute of Water 
Resources 
Stages of Participation—problem definition, model construction, data 
gathering, simulation runs, verification and validation of models 
Satisfactory:  Effective      
moderate research goa      
engaged in repeated vi   
building trust and salie      
influence in decisions. Degree of Involvement—Collaborative and created new policy alternatives  
Level of Influence—Advisors had trouble executing plans later on when the 
politics changed and final decision went to State governors Needs Improvement: T     
when political tides sh     
turned the participants     
unable to influence de  




Table 2.10 Summary of five dimensions characterizing each participatory efforts and two-
stage evaluation (cont.) 







Successful:  The simp      
the model.  Participant      
perspective that allow      
even when counterintu   
Stakeholder: Intended users were residents and community members. 
Expert opinions were solicited from Southern Nevada Water Authority and 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
Organizing team: University research team in consultation with U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation and water authorities 
Satisfactory:  The mod      
effective tool that is sa      
policy process Stages of Participation—Experts were engaged in problem definition, 
public participants were engaged in model use, analysis, and validation of 
acceptable policy options 
Degree of Involvement—Inform 
Needs Improvement:    
stakeholder knowledg      
outcomes and increasi       
decisions  
Level of Influence—As a communication tool not intended to change 
decisions  
Purpose—Primarily used as a stakeholder learning support tool that allowed 
them to evaluate the relative merits of different policy options to resolve 
future problems of demand exceeding supply 
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Table 2.11 Summary of five dimensions characterizing each participatory efforts and two-
stage evaluation (cont.) 







Successful:  Creation o    
collaboration despite p   
relationships among p    
thinking on how to be     
and cultural difference      
Stakeholders: Community landowners, government agencies, and donor 
and non-governmental organizations. A cultural guide and interpreter helped 
conduct the participatory research 
Organizing team: Solomon Water Authority and University research team 
in collaboration with Australian Water Resources Facility, and AusAID in the 
International Water Centre  
Satisfactory:  The mod      
consensus on a set of f    
fragmented nature of p    
questions regarding cr    
everyone was included     
later stages 
Stages of Participation—Fragmented: local community, government 
representatives, NGOs and donor organizations in problem definition, a 
smaller representative group engaged in model use and validation 
Degree of Involvement—Collaborative  
Level of Influence—Government agencies used the model for prioritizing 
interventions. Model was not intended to resolve negotiation conflicts. Needs Improvement:      
landowners and other     
of model building and  Purpose— Prioritize management actions and identify competing interests to 
improve water use 
 
 
Table 2.12 Summary of five dimensions characterizing each participatory efforts and two-
stage evaluation (cont.) 






Successful:  Achieved     
and building adaptive   
community members.     
negotiating agreement 
Stakeholders: Public institutions and local community representatives 
from various ethnic groups 
Organizing team: One rural community council and CIRAD research team 
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Stages of Participation—Problem definition developed in role-playing 
games, model building and validation, and model use in scenario-based 
analysis 
Satisfactory:  The dire     
the modelling effort ar     
Long-term, it’s difficu      
influence on national l    
"owned" the model, or      
anyone Degree of Involvement—Empowerment 
Level of Influence—Local community members created self-governing rules 
for land-use at small scale. With time it empowered members to create land-
use plans Needs Improvement:     dialogue between expe      
create mutual learning 
Purpose—Improve land use strategies and planning by empowering 
communities 
 provides a summary of the two-stage evaluation process.  Four lessons on the mechanisms 
for model effectiveness are outlined based on the proposed evaluation framework.  
 
First, the effectiveness of the five participatory models, assessed in terms of process 
mechanisms, was independent of their (diverse) technical characteristics.  In practice, there is 
often a distinction between models for policy and models for science.  Models developed by 
scientists for other technicians are intended for experts rather than stakeholders and are 
generally more complex, data-intensive, and sophisticated.  They are typically judged on 
their scientific accuracy.  Conversely, models in the policy context are intended for a diverse 
audience and must weigh the benefits of increased complexity against the costs, namely the 
possibility of alienating non-technical participants [Webler et al., 2011].  They are best 
judged on their ability to capture scientific facts and render them useful—through 
mechanisms like those described in Section 2.5.2 – to both technical and non-technical 
participants.  Previous comparative studies indicate that complexity can often obscure 
transparency, limit model accessibility, and lead to information asymmetries that can 
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undermine the participatory process and support insulated decision-making [Mendoza and 
Prabhu, 2005; Lemos et al., 2010].  
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Table 2.8 Summary of five dimensions characterizing each participatory efforts and two-stage evaluation 







Successful: Creation of a flexibility optimization 
model using mixed methods to improve model 
saliency  
Stakeholders: Six district-level government personnel: two district 
foresters, one agricultural extension officer, one social scientist, and one 
provincial officer who is also an expert on gender issues  
Organizing team: University research team and a facilitator  
Stages of Participation—Model formulation, problem definition and 
identification, model building and use, model validation by quantifying 
SWOT and process indicators 
Satisfactory: Model was successful at building 
consensus and achieving purpose, however, it is 
unclear if or how this influenced anything 
Degree of Involvement—Consultation and moderate  
Level of Influence—No indication that any decisions were influenced 
Needs Improvement: Provide a more complete 
record and documentation of the short or long-
term benefits of the effort Purpose—Broad process goal: reach consensus on action plans based on 




Table 2.9 Summary of five dimensions characterizing each participatory efforts and two-stage evaluation (cont.) 








Successful:  The model was salient and some 
core members became skilled in modifying the 
assumptions of the model in order to answer their 
questions.  To some extent the model is still used 
today. 
Stakeholders: Representatives from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and 
USACE 
Organizing team: University research team and Institute of Water 
Resources 
Stages of Participation—problem definition, model construction, data 
gathering, simulation runs, verification and validation of models 
Satisfactory:  Effectiveness in achieving the more 
moderate research goals.  The model platform 
engaged in repeated virtual experimentation 
building trust and saliency; however, it had little 
influence in decisions. Degree of Involvement—Collaborative and created new policy alternatives  
Level of Influence—Advisors had trouble executing plans later on when the 
politics changed and final decision went to State governors Needs Improvement: The model lost saliency 
when political tides shifted.  This effectively 
turned the participants into advisors who were 
unable to influence decisions. 




Table 2.10 Summary of five dimensions characterizing each participatory efforts and two-stage evaluation (cont.) 







Successful:  The simple and intuitive nature of 
the model.  Participants acquired a new systems 
perspective that allowed them to accept results 
even when counterintuitive.  
Stakeholder: Intended users were residents and community members. 
Expert opinions were solicited from Southern Nevada Water Authority and 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
Organizing team: University research team in consultation with U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation and water authorities 
Satisfactory:  The model was made into an 
effective tool that is salient and legitimate in the 
policy process Stages of Participation—Experts were engaged in problem definition, 
public participants were engaged in model use, analysis, and validation of 
acceptable policy options 
Degree of Involvement—Inform 
Needs Improvement:  Incorporation of 
stakeholder knowledge and feedback to improve 
outcomes and increasing the level of influence in 
decisions  
Level of Influence—As a communication tool not intended to change 
decisions  
Purpose—Primarily used as a stakeholder learning support tool that allowed 
them to evaluate the relative merits of different policy options to resolve 
future problems of demand exceeding supply 
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Table 2.11 Summary of five dimensions characterizing each participatory efforts and two-stage evaluation (cont.) 







Successful:  Creation of dialogue and 
collaboration despite past acrimonious 
relationships among participants.  Careful 
thinking on how to be sensitive to age, gender, 
and cultural differences to achieve inclusiveness  
Stakeholders: Community landowners, government agencies, and donor 
and non-governmental organizations. A cultural guide and interpreter helped 
conduct the participatory research 
Organizing team: Solomon Water Authority and University research team 
in collaboration with Australian Water Resources Facility, and AusAID in the 
International Water Centre  
Satisfactory:  The model was crucial in creating 
consensus on a set of facts; however, the 
fragmented nature of participation left some 
questions regarding credibility when not 
everyone was included in relevant dialogues at 
later stages 
Stages of Participation—Fragmented: local community, government 
representatives, NGOs and donor organizations in problem definition, a 
smaller representative group engaged in model use and validation 
Degree of Involvement—Collaborative  
Level of Influence—Government agencies used the model for prioritizing 
interventions. Model was not intended to resolve negotiation conflicts. Needs Improvement:  Inclusion of g community 
landowners and other stakeholders in later stages 
of model building and use Purpose— Prioritize management actions and identify competing interests to 




Table 2.12 Summary of five dimensions characterizing each participatory efforts and two-stage evaluation (cont.) 






Successful:  Achieved the goal of empowerment 
and building adaptive capacity among 
community members.  Created a single-text 
negotiating agreement 
Stakeholders: Public institutions and local community representatives 
from various ethnic groups 
Organizing team: One rural community council and CIRAD research team 
Stages of Participation—Problem definition developed in role-playing 
games, model building and validation, and model use in scenario-based 
analysis 
Satisfactory:  The direct short-term benefits of 
the modelling effort are vaguely explained.  
Long-term, it’s difficult to identify the model’s 
influence on national level policies, who 
"owned" the model, or how was it accessible to 
anyone Degree of Involvement—Empowerment 
Level of Influence—Local community members created self-governing rules 
for land-use at small scale. With time it empowered members to create land-
use plans Needs Improvement:  Providing a two-way dialogue between experts and core participants to 
create mutual learning 
Purpose—Improve land use strategies and planning by empowering 
communities 
84 
It is clear from the stage two assessments (Table 2.8) that modelers in all five case studies 
were aware of the need to produce understandable models, although the evaluations of 
particular sub-criteria suggest that a stronger two-way dialogue between modelers and the 
public could have improved some of the models.  Prior method comparison studies 
[Hobbs et al., 1992] reinforce our conclusion that how the model is used—the 
interactions and dealings among participants and model—is as important as the specifics 
of the modelling method. 
 
Second, models with greater flexibility had enhanced relevance to case study participants, 
in part because these models evolved to become more complete and sometimes even 
more complex only as the participants’ involvement became more sophisticated; they 
were thus designed around the decision-making process. Model completeness and 
flexibility here refer to the factors that were deemed important, and how they were 
measured and integrated into the model platform; their importance can be clearly 
observed in the case studies.  In the Senegal Delta case, the self-design aspects of the 
model resulted in a simple and highly flexible model.  With each role-playing game, the 
model was adapted to include new information identified as relevant by the participants.  
Given the diversity of participants and their limited previous experience with modeling, 
the use of a simple, self-designed model was crucial to facilitate dialogue.  In the ACT-
ACF case study, the representatives from each State and the USACE were mid- to high-
level water managers who appreciated increased accuracy and completeness despite its 
accompanying complexity, provided that the model captured system nuances.  As 
managers’ understanding of the system improved, so did the model’s relevance, and they 
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requested greater sophistication to address their specific questions.  The evaluation 
criteria show the balance between completeness and flexibility as these two 
characteristics relate to the mechanisms of relevance and credibility.  The importance of 
this balance is consistent with the observations of Palmer et al. [2013] that the key to 
relevant models is to engage participants throughout the modeling process, continually 
focusing on “Who will use the model” and “How will it be used to make decisions?”   
  
Third, the inherently interdisciplinary and largely non-technical tasks of PM – identifying 
stakeholders, selecting participants, defining the capacity and extent of stakeholder 
involvement, and structuring the participatory process—will affect the ability of the 
model to build credibility, saliency, and legitimacy. Participants’ interactions (e.g., 
consensus, trust, information exchange) are highly sensitive to group representation and 
size.  It might be asked whether modeling is more effective in the context of smaller or 
larger groups, or whether there are ways to structure (larger) groups in order to better use 
models.  The case studies suggest that a balance must be achieved between establishing a 
broad representative group and finding a group size that enhances coherent and 
productive dialogue between participants.  The evaluation highlights the nature of this 
balance.  In Zimbabwe, six representative participants ensured a quick and efficient 
model building and engagement process.  However, it is unknown whether the PM effort 
influenced any decisions and, therefore, whether the model, however effective, was 
anything more than an exercise with no real consequences.  Conversely, the Solomon 
Islands case study engaged more than 99 stakeholders, but due to past social conflicts, 
workshops were initially held separately.  This resulted in more inclusive participation 
86 
and provided a culturally sensitive environment associated with age and gender roles.  It 
was, however, time-intensive, and the authors acknowledged the “unwieldy” effects of 
large groups in reaching consensus.  The cultural specificity of the Solomon Islands case 
study makes it difficult to infer whether this apparently effective approach of employing 
smaller subgroups would be transferrable to other contexts. The evaluation shows how 
model effectiveness in improving scores across all legitimacy, credibility, and saliency 
criteria is highly dependent on the working group size and how size influences the 
dynamics of group interactions.  
 
Fourth and finally, the boundary object lens of the evaluation framework reveals how the 
computer models themselves – as distinct from group facilitation, mediation, or other 
participatory techniques – can catalyze engagement in negotiation environments. During 
workshops in the Las Vegas case study, participants accessed SDM outputs to compare 
the effects of five possible policy solutions to a water resources problem.  And in the 
ACT-ACF case study, the model had a user interface designed to let participants change 
model control parameters and features themselves.  Advances in computing technology 
like fast computation speeds and the ease with which we can now create and share 
information in visual or graphic form allow modelers to run scenarios and provide new 
model output in real time as a fundamental part of the participatory experience.  Real-
time user feedback has tangible benefits, as it allows changes to model formulation, quick 
and easy policy trade-off comparisons, and timely deliberations.  Advances in computer 
technology have boosted the ability of models to contribute to the evolving needs of fast-
paced negotiation environments that rely on quick information exchange. This is 
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consistent with two findings from the literature.  The first concludes that effective science 
for decision-making allows changes in how problems are defined and framed before 
providing solutions [Cash et al., 2003].  The second is that models can be central to 
creating negotiated solutions from participants’ dynamic interactions [Bousquet and Le 
Page, 2004; Dwyer and Stave, 2008]. The cases provide evidence of modeling platforms 
that transform water negotiations to support policy as a process that is debated rather than 
policy as a prescribed outcome.  
 
Comparing five case studies allows for some generalizations regarding the success of 
PM. An important question is whether different types of computer models (e.g., ABM, 
MCDA, SDM, BN, etc.) are more or less useful to participatory modeling.  In our review 
of the literature, there is no one model that lends itself better to participatory processes 
than the others.  In fact, agent-based modeling, one of the most complex approaches and 
among the least likely to be found intuitive, proved to be very effective at engaging 
Senegalese farmers and fisherman (i.e., people least familiar with computer models).  In 
the Senegal case study, organizers defined the purpose as creating “autonomous and 
empowered communities,” and by working with the participants and making modeling 
like a game, they were successful in conveying very complex information.  So while 
there is no winner in the model type field, some approaches to PM are more effective 
than others when they take advantage of process mechanisms like those we have outlined.   
 
This factor is related to another key factor in model effectiveness; effort.  Cases that 
scored high were also projects where engagement was sustained for longer periods (ACT-
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ACF, Solomon Islands, and Senegal Delta).  It can be inferred that sustained effort 
contributes to creating shared purpose and genuine dialogue—factors that are often 
written off as “intangibles” but are in fact important to PM success.  In short, the more 
effort invested in getting participants to incorporate models in their thinking so that it 
becomes a tool for communicating, the more effective the model.  Projects that defined 
their purpose in more limited terms (e.g., the Las Vegas project, whose purpose was to 
inform) could reach their objectives but still be assessed medium or low in achieving 
saliency or credibility.  The reason is because the limited goals meant there was no 
opportunity to test how effective the PM efforts were in building participants’ ability to 
use model information to influence resources management.  
 
2.8 Summary and conclusions 
Over the last 30 years, changes in “traditional” WRM models have opened a debate 
among experts about how to create a more accessible modeling paradigm that is 
transparent, flexible, timely, and relevant to the needs of a diverse public [Loucks and 
French, 1985; Rogers and Fiering, 1986; Lund and Palmer, 1997; Simonovic and Fahmy, 
1999; Mendoza and Prabhu, 2005].  Traditional WRM models lacked the “explicit 
recognition of various interests and pressures [that] are part of the process used to 
generate the alternative candidate” policies [Rogers and Fiering, 1986, p.147].  The 
challenge to improve the efforts that bring greater public participation into WRM 
remains, both in how scientific/technical information is used and in how stakeholders are 
engaged to support a democratic discussion about decision-making alternatives.  This 
chapter has presented the role computer models can play in addressing these challenges. 
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Like traditional models, participatory models help prioritize management decisions and 
strategies. However, they cannot be evaluated using traditional criteria for model 
effectiveness.  This study proposed a two-stage framework for assessing participatory 
WRM models. Synthesizing previously established concepts of participation and 
boundary objects, the framework provides a structured vocabulary and clear mechanisms 
that capture the merits of models in participatory and social contexts.  These 
contributions have the potential to help facilitate and standardize design and reporting 
efforts in future participatory modeling research. 
 
Any comprehensive assessment of the value of PM requires systematic evaluations and 
comparative studies based on documented evidence from previous trials, failures, and 
successes.  However, data availability is limited and documentation is patchy; indeed, 
these challenges partially motivated this work.  The diversity of efforts in the literature 
suggest that PM has been dominated by ‘trial-and-error’ and ‘learning-by-doing,’ yet as 
the field evolves and consolidates, standard documentation is needed to improve the 
practice of PM.  The framework we formulated can help structure more complete records 
and systematic documentation of evidence.  Improved record-keeping and documentation 
would support an higher standard for evaluation and reporting of both future design and 
concluded PM efforts, while still leaving flexibility in the disciplinary methods used for 
evaluation (e.g., surveys, interviews, third party evaluations).  Our framework should 
facilitate more systematic comparison across a wide range of PM studies.  
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Based on the concept of boundary objects, we conclude that models for policy function to 
create a syntax and common ground in order to build mutual understanding of a problem 
as a precursor to negotiation.  This is consistent with NRC findings that direct 
interactions between participants increase the effectiveness of future engagements by 
building on dealings for mutual understanding and trust [NRC, 2008].  A boundary object 
can be the bridge that enables stakeholders to conceptualize new alternatives based on 
realistic scenarios developed and tested in the model.  Effective models can provide an 
open and transparent platform based on a structured discussion, creating opportunities to 
change the focus and move beyond conflict towards negotiated solutions [Dwyer and 
Stave, 2008].  Given the right mechanisms and conditions, the iterative process of model-
stakeholder dynamics can foster trust, confidence, and consensus.  
 
Finally, this study demonstrates that process mechanisms allow computer models to 
render scientific and technical knowledge useful and relevant to stakeholder needs.  
Previous literature has focused on final (and to a lesser extent, intermediate) management 
outcomes to demonstrate the benefits of PM. Certainly, the strength of 
policy/management outcomes is a legitimate basis for assessment, but outcomes are only 
half of the picture. Building resource management policies that ‘get the science right’ 
requires not only an accurate assessment of facts (i.e., scientific and technical knowledge) 
but also an accurate assessment of public values (i.e., public knowledge, preferences, and 
acceptable trade-offs) [NRC, 2008].  The participatory process is one of the principles of 
IWRM, so one might naturally ask whether that process is being embraced and 
implemented to its full potential, or if natural resource managers are just “going through 
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the motions.”  When PM is implemented, is it “real”?  We argue that prior to an 
assessment of outcomes, we stand to benefit from considering the mechanisms of the PM 
process that make those outcomes possible.  Having first identified the challenges of 
evaluating process mechanisms that facilitate the accessibility and application of 
technical knowledge (Section 2.2), we proposed a novel two-stage evaluation framework 
to help identify the divide that can exist between technical solutions and resource 
management, and we applied it to existing case studies by focusing on the way models 
were used in the PM process.    
 
The challenges of interdisciplinary research mirror the challenges identified in resource 
management; building bridges that enable the integration of methods and practices across 
diverse disciplinary lines is not easy [Ledford, 2015].  The literature suggests that policy 
decisions are most effective when people have been engaged early and frequently in the 
discussions and can understand the benefits and risks involved [NRC, 2008; Posner et al., 
2016; Werick et al., 1994].  Participation in model building is one platform for those 
repeated engagements. The processes of building institutional capacity and strengthening 
water governance are an outcome of repeated engagement, a form of “democracy in 
action.” They allow private individuals to become public citizens who are engaged in 
developing policies they find acceptable and binding [NRC, 2008].  
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 CHRONICLES OF A CRISIS FORETOLD: WATER GOVERNANCE, 
POWER, AND POLITICS IN SÃO PAULO’S DROUGHT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The following two chapters provide different perspectives on São Paulo’s water crisis: 
this chapter documents the drought event between 2013 and 2015 and explores how it 
was exacerbated by a convergence of several non-water related events, while Chapter 4 is 
a technical analysis of system performance and alternative drought plans.  The 
contribution of this chapter is to chronicle and critically examine São Paulo’s drought 
event in order to understand how governance, power, and politics exacerbated a natural 
event.  Although the two public workshops12 we conducted failed to build collaboration 
between crucial decision-makers, the workshops contributed insights for our present 
analysis of institutional barriers to increased participation and governance in São Paulo.  
The mock participatory model developed and presented at the workshops is also reported 
here, including an analysis based on the two-stage framework (from Chapter 1) to assess 
its merits and shortcomings as a boundary object to engage participants.  
 
 The case study of São Paulo presented in this chapter shows the limitations of framing 
water problems purely in terms of scarcity or management.  While scarcity and poor 
management are important underlying drivers, water crises often stem from or are 
exacerbated by problems in water governance.  The case of São Paulo provides concrete 
                                                 
12 The two workshops described in this chapter arose from the collaborative, academic effort initiated by 
Falconi in 2013 with Richard Palmer and William Werick for the purpose of together developing and 
presenting a participatory model in São Paulo.  Palmer and Werick made two separate visits to Brazil and 
participated along with Falconi in the workshops organized at UNICAMP.   
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evidence of how political interests can sideline technical know-how, models, and plans, 
even co-opting technical information and jargon to obscure the severity of the problem.  
This case study illustrates that participation in water resource management is far more 
complex than just having a seat at the table, and that even the “best-conceived” systems 
can go awry due to several technical and non-technical factors.  Beyond São Paulo, this 
case study reveals the many contradictions that exist within the internationally recognized 
and widely used framework of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM).  
  
As discussed in Chapter 1, IWRM has emerged over the last two decades as the new 
international paradigm for managing water, with an emphasis on effective governance.  
IWRM was highly influential in Brazil’s water reform process, and many Brazilian 
experts were active participants in promoting IWRM’s ideals in water management.  The 
IWRM paradigm emphasizes the importance of stakeholder participation in water 
resource planning.  Indeed, it repeatedly invokes diverse knowledge and participation in 
deliberations as effective tools to deal with competing demands for allocation of water 
resources.  However, the IWRM framework includes some contradictions, and it fails to 
acknowledge the political nature of water resources. These shortcomings, which have 
been explored by other scholars [Biswas, 2004; Conca, 2006; Molle, 2009], are central to 
the São Paulo water crisis.  
 
3.1.1 A crisis in São Paulo 
The metropolitan region of São Paulo (MRSP) and neighboring regions experienced the 
worst drought in recorded history starting in 2013, placing some 21 million residents at 
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risk of water shortages.  From some perspectives, the explanatory factor in São Paulo’s 
drought may appear to be lack of planning, while others explain the lack of rainfall as an 
extremely rare (climatological) event [Braga and Kelman, 2016].  However, these 
framings of the crisis are narrow and simplistic, leaving out a great deal of the evidence.  
This case study illustrates how water allocation decisions are fraught with political 
questions of who gets what and when, and it reveals the extent to which underlying 
institutional challenges (e.g., who has access to technical information) drive water 
conflicts.  Recognizing how technically-informed solutions and existing plans can be 
sidelined by information asymmetries, by the use of technical jargon to obscure 
information, and by the timing and light in which facts are presented reveals key 
impediments to the participation of specific stakeholders.  Rainfall eventually eased the 
drought conditions in São Paulo, but not before water governance (based on IWRM 
principles) had been undermined. This chapter explores this drought event, including 
several layers of social and political unraveling, to chronicle what masked early and 
urgent warnings of the impending crisis.  
 
In an interview titled “Living Dangerously,” Fernando Reinach pointed to São Paulo’s 
insatiable thirst, which caused an endemic crisis that had been growing for decades as 
demand outpaced supply, and to a tendency by authorities towards “living dangerously” 
by ignoring the problem [Safatle, 2015].  Reinach is no stranger to São Paulo’s water 
conflicts, which have been ongoing for decades. His father was the president of the state-
owned water utility company, SABESP, in the late 1970s, and the SABESP headquarters 
building is named after Reinach senior. Since childhood, Reinach has watched the 
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progression of the Cantareira system from a major engineering feat to the dire 
circumstances of 2015.  Reinach holds a Ph.D. from Cornell University, is a member of 
the Brazilian Academy of Science, and was once the Secretary of Science Development 
at the Ministry of Science and Technology. He calls the drought the “last drop” that 
triggered the water crisis.  In the midst of the drought, Brazil made newspaper headlines 
as the eyes of the world turned to watch how the country would deal with the confluence 
of several issues: preparations to host the 2014 World Cup, mounting signs of an 
economic slump, and the start of a highly competitive presidential election.  All of these 
happenings placed Brazil and its politicians under a magnifying glass on the world stage.  
Public and external perception of the facts took on new importance, and masking the 
severity of water resources problem seemed like an acceptable policy to those in charge, 
despite what was at stake.  
 
3.1.2 Objectives and methodology 
Given the magnitude and severity of the problem, I initiated an academic collaboration in 
2013 with Richard Palmer and William Werick, coauthors of the U.S. National Drought 
Study (1995) and collaborative modeling experts who pioneered the method of Shared 
Vision Planning.  I sought their collaboration to engage Brazilian academics and facilitate 
two public workshops that were held over a period of 10 months at the University of 
Campinas (UNICAMP).  The objective of this multi-institutional collaboration was to 
demonstrate what an open and transparent dialogue (with the use of a participatory 
model) would look like if applied to São Paulo’s water conflicts.  The objective of this 
chapter is to summarize and report the results of these workshops and to analyze the 
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obstacles to building collaboration around solving the water conflict.  While both 
workshops drew significant attendance (more than 150 diverse participants each), they 
suffered from the absence of certain well-positioned stakeholders who were responsible 
for making major water decisions and who entirely circumvented existing platforms for 
deliberations.  Efforts over a year and a half to engage the SABESP water utility and state 
water authorities failed.  During this time period, the drought worsened and water supply 
deliveries were reduced by more than half.  Here, we analyze the state water authorities’ 
response to the drought. 
 
This chapter makes use of a mixed-method approach that includes interviews, meeting 
attendance, and content analysis of technical documents.  I conducted a total of 33 semi-
structured interviews with water expert participants and local stakeholders between 2011-
2015 during separate research trips to Brazil.  Another source of information came from 
my attendance and participation in over two dozen water basin and water permit 
renegotiation meetings from August 2013 to December 2015.  Interviews and meeting 
attendance help triangulate information and identify the discrepancies between written 
documents and management actions.  Appendix B provides a methodological note on the 
interviews conducted and the roster of meeting attendance.  Appendix C provides a 
sample of the open-ended interview questions approved by the Institutional Review 
Board.  
 
Information gathered through interviews and meeting attendance was complemented and 
contrasted with that obtained through contact with key informants, document review of 
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technical reports, and observations in two different online discussion groups between 
2013 and 2015.  My document analysis involved mining a range of document types (e.g., 
decrees, reports, resolutions, etc.) for information including performance metrics (e.g., 
reliability), definitions (e.g., water banks) and regulations (e.g., primary vs. secondary 
flows) that pertained to the operation of the Cantareira system.  The online groups 
included a public forum (São Paulo’s Water Crisis Forum) and a national expert forum 
(Brazilian Water Resources Association online forum), both of which actively discuss 
water resource concerns.13  Lastly, quantitative methods were used to develop a mock 
participatory computer model called the Shared Vision Model (SVM), which is described 
in the workshop interventions section. For an application of this model to analyze policies 
for the Cantareira water supply system, please refer to Chapter 4.  In this chapter, the 
SVM computer model developed for the workshops is analyzed in terms of its role as a 
boundary object for engaging stakeholders.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 explains the importance of water 
governance to understanding this case study. Section 3.3 provides detailed background on 
Brazil’s National Water Reform and argues the importance of São Paulo as a case study 
region, given its central role in state and national water politics. The trajectory of water 
conflict between two basins makes this case study region a particularly interesting one.  
Section 3.4, titled “Anatomy of a Crisis,” documents how São Paulo’s critical situation – 
                                                 
13 The  Brazilian Water Resources Association online forum fell relatively silent on the topic of São 
Paulo’s drought after Kelman and Braga were named to governmental positions.  Many members of the 
Association were students or colleagues of these two prominent professors, and criticism of the handling of 
the drought may have become uncomfortable for members. 
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which nearly caused a water system collapse – happened despite plans and known 
technical solutions.  Section 3.5 documents the factors that motivated us to organize two 
Shared Vision Planning (SVP) workshops, with an emphasis both on the technical 
operations of the Cantareira water system and on the role of information asymmetries in 
exacerbating the problem. Moreover, it provides a discussion of participation, water 
governance, cooperation, and institutional authority that is grounded in extensive 
fieldwork, including the workshop interventions. Section 3.6 concludes with some 
lessons learned. 
 
3.2 The importance of water governance 
Water governance is often viewed by technical experts as laws and regulations [Rogers et 
al., 2009], rather than as a struggle between economics, equity, and the right to decide.  
While water governance does deal with regulations, it is also the “formal and informal 
instruments” through which institutions, people, and networks manage water [Kayser et 
al., 2015, p.187].  River basins are fertile ground for exploring networks of disparate 
actors who have learned to mobilize necessary resources to bring water into the political 
agenda and build political support [Abers and Keck, 2007].   
 
Social and political scientists point out the importance of competing interests in the 
struggle to reach a decision – to govern – despite the existence of relevant laws and 
regulations.  We find competing interests present any time water conflicts surface, and 
Brazil is no exception.  One example of particular interest to our current study is the 
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innate tension between technical expertise and decentralized/participatory management 
that has been woven into the very fabric of modern Brazilian water management.   
 
The Brazilian water reform movement began in the 1970s, and from the beginning it 
idealized hard science.  Hoping to depoliticize a field that had been historically burdened 
with power struggles, reformists argued that objective, rational, science-based decision-
making was the means to find optimal, efficient, technical solutions.  This perspective is 
not uncommon among experts who believe in the attractive promise that technological 
progress will benefit all without the messiness of political meddling [Jamieson, 2000; 
Jasanoff, 2000; Scott, 2004].  At the same time, many of the sanitation engineers and 
other technical experts (técnicos) who were important architects and mobilizers of the 
reforms espoused progressive views on participatory decision-making, and their ideas 
helped to shape Brazil’s new regulations.  Even as decentralized, participatory 
management and institutions were written into law and brought into existence, reformists 
assumed that planning decisions would be protected from politics by sheer technical 
competency.  Whether deliberately or through naivete, reformers overlooked the inherent 
contradiction between technical primacy and (meaningful) public participation, ignoring 
the fact that technically insulated decision-making excludes non-technical actors from 
participating.  Nevertheless, many of the technical experts who had called for more 
decentralized and participatory management took leadership roles in the newly created 
agencies and river basin councils [Gutierrez, 2010].  
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But laws, regulations, and a handful of institutions created by decree are not sufficient for 
water governance; “politics is the arena where changing values of water are fought” 
[Rogers et al., 2009, p.248].   Experts found the technical ideal challenged when, during 
the participatory process, policy alternatives were opened to discussion, thus 
transforming expert ideas and decisions into a subject of debate.  Bargaining over 
technical details was not what Brazilian reformers had envisioned.  The new paradigm 
quickly revealed the inaccuracy of the tacit assumption that “rational” decisions and 
policies were to remain apolitical in the policy process.  Water allocations had always 
been susceptible to powerful influences, and now there were even more participants at the 
table.  For the Brazilian river basin committees, arrangements on paper for their role in 
water management became real only as the committees took concrete actions to build 
political support.  This is the process by which small and repeated actions create 
legitimacy and, over time, power. The term “practical authority” was coined by Abers 
and Keck [2013] to refer to political authority that comes from experience rather than 
from laws and regulations [Abers and Keck, 2006, 2007]. 
 
Hence, water governance evolves dynamically but in unpredictable time frames.  On the 
one hand, ineffective participation weakens governing institutions, and participation 
tends to turn sterile if governance is not exercised.  On the other hand, active water 
governance can strengthen institutions but it demands the kind of autonomy, brokerage, 
and improvisation that are associated with decision-making power.  São Paulo’s water 
crisis was mostly a governance crisis that can best be understood given the tension that 
arose between insulating technical decision and who had the power to govern over the 
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water institutions.  As we shall see in the next section, the study region had active water-
governing institutions as the drought crisis began, yet these institutions failed to gather 
support to act during the crisis. 
 
3.3 Background on São Paulo’s case study  
Brazil is a privileged place to study the IWRM framework.  Water resources experts in 
Brazil are not considered “mere recipients of the IWRM paradigm but as active 
participants in the world-wide, multi-centric process of paradigm change” in water 
management [Gutierrez, 2007, p.84].  The next subsections lay out the importance of São 
Paulo as a case study region, given its central role in Brazil’s National Water Reform and 
in light of how its history and trajectory of water conflicts have created its existing 
institutions.   
 
3.3.1 São Paulo as an important case study on the conflicting objectives of IWRM 
The river basin committees in the state of São Paulo are among the oldest in the country, 
and they have decades of experience dealing with civil society in the negotiations of 
water management.  São Paulo’s state water laws (as detailed in Section 3.3.2) explicitly 
called for the creation of the first two river basin committees – the Alto Tietê (AT) and 
the Piracicaba, Capivari and Jundaí (PCJ) basins – which shared water to supply the 
MRSP and surrounding regions.  The long and contentious dispute over water allocation 
between the AT and PCJ basins made the region among the most vested in creating 
decentralized and participatory water laws in Brazil.  The PCJ river basin is considered to 
be at the epicenter of the São Paulo State Water Law, and active members of the PCJ 
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river basin have been prominent authorities in the Nation’s water reform [Castellano and 
Barbi, 2006; Castellano, 2008; Abers and Keck, 2013].   
 
 
Figure 3.1 Map of Brazil highlighting the state of São Paulo [TUBE, 2016] 
 
The state of São Paulo is the most economically developed region in Brazil.  The state of 
São Paulo has historically been the economic engine for Brazil and currently has a Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) greater than the next four Brazilian states combined [IBGE, 
103 
2015a, IBGE, 2015b] (Figure 3.1).  Together, the MRSP and PCJ region are responsible 
for 20.9% of Brazil’s GDP [SEADE, 2011a, SEADE, 2011b].  Moreover, the state has a 
history of established institutions that are soluble, including water institutions.  São Paulo 
is a good testing ground to examine the role of participation and models in implementing 
IWRM for five reasons.  First, it has a longstanding commitment, at least on paper, to 
IWRM principles dating to the passing of its State Water Law in 1991.  Second, there are 
identifiable sources of conflict between influential regions and between the interests of 
different stakeholders.  Third, the stakeholders in a São Paulo have a reputation for being 
relatively well-organized.  Fourth, there is a large per capita community of well-trained 
and respected technical water professionals, since the region is home to one of the oldest 
schools of engineering in the country (Escola Politécnica da Universidade de São Paulo-
-USP) and to several universities renowned both in Brazil and across Latin America 
(including USP and UNICAMP).  Finally, there are well-established water organizations 
including a water and sanitation authority, water pollution and environmental agencies, 
and municipal water institutions (detailed in Section 3.3.3).  
 
3.3.2 State and national reform  
In the early 1970s, Brazilian water experts and professional organizations, led 
predominantly by civil and sanitation engineers, participated in international discussion 
that informed both their vision and the model for the Brazilian water management reform.  
Interestingly, São Paulo’s State Water Law of 1991 (Law 7.633/1991) 14 predated the 
1992 Dublin Principles documents that first explicitly expressed the concept of IWRM.  
                                                 
14 São Paulo State Water Act (1991), Lei Estadual Nº 7.663, de 30 de Dezembro de 1991.  
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The Brazilian National Water Resource Policy15 (NWRP of 1997) was passed six years 
after São Paulo’s reform, and it reinforced the central tenets of IWRM. The long and 
intense reform process involved numerous public debates and workshops, which were 
seen as central to garnering “strong support for the decentralization process and intensive 
community participation” [Porto and Kelman, 2000, p.254].  
 
Inspired by the French management model, the principles of integration, decentralization, 
and participation (IDP) were fundamental to the new water management model in Brazil 
[Veiga and Magrini, 2013; Diz and Soeftestad, 2004].  The National Water Resource 
Policy in Brazil interprets the IDP model as meant to: 1) coordinate (integrate) 
management in multiple uses of water through numerous outlined instruments; 2) 
decentralize decisions at national, state, and river basin levels that are interrelated, with 
the river basin becoming the basic territorial unit; and 3) create participation at the level 
of the Comitê de Bacia Hidrográfica (river basin committee, or CBH).  The CBH is an 
innovative, tri-party, representation comprised of state and federal government, public 
and private water users, and civil society organizations [Gutierrez, 2007].  Brazil’s 
stakeholder-driven CBHs were intended to help democratize the decision-making 
process.  The law, in theory, made river basins the territorial unit where decisions were 
negotiated and debated.  It was meant to guarantee that “the negotiation of conflicts, the 
sustainable use of water resources, and the consequent efficiency and legitimacy of all 
decisions will be achieved through the participation of stakeholders, that is, all those 
                                                 
15 National Water Resources Policy (1997), Lei Nº 9.433, de 8 de Janeiro de 1997. 
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interested in (or affected by) the integrated management of water resources at the river 
basin level” [Gutierrez, 2008].  
 
The idealization of technical knowledge and expertise has been a common theme in 
Brazil’s National Water reform.  The confidence of Brazilian técnicos in the technocratic 
approach came from a long history of authoritarian military regimes in Brazil that spilled 
over to the planning and policy discourse [Abers and Keck, 2013, p.42–43].  The 
decentralized and participatory management paradigm assumed that technical 
competency and rational decisions would remain apolitical.  Of course, this did not occur.  
In this case, where técnicos played a key role in the reform, their actions were influenced 
by implicit judgments and worldviews rather than strictly scientific and technical 
knowledge [Lemos et al., 2012].  
 
3.3.3 Institutional framework 
This section introduces some of the institutions in the São Paulo case study.  These are 
federal, state, and basin-level institutions that play a role in São Paulo’s water 
management.  Understanding their relations to the National Institutional Framework 
(Figure 3.2) helps us determine the institutional functions that were (or were not) 
executed during the crisis.   
 
ANA (National Water Agency) is a federal agency that was created in 2000 as directed 
by Law 9984 of 2000.  Legislation called for an autonomous Agency that would have 
links to the Ministry of Environment, but could worked across sectors. ANA has the 
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authority to grant user rights for rivers of federal dominion.  Since the Cantareira system 
has two rivers crossing more than one state and three state rivers, ANA and DAEE share 
authority for granting rights.   
 
DAEE (Department of Water and Electrical Energy) is the executing agency that under 
state law is responsible for managing the water resources of state dominion.  It grants, 
licenses, plans, and registers water permits.  It was modeled after the Tennessee Valley 
Authority when it was founded in 1951.  Given the history and importance of 
hydropower in Brazil, its staff is very technical.  For decades, it was responsible for the 
building and technical oversight of hydropower dams in the state.  
 
SABESP (Basic Sanitation Company of the State of São Paulo) is the primary water 
utility company in the state of São Paulo and supplier to the MRSP.  It is a mixed capital 
company, 50.3% public and 49.7% private, and is listed on the SP and NY stock 
exchanges.  Although it is a state entity, it has been operated as a private company since 
1994 (when it entered the SP stock exchange), and it has paid substantial dividends to its 
stockholders and bonuses to executive officers.  High-level positions are filled by 
gubernatorial appointment, and the technical body is composed of concursados 
(competition-based government positions).   
 
ARSESP (Regulating Agency for Public Service Concessions) is a state agency that 
regulates, controls, and oversees basic sanitation in the state.  Its principal powers are to 
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regulate and supervise sanitation services of both state and municipal ownership.  During 
the drought, it authorized the restructuring of price rates and the “bonus” program. 
 
CETESB (Environmental Sanitation Technology Company) is a state agency responsible 
for the control, oversight, monitoring, and licensing of activities that generate pollution or 
affect the fundamental preservation and recovery of water quality.  During the drought, 
they were largely absent from the debates.  
 
CBHs (River Basin Committees, or CBH) are the territorial units in state and federal 
water laws.  The CBH was intended as the planning unit where members would resolve 
water problems through conflict resolution and consensus building. 
 
The Water Agency is the executive arm of a CBH.  Despite having access to a rich 
database, and a great deal of technical expertise, the AT and PCJ water agencies have 
only played secondary roles in supporting the river basin decisions.  Although they have 
situation rooms for monitoring the basins and are financially solvent, both agencies 
remained distant from the turmoil of the water crisis.  
 
Though not part of the National Institutional framework, two other entities played an 
important role during the drought:   
MP-GAEMA (Public Ministry) is a government entity at both state and federal level 
responsible for promoting class action suits in the public interest.  The institution’s 
environmental branch in the state of São Paulo (GAEMA) has been very active including 
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organizing public hearings, requesting data through the Freedom of Information Act (Lei 
12.527 of 2011), and bringing suits against other public agencies for dereliction of 
responsibilities. It also negotiates “conduct adjustment agreements” in disputes involving 
public actors. 
 
CPI (Parliamentary Commission Inquiry) is a commission set up by legislative 
assemblies at all levels of the federal government charged with investigations that are in 
the public interest.  Similar to congressional hearings in the USA, by law the commission 
can compel experts and people under investigation to give testimony.  
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3.3.4 São Paulo’s history of governance and joint management 
In this subsection, I examine how governance issues have developed in the São Paulo 
institutional context.  Water stress is not new to the MRSP region.  In 2003, a World 
Bank Report warned of the existing “dramatic situation” in the MRSP given the “serious 
risks” faced by the city’s water supply systems [Porto, 2003].  In 2010, a federal Atlas of 
Urban Water Supply looked at the reliability of water supplies on a 2025 horizon given 
the physical and economic costs to maintain current infrastructure in the major cities of 
Brazil.  For the MRSP, that figure was R$4 billion [ANA, 2011] because supplies would 
have to be transported from further away to meet the demands of a growing population.  
An increase in water supply to the MRSP was possible only through a combination of 
great engineering feats and water transfers from other basins, such as the inter-basin 
transfer from the PCJ river basins (Figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3 River basins units in the state of São Paulo showing PCJ and AT [CIESP and 
FIESP, 2014]  
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For decades, the PCJ river basins and neighboring Alto Tietê basin, which corresponds 
very closely with the MRSP, have been involved in a contentious dispute over water 
allocation.  In 1974, the military regime signed Decree No. 750, which authorized the 
then fully state-owned company SABESP to divert up to 33 m3/s from the PCJ basin to 
provide water to the economically booming region of São Paulo.  SABESP began 
diverting water from the PCJ basin because the city’s water sources were insufficient to 
meet its growing demands.  Within the 1991 São Paulo State Water Law was a mandate 
for the creation of the PCJ and AT river basin committees as the first two committees in 
the state [Castellano and Barbi, 2006].  They were created in 1993 and 1994, 
respectively.  The Alto Tietê basin had the resources and motives to become an active 
and vibrant CBH, as it was expected to resolve the mounting water resource problems 
affecting São Paulo.  However, the CBH-AT struggled to thrive from the start, and its 
autonomy was undermined as committee decisions were sidelined and members lost 
interest in participating in activities that did not carry much weight.  In practice, 
SABESP, DAEE, and the State Secretariat of Water Resources and Sanitation crowded 
out the role of the CBH-AT and acted as negotiator of contracts and permits on behalf of 
the Alto Tietê basin.  
 
The Cantareira system is an extensive network of reservoirs and tunnels that supply water 
to roughly half of the population in metropolitan São Paulo.  This major infrastructure 
project along with a 30-year water permit concession was approved during the military 
government, and the affected municipalities in the PCJ basins resented this fact 
[Castellano and Barbi, 2006].   Conflict over the construction of the Cantareira system 
111 
began when the water transfer between PCJ and Alto Tietê caused a significant decrease 
in water quality to downstream users of the PCJ basins [Seydell, 2000].  The decades-
long battle over water between PCJ, SABESP, and the two state agencies was dubbed the 
“Cold War” in an interview with José Machado who was past president-director of ANA 
and among the founders of the PCJ Consortium [Pereira, 2016].  PCJ remained 
dissatisfied with the imposed Cantareira transfer that gave 10 times more water to 
SABESP than to the sending region after 1975 [Nunes and Castro, 2014].  It is under 
these circumstances that mobilization in the PCJ basin first began to build and shape the 
institutions that govern there today.   
 
The CBH-PCJ has evolved over time in its functions and form.  The first version of the 
PCJ council was the self-funded Intermunicipal Consortium of the Piracicaba and 
Capivari river basins, created in 1989.  The consortium was the result of intense 
campaigning and mobilization in the 1970 and 1980s by the municipalities downstream 
of the Cantareira system to restore the Piracicaba river basin [AEAP, 2016].  The PCJ 
Consortium gained authority and respect as it negotiated between civil society, NGOs, 
and public and private interests for the basin.  Moreover, the PCJ Consortium members’ 
capacity for dialogue and negotiation allowed them to cope effectively through the 
challenging transition years of the reform, and helped them mature in their technical and 
political abilities as joint management organizations [Barbi, 2007].  They learned to work 
directly with SABESP and DAEE, and later with ANA, to institute water pricing, the first 
Water Agency in PCJ, and the first open negotiations of water permits (outorga) in 2004.  
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In 2004, the 30-year concession to SABESP expired, and water permit negotiations to 
renew allocations took place under new conditions.  For one thing, the laws in place had 
changed.  The National Water Agency (ANA) had been created in 2001, and SABESP 
had been partially privatized, with stock traded on the São Paulo and New York Stock 
Exchanges starting in 1997 and 2002, respectively.  Also, ANA (a federal agency) and 
DAEE (a state agency) shared regulatory authority over the Cantareira and oversaw water 
permitting for the basin.  During the 2004 negotiations, the PCJ councils were credited 
with improved negotiating capacities by including diverse players and creating an 
environment of cooperation, conflict resolution, and compromise [Barbi, 2007].  The PCJ 
river basin committee negotiated heavily and held numerous meetings over the course of 
2 years.  Despite several concessions, the final PJC document included key conditions 
that its members considered victories at the time: 1) the new permits were granted for a 
10-year period as opposed to a 30-year requested; 2) the legal permit included a 
commitment and a timeline for SABESP to meet a number of conditions over the next 
decade (e.g., a signed commitment to investments in sewage collection and treatment 
over the next 10 years, commitment to reduce water loss, a concrete Macro-metropolis 
Plan to reduce water dependency from the Cantareira); and 3) the creation of the Water 
Bank (Banco de Aguas) as an innovative management tool to save water for dry seasons 
or times of need [Castellano and Barbi, 2006; Abers and Keck, 2013].  
 
3.4 Anatomy of a crisis 
The previous section suggests that the history of water governance in Alto Tietê and PCJ 
make the Cantareira system in São Paulo an attractive case study for adaptive 
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management in the face of critical events.  The water crisis provided a clear problem 
definition. The actors and institutions in the river basins involved were reasonably well-
organized and well-informed.  Many of the actors knew each other from decades of 
experience interacting, negotiating, and disputing water issues at local and national 
levels. And yet when the 2013 drought crisis placed São Paulo at risk of running out of 
water, the initial response was slow and inadequate given the magnitude of the problem.  
  
In a megacity of the size and importance of São Paulo, there is no simple narrative of the 
water crisis.  São Paulo’s water situation had been a growing problem for decades; a lack 
of rainfall, followed by denial, was what triggered the acute problem. The purpose of this 
section is to show that framing the problem strictly in terms of water scarcity (limited 
resources that can be managed better), would ignore a significant amount of evidence on 
the influence of power and politics.  São Paulo’s failure to respond promptly to the water 
crisis makes the region a good case study for highlighting the contradictions within the 
principles of IWRM.  
 
The remainder of this section focuses on the events that surrounded the drought and water 
permits negotiations from October 2013 to December 2015.  Section 3.4.1 looks at the 
role of denial and lack of information.  Section 3.4.2 show how technical knowledge and 
technical jargon were used to mask the severity of the problem, ultimately allowing a 
small group of well-positioned players to shield their decisions from the public eye.  
Section 3.4.3 explains how the authority of existing agencies was brought into question.  
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Section 3.4.4 explains some of the complex and competing layers of political interests 
that were stronger than the existing coalition around the river basin committees.   
 
3.4.1 Denial and lack of information  
The drought tipped a long-existing problem into a critical situation. As previously noted, 
a World Bank report (2003) written nearly a decade before the crisis warned that São 
Paulo would face water problems.  Such warnings were the motivation for the Macro-
metropolis Plan to reduce conflict.  The Macro-metropolis Plan was an important 
stipulation in the 2004 negotiations: the final permitting document, Decree 121316 Article 
XVI explicitly stated the need for the MRSP to seek other water sources because its sole 
dependence on an inter-basin water transfer posed problems for both basins.  SABESP 
presented the original plan of supplies until 2025, called Plano Diretor de Abastecimento 
de Água da RMSP (Master Plan of Water Supply for the MRSP), to DAEE and State 
government in 2006 but these authorities did not accept it (Meeting #1, September 2013).  
Instead, a broader, more ambitious study was commissioned in 2008 by the state to map 
new water sources and demands for a 2035 horizon and in the so-called “macro-
metropolis,” corresponding to 180 municipalities and about 30 million people.  The plan 
was only completed in October 2013 [Cobrape, 2013], several months into the start of the 
negotiation and the drought event.  
 
Based on our simulation model and analysis of the Cantareira, reservoirs had registered a 
negative net balance for 22 months (between May 2013 and February 2015).  Yet, nearly 
                                                 
16 DAEE Decree 1213 (2004), Portaria DAEE Nº 1213, de 06 de Agosto de 2004 
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12 months went by with negative balance before system demands were reduced at the end 
of March 2014.  Moreover, an internal SABESP report dated January 2014, called 
Rodízio do Sistema Cantareira 2014 (Rotation of the Cantareira System 2014), provided 
three restriction plans for dealing with the impending water shortages to avoid what they 
called “a system collapse” (discussed in Section 4.4.1).  SABESP’s administration chose 
to ignore these plans, betting that it would eventually rain.  Things would get much worse 
before their bet paid off.  
 
My preliminary interviews (conducted in 2011 and 2012) and technical document 
reviews pointed to the robust monitoring network and hydrological simulation models 
available in the state of São Paulo.  As noted earlier, the concentration of technical 
expertise and university research funding in São Paulo seemed promising for data 
availability on water quantity and allocations.  In August 2013, when I began my 
extended period of fieldwork in São Paulo, negotiations were underway to renew water 
transfer permits between PCJ and metropolitan São Paulo.  However, I quickly learned of 
the lack of access to some of the most basic information about the Cantareira system, 
information that one might expect to be essential for managing water (e.g., 
inflows/outflows, user permits, pricing).  Given São Paulo’s wealth and importance, the 
vast lacuna of data came as a surprise to many.  For example, in an interview with two 
ANA técnicos, it was revealed that ANA did not have direct access to monitoring stations 
in the Cantareira. Only after an incident of misreporting did ANA have a técnico from the 
Situation Room assigned to monitor SABESP’s self-reported flows on a monthly basis 
(Interview #29, Brasilia).  For years, ANA had relied on SABESP’s monitoring stations 
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and reporting. 17  During the seven months that I interviewed and attended meetings 
(August 2013-April 2014), several grave concerns over access to information would 
surface.  As the drought worsened and the reservoirs emptied in the months that followed, 
it became increasingly apparent to everyone that none of the existing agencies had 
authority to regulate SABESP.   
 
When the drought became local and international news, and as district judges were 
pressuring state authorities to declare a state of emergency, São Paulo’s situation needed 
to appear under control.  São Paulo Governor Geraldo Alckmin, who was up for 
reelection for a fifth term, continued to promise that the city of São Paulo would not run 
out of water, assuring people that third and fourth reserves would be tapped from the 
dead storage (explaned in detail in section 3.4.2) to supply water in the event of a real 
emergency situation [G1 Globo, 2014; Maciel and Fernandes, 2015].  The National 
Water Agency affirmed in the Legislative Assembly capturing this volume was not 
possible.  Meanwhile, Alckmin used the imminent crisis argument to strong-arm federal 
authorities to allow a long-disputed water transfer from Paraiba do Sul, which enraged 
the neighboring Rio de Janeiro Governor.   
 
Residents in the state and city of São Paulo did not experience the drought equally.  
There were neighborhoods in the MRSP where people saw their water cut off for 10 to 24 
hours at a time, while some of the wealthy neighborhoods experienced almost no cuts 
                                                 
17 In early 2014, under growing pressure from PCJ river basin committee members and the Ministério 
Público, ANA installed three new monitoring station upstream of the Cantareira’s reservoirs. 
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during the entire crisis.  The explanation provided by SABESP was that the pressure 
reduction, used to reduce consumption and water loss, also affected water deliveries to 
high points and end-of-the-line regions in the periphery of the city.  These, as it happens, 
were often poorer neighborhoods where households did not have water tanks to store 
reserves during water cut offs.  
 
3.4.2 The drought and muddying of information 
In general, the onset of the water crisis was obscured, rather than clarified, by technical 
information. Authorities often used technical jargon to mask or deliberately 
mischaracterize the severity of the problem.  Three clear examples are provided in the 
subsections that follow.  The first alarming signs came early in October 2013 when 
Cantareira reservoir levels were at an unusually low 37%.  The rainy season in the 
Southeast region begins in October and ends in March.  By January 2014, three months 
into the wet season, some CBH members raised concerns over unusually low rainfall for 
the season.  Instead of filling up, the reservoir system was emptying fast, at an estimated 
60 thousand liters per month.  In February 2014, the GTAG (Technical Advisory 
Management Group) was belatedly formed to manage the crisis.  It was comprised of one 
representative from each of the agencies ANA, DAEE, and SABESP, plus the Executive 
secretaries for the PCJ and Alto Tietê river basin committees (though both committee 
secretaries at the time were DAEE state employees and occupy seats as representatives of 
the public sector within the committees). 
 
3.4.2.1 Reservoir levels and percentages 
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In October 2013, uncertainty began to set in among basin committee members over basic 
information about the system.  Take, for example, the unnecessary confusion over 
reservoir levels and the use of dead storage.  SABESP had always reported reservoir 
levels in percentages rather than total volume.  This would not be an issue if the method 
for calculating percentages were clear; however, what constituted 100% of the volume 
changed over the drought period.  Twice in 2014, once on May 16 and again on October 
20, the reservoir volume percentage reported online jumped overnight from single to 
double digits.  Further confusion came from the unconventional calculations used to 
report percentages: instead of adding the newly available (dead) volume to the numerator 
and denominator to calculate the percentage based on the new total volume, SABESP 
calculations left the denominator unchanged.  Mathematical conventions aside, there 
were two other issues with this reporting.  First, it masked the severity of the drought by 
artificially inflating the reservoir levels (by dividing by a smaller number), and second, it 
complicated any attempted comparisons between the current situation and that of 
previous months or years.  Is 15% today the same as 15% last month or last year, or in 
relation to the last drought? Confusion ensued over which percentage to use when 
speaking about the state of the Cantareira.  As the crisis evolved, SABESP changed its 
website to report reservoir levels in three different percentages.  Only in March 2015 did 
the courts finally require SABESP to clarify its reporting methods and reveal the real 
volumes behind the calculated percentages. The SABESP website continues to report 
three percentages.  CBH members would continue to raise similar questions over 
numerous other sources of information.  
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In December 2013, the PCJ Consortium was the first to announce a gloomy outlook for 
the Cantareira and to question current consumption rates [Consórcio PCJ, 2014].  The 
central question at monthly meetings of the technical subcommittee for Hydrological 
Monitoring (CT-MH) was whether the Cantareira could continue to produce deliveries 
totaling 36 m3/s (i.e., 33 m3/s to MRSP and 3 m3/s to PCJ).  The repeated answer from the 
subcommittee’s coordinator was that in times of need, the Water Banks allowed each 
basin to utilize its water “savings.”  However, based on sources outside SABESP, the 
leading consultant to the PCJ Consortium had announced in a closed-door meeting in 
September 2013 that, given the absence of physical space to store water in the Water 
Banks, the water “savings” existed only on paper [meeting attendance #2, September 
2013].   
 
In January 2014, when tensions were running high and news media showed up to report 
on that month’s CT-MH meeting, a young state prosecutor from the Ministério Público 
representing that institution’s environmental group GAEMA decided to confront the 
subcommittee’s coordinator, Aster Dias de Andrade, in front of the cameras.  After 
reading articles of the water law and leading the coordinator through a series of questions 
that he seemed increasingly uncomfortable answering, Dr. Alexandra Facciolli asked her 
final question:  Today SABESP has as much water in savings as the water stored in the 
entire Cantareira system.  How is this possible?  It is because the water banks are virtual, 
right, they are not real? After a long pause and a faint sign of agreement from Mr. Dias, 
Dr. Facciolli made a motion to suspend the use of the water banks until better information 
about the state of the reservoirs could be collected [meeting attendance #3, January 
120 
2014].  In the end, the water banks, which were created for safety during times of 
emergency, had helped to expedite the drawdown of the Cantareira system. 
 
3.4.2.2 Dead storage or “dead volume” 
Levels in the Cantareira reservoir and the use of water banks are directly related to 
another management instrument that became controversial: the use of dead storage 
(“Volumen Morto”).  Dead storage is the textbook technical term that refers to the water 
stored in a reservoir underneath the gravity-fed outlet (Figure 3.4). This water is not 
normally intended for use [Votruba and Broža, 1989].  Despite the consistent use of the 
term “dead storage” in all official documents for the Cantareira system, state authorities 
chose to refer to this additional volume as “technical reserve” or “strategic reserves” 
during this drought event [G1 Globo, 2015].  The pumping of dead storage on its own is 
not controversial, but how the use of the dead storage was handled turned it into another 
tangle of information that added to growing distrust.  First, the actual volume of water 
that was available in dead storage was ambiguous, and three water institutions with 
authority on the matter (GTAG, ANA, SABESP) reported three different values [Martins, 
2014].  Second, the dead storage was not originally intended for use, and could only be 
allocated via a formal process.  The authorization according to ANA and DAEE was 




Figure 3.4 Dead storage [Source: adapted from original graphic by A.C. Zuffo] 
 
SABESP reported on their website to have requested an emergency permit from ANA 
and DAEE to access a portion of the dead storage on two different occasions – first on 
April 17, and again on September 17, 2014.  ANA’s timeline places the request in 
October, while the official Resolution was only issued on November 17.18  However, 
official documents presented by SABESP on April 17 showed construction and 
investment to pump from dead storage volumes 1 and 2 scheduled to begin in mid-May 
and October of 2014 [SABESP, 2014b].  It is unclear whether SABESP made an 
authorization request or an announcement, and only those members of GTAG present at 
the April 17 meeting know how the plans were presented that day.  What is clear is that 
the custom-made floating pumps and public works, which cost R$80 million (USD $37 
                                                 
18 ANA/DAEE 1672 (2014). Resolução Conjunta ANA/DAEE No 1672, de 17 de Novembro de 2014. 
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million at the time), were commissioned months ahead of the installation.  Prior to 
authorizing access to dead storage for a second time in October 2014, ANA requested a 
more detailed plan on the risks of emptying the system. This analysis, based on 
simulation of past rainfall variability, was to be delivered at the end of September.  
However, SABESP requested a deadline extension three times.  GAEMA also tried to 
stop the use of dead storage through a civil action suit.  Neither of these attempts 
succeeded.   
 
The failure of both these efforts to make SABESP’s actions more transparent was 
noteworthy.  Both ANA (the federal licensing agency) and MP-GAEMA (the state-level 
public prosecutor for environmental affairs) had legal authority to require SABESP to 
provide more details of its operational plans for the Cantareira system.  By failing to 
respond, SABESP made a bold statement that it could disregard the authority of the 
licensing, monitoring, and regulatory institutions that oversaw the utility company.   
 
To add to the offense, ANA made an independent visit to the Atibainha reservoir on 
October 14 (where water would be newly withdrawn from dead storage), and found the 
reservoir already below authorized levels, even though SABESP reporting did not admit 
this fact [Korman, 2014; Monteiro and Rodrigues, 2014].  When ANA went back the 
next day on October 15, for a second visit, the technician found that the water gauge had 
been removed, and the online monitoring system was offline for 2 days afterwards.  ANA 
eventually left the GTAG in August 2014 over differences with SSRH Secretary, Mauro 
Acre, on the “proposed limitations for water withdrawal from the Cantareira system and 
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in the absence of following recommended flow rates to the MRSP to be applied since 
June 30, 2014” [ANA, 2014]. 
 
3.4.2.3 Pressure Reduction Valves (PRV) 
The use of pressure reduction valves (PRVs) to reduce physical water loss in the 
distribution system also posed some contradictions.  A diagram on the SABESP website 
purported to show how flow in the distribution system is monitored and can be reduced 
remotely.  The website also made a point of differentiating between pressure reduction, 
which leaves some water pressure in the pipes, and rodizio (rotation based on turning off 
the flow, fecha registro), which leaves pipes depressurized.  The website displayed, for 
example, the need to have high pressure during the mornings, while pressure could be 
reduced at night and in the early morning. To quote from the website: “Each sector has a 
remote measurement system to identify the amount of water consumed and the flow in 
the pipes during each hour of the day. Based on this information, the amount of water 
given the time of day can be controlled through linked network valves” [SABESP, n.d.]. 
 
In early 2015, newspapers reported interviews with SABESP employees and residents of 
affected neighborhoods, some live, which told a different story than the one SABESP 
was presenting on their site.  News reports asserted that 50% of the water demand 
reduction came from people’s water being turned off altogether [Leite, 2015, 2016].  A 
high-level official, not named in the report, was quoted as saying, "We have 60% of the 
network in the metropolitan area controlled by PRVs. This leaves 40% of the network. In 
these areas, we need to revert to [closing] operations in the street. There's no way. A part 
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of the city ends up being shut off.”  It is unclear whether PRVs forced the stated 50% 
demand reduction or just aided in achieving it.  To put this in context, in the US, 
restrictions can be voluntarily (e.g., no pool and outdoor water use on certain days) or 
mandatory (e.g., California 20% required reduction), but even the most severe mandatory 
reductions require collaboration from the public, and people are informed in advance.  
Prior to 2015, SABESP did not inform consumers in regions affected by PRVs.  Only in 
early 2015 could customers log on to SABESP’s website to learn if their neighborhood 
would be affected by pressure reductions.  Consequently, PRVs had the effect of 
reducing consumption and water loss, a fact SABESP openly admits.  The utility did not 
declare mandatory restrictions.  Yet, hidden in technical jargon of PRVs, is the 
undeclared rodizio that achieved the same effect. 
 
3.4.3 Lack of authority  
The basin committees in São Paulo are among the oldest in the country. They have 
decades of experience and have provided a platform for negotiations and management 
discussions with the participation of civil society on issues of water quantity and quality.  
The CBH and technical councils had created arenas to resolve critical problems; 
however, when the crisis began, frustration and concerns grew as key stakeholders and 
committee members were excluded from conversations.  It became apparent that the most 
difficult decisions were being made elsewhere.  The state Governor centralized the 
discussion and deliberations around a handful of technical actors, leaving the CBH out of 
the conversation.   
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The day before Carnival holiday in 2014, during a February monitoring subcommittee 
meeting, state prosecutor Facciolli expressed her frustration over the lack of information 
on water availability that rendered the role of the CT-MH inconsequential.  The morning 
meeting had started late, as heavy rainfall had delayed the arrivals of many council 
members.  When the meeting finally began, the information presented did not include 
February flows because the data had not yet been released to coordinators (and arguably 
to ANA).  Facciolli took the microphone and questioned the legitimacy of any decision 
from a council lacking the most basic and up-to-date information on the status of the 
Cantateira reservoirs. Seven months later, GAEMA of the Ministério Público filed a civil 
action suit against ANA/DAEE/SABESP for inadmissible risk in the operations of the 
system, for negligence in their responsibilities as regulating and management agencies, 
and for the economic, social, and environmental risks imposed on the region [GAEMA-
MP, 2014].  The civil suit further underscored the lack of authority of these agencies in 
their role as regulators. 
 
As illustrated in several previous examples of the deliberate muddying of information, 
there were institutions that were actively trying to be involved.  Some entities questioned 
and pressed the state and federal agencies to do their job – in GAEMA’s case, for 
example, taking the cases to the courts.  The inaction of the regulatory agencies like 
ANA, ARSEPS, and DAEE showed that they lacked the both authority to enforce the 
decisions that were their legal responsibility and the flexibility to interpret the law.  
Instead, powerful players found other means to resolve their problem outside of the 
established channels.  GTAG is an example of this circumvention.  Given the emergency 
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situation, laws and regulations were rushed, bent, and at times bypassed all together (e.g., 
GTAG resolutions or emergency construction of public works), effectively weakening 
the power and relevance of the existing institutions.  As we see next, even SABESP, the 
party that most benefitted from ANA and DAEE’s collective impotence, had its hands 
tied.  
 
The complex power dynamics were most obvious only after the gubernatorial election, 
when tapes recording discussions among high-level administrators surfaced.  A leaked 
tape of SABESP officials discussing their frustration over their minimal role and inability 
to prevent the crisis came to light after the November 2014 elections.  Paulo Massato, 
Metropolitan Director of SABESP, called for São Paulo’s exodus for vacation, stating 
that “there will be no water to take showers, to clean the house.” SABESP’s president at 
the time, Dilma Pena, was caught on the same tape saying that she wished SABESP had 
begun water conservation campaigns earlier, and lamenting that “superior orders” had 
prevented SABESP from being more open and involved with the public. 19    The 
Governor refused to declare a state of emergency.  Instead he explained that federal 
authorities induced the water shortages, hence, forcing the city into a state of emergency 
[do Valle, 2015]: “When the ANA determines that you have to reduce from 33 to 17 
[cubic meters per second] in the Cantareira, it is obvious that you are already under 
restriction … There is no need to decree [a state of emergency], this is more than 
explicit.”  Thus, he attributed the water shortages to ANA’s request to reduce 
                                                 
19 The tape of the two administrators talking can be heard here: 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2014/10/1537493-orientacao-superior-impediu-alerta-sobre-crise-
diz-presidente-da-sabesp.shtml (Accessed 12-15-2015) 
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withdrawals from the Cantareira system rather than acknowledging the need for 
preventative measures.  In fact, no official statement of emergency was ever announced 
by the Governor.  It was eventually reported in August 2014 that authorities at SABESP 
knew the severity of the situation in detail, since several rationing schemes had been 
presented in a plan entitled Rodízio do Sistema Cantareira 2014 dated January 2014 
[SABESP, 2014d].  However, on October 15, 2014 SABESP’s president revealed in a 
deposition that the company was prohibited by the Tribunal Judge from mentioning 
“drought” or “restrictions/rationing” in any of their public campaigns prior to the 
elections [Boghossian and Gama, 2014; Korman, 2014].   
 
Several red flags heralding an acute water crisis would be raised months prior to the crisis 
as shown in timeline of events superimposed on reservoir levels (Figure 3.5).  
Throughout the drought, the lack of authority over water in São Paulo became 
increasingly apparent.  ANA made repeated attempts to impose criteria and limits for 
water deliveries to the Cantareira.  They were not successful.  Joint resolutions from 
ANA and DAEE justified allocation requests based on the SABESP’s technical analysis 
rather than their own.  Within the institutional structure of the state, DAEE and SABESP 
are two arms of the state government overseen by the SSRH.  A number of experts 
interviewed expressed their skepticism of DAEE’s authority over SABESP, since the 
latter is a more technically equipped and financially powerful institution (Interview #12, 
14, 20).  Indeed, SABESP’s private and public arms made it susceptible to conflicts 




Figure 3.5 Timeline of events and reservoir levels during the 2013-2015 drought
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3.4.4 Water issues and political power in federal and state politics  
Although national and governmental politics are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is 
worth mentioning a few notable examples of the role of political power in São Paulo’s 
water crisis. These events show the ways in which technical information was used to 
influence public perception, and they reveal how several layers of politics played into the 
dissemination of information and complicated actions in the midst of a devastating 
natural event.  The drought crisis continued to worsen during the run-up to the 2014 
presidential and gubernatorial election.  In a few words, the water crisis entered into the 
political strategies of competing parties and office-holders at various levels of 
government.  Whoever could create a perception of competence – or, conversely, make a 
charge of incompetence stick – won electoral approval points.  
 
The 2014 presidential and state gubernatorial elections added political salience to the 
water conflict as candidates used the issue to attack the opposition at the federal and state 
levels.  During the gubernatorial debates, several candidates attacked incumbent São 
Paulo Governor Alckmin (PSDB candidate), citing his failure to act quickly and 
transparently, but to no avail.  Alckmin won the elections in the first round with more 
than 60% of the popular vote.  During a debate among presidential candidates on October 
20, 2014, incumbent president Dilma Rousseff (PT candidate) used the water crisis for 
the first time as an example of how her opponent’s party had lacked any foresight to plan 
for an event as critical as the one experienced in São Paulo.   
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At the start of 2016, there was much speculation that four-time governor Alckmin would 
seek PSDB’s nomination for the 2018 presidential election.  Governor Alckmin received 
the Lúcio Costa Award from the Urban Development Commission for the “excellence” 
with which he had handled the drought. One of Alckmin’s party colleagues in the House 
of Representatives made the award nomination.  The prize was awarded on October 23, 
2015, when the reservoirs were at -13.5%.  Alckmin expressed to the media, “All 
modesty aside, the award is well deserved.”  Partisan politics also played an important 
role.  Questioning the Governor’s decisions about water could be interpreted as being in 
alliance with the opposition party (Worker’s Party, or PT).  This was undesirable in the 
divisive political climate leading up to the Brazilian presidential impeachment.  PSDB 
would later play an important role in the protest and political coalition to impeach 
Rousseff (PT) from the presidency.  Given the troubled state of current politics in Brazil, 
the PSDB (Alckimin’s party) needed to gather all the momentum it could for the next 
presidential election.  
 
The level of denial by authorities and the lack of information (exposed only during the 
drought) thwarted any participatory efforts that came from outside the Governor’s circle.  
In fact, despite existing drought plans, acknowledgement from top-level administrators at 
SABESP that situation was critical, and attempts by regulators and other authorities to 
intervene, drought mitigation actions were delayed.  These events make sense only when 
juxtaposed with the political climate created by the November 2014 presidential and 
governmental elections, and with the motions to impeach President Rousseff, which 
began in May 2016.  Power and politics were central to hindering governance. 
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3.5 Shared Vision Model and Shared Vision Planning interventions 
Given the perceived information asymmetries and importance of access to technical 
information, I initiated an academic collaboration with Palmer and Werick.  As noted 
before, both were experts in collaborative modeling and drought management.  My direct 
collaboration with Faculty at UNICAMP (located in the PCJ basin) and contact with 
active members of the PCJ river basin councils over the course of more than six months 
motivated me to take part in organizing two public workshops (in May 2014 and March 
2015) to help demonstrate what an open and transparent dialogue would look like if 
applied in São Paulo’s water conflicts. This section describes the experimental workshops 
and what we learned, given the failure to build collaboration among all parties in an 
attempt to resolve the immediate water conflict.  This section is organized as follows. 
Section 3.5.1 describes the Shared Vision Model developed for the workshops.  Section 
3.5.2 and 3.5.3 use the two-stage framework—five dimensions of participation and 
mechanisms for building credibility, salience, and legitimacy—developed in Chapter 2 to 
describe and report on the design of these workshop agenda and accomplishment.  
Section 3.5.4 explains the challenges to collaboration and limitation of the SVP effort. 
 
3.5.1 The Shared Vision Model (SVM) 
The SVM is a simulation model of the Cantareira system’s inflows and outflows based on 
83 years of data.  It was constructed by William Werick 20  in Microsoft Excel to 
                                                 
20 Werick developed the SVM for the workshops and later worked closely with Falconi and Palmer to 
ensure that all members of the team could run or change the model as needed to test future policy options. 
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maximize its availability to the public during and after the two workshops.  Visual 
simulations are favored as ideal for stakeholder engagement processes [Winz et al., 
2009], so the SVM allows easy graphics and visual adjustment of simulation parameters 
to create several “if-then” scenarios.  This feature allows users to test policy alternatives 
systematically in real-time.  Given the drought crisis in São Paulo, prompt availability of 
model results was important.  Based on changes in demand, the model provides visual 
outputs of current reservoir storage in the Cantareira system (shown in blue in cubic 
hectometers in Figure 3.6), monthly water deficit (shown in red in m3/s), and yearly 
Position Analysis (not shown).  The model was validated using historical data.  Although 
the SVM was built as a tool for discussions and as an attempt to facilitate stakeholder 
engagement, we consider it a “mock” model given the limited feedback it received and 
the lack of full validation by all key stakeholders.  
 
 
Figure 3.6 The SVM interface  
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3.5.2 Stage one: defining the five dimensions of participation for São Paulo  
The following subsections describe the workshop events using the framework presented 
in detail in previous chapter, Section 2.4 and 2.5.  Table 3.1 summarizes stage one of the 
SVP participatory process.  
Table 3.1 Stage 1 – Five dimension of participation 
Dimension 1: Stakeholders  
1a. Core Participants: The workshops were intended to include all major actors 
in the Cantareira water dispute.  The event was open to the public and announced via 
newspapers and on UNICAMP’s website, as well as via the Brazilian Water Resources 
Association list server. Formal invitations from UNICAMP administration were sent to 
ANA, DAEE, SSRH, MP GAEMA, USP professors, and the Executive secretaries of the 
PCJ and Alto Tietê River Basin Committees.  Those present at each workshop are 
detailed below.  
1b. Organizing team: Falconi, Palmer, and Werick with the institutional support 
of UNICAMP 
Dimension 2. Stage of involvement:  
Involved in problem definition, model use, and scenario testing. Model use was 
limited to two sessions during the two workshops where alternative scenario testing was 
possible. Feedback on how the model could be useful for a drought event such as the one 
São Paulo was experiencing was taken into consideration in the second version of the 
model but not to the extent necessary for a true participatory model. 
Dimension 3. Degree of Involvement:  
At first, the degree of involvement was set low at Involved/Collaborative, but 
could expand to Empowerment in the event the efforts gained traction (please refer to 
Table 2.1 for the definitions of different degrees of involvement).  We had intended the 
workshops to create a collaborative environment and a more involved engagement of 
participants in drought management, but as outsiders we had no control over the general 
drought management process in São Paulo.  We enlisted and engaged key stakeholders 
from the PCJ basin committees and academics working directly to advise the PCJ 
Consortium and committees, but not all actors saw the benefit of participating.  As a 
result, the effort remained an “involved” effort (see Table 2.1), but the combination of 
political timing and the drought conflict made sustained collaboration among involved 
parties difficult.  For example, Rui Brasil, a high-level representative from the SSRH was 
present in the second workshop; however, he limited his participation to a generic 
presentation and a brief session of questions and answers before departing. 
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Dimension 4. Level of influence:  
The workshops had no influence in the operations and management of the system. 
At a very small scale, they influenced the ongoing actions of the Ministério Público and 
provided expert testimony and evidence for public hearings led by GAEMA on the 
impacts of the drought.  (The reasons for low level of influence of the model and 
workshops are described in Section 3.5.3 and 3.5.4).   
 
Dimension 5. Purpose:  
To illustrate what a participatory model would look like for the Cantareira system, 
and to demonstrate the expediency of a Shared Vision Model for evaluating relevant 
strategies during São Paulo’s water negotiations and later the drought policy options.  
 
 
3.5.2.1 Workshop 1: Shared Vision Planning for the Cantareira system 
The International Workshop on Conflict Resolution and Water Scarcity in São Paulo 
took place on May 15, 2014, on the very day the emergency floating pumps were 
activated to access the first dead storage.  The main goal of the first workshop was to 
illustrate what a participatory computer model would look like for the Cantareira system, 
and to assess the possibility of a participatory platform for the re-negotiation of water 
allocations.  As the Cantareira fell to its lowest recorded level (as of that date), SABESP 
requested a special permit signed by the regulating agencies, ANA and DAEE, to 
authorize the use of the dead storage.  There was concern from the population at large, 
but also a growing uncertainty among the PCJ basin committee’s technical and non-
technical members alike, apparent from the number of unanswered questions they had 
raised.  
 
The mock SVM is visual and has a simple interface that provides easy access to questions 
that were often raised during discussions, such as:  How much water is left in the 
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reservoirs? Can an estimate of days of water supply left be made based on current 
demand levels? What would happen if demand was reduced? What is the degree of 
certainty for the estimated values?  The SVM is intended for use in real time to explore 
several scenarios based on current system storage levels and to demonstrate the model’s 
various useful features in water allocation discussions for the Cantareira system.  The 
model generated considerable interest, but attendees raised concerns over the viability of 
a SVP platform given the critical situation at the time.  
 
The afternoon session was dedicated to subdivided group discussions and a feasibility 
discussion at large.  The attendees – who numbered over 150 and included government 
agency employees, water utility managers, academics, and representatives of private 
entities – were asked five triage questions (described in Section 4.3.4.1) designed to 
evaluate whether SVP could be successful [Werick and Palmer, 2004].  The assembled 
participants overwhelmingly agreed on the value of attempting a more participatory water 
allocation process.  Yet they also noted, nearly unanimously, that a small number of well-
positioned stakeholders who were not officially present at the workshop (like SABESP 
and the state authorities) would not welcome the increased scrutiny of stakeholder 
participation.  
 
The meeting did not bring about change in any management operations of the Cantareira 
system.  It did, however, influence how people thought about technical information.  The 
most tangible evidence of this is the Ministério Público’s decision to request via the 
Public Information Act that SABESP provide several years of data from the monitoring 
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stations upstream and downstream of the reservoirs.  The request was drafted by the 
MP’s technical analysts and revised by several of the presenters at the Workshop 
including our research team. The Ministério Público cited our workshop specifically as 
the motivation for their request.  This was the first of several requests that Ministério 
Público would make of SABESP.  
   
3.5.2.2 Workshop 2: Shared Vision Model and virtual droughts 
The Forum on Water Sustainability took place over two days, March 17 and 18, 2015.  It 
was held almost one year into the drought, ten months after the first workshop.  
Ambiguity over the real socioeconomic consequences of the drought made for a very 
tense start to 2015.  The Cantareira system had set a new all-time record low storage in 
January 2015 and was delivering a mere 14.2 m3/s in March 2015, less than half of the 
normal water supply.  The forum had over 300 registered attendees, as well as some 500 
remote, online live viewers.   
 
The goal of the second workshop was to create drought preparedness options based on 
virtual drought policy alternatives so that participants could explore the potential trade-
offs and consequences in the controlled simulation environment of the virtual models.  
Leading the workshop organization were UNICAMP’s Office of International Affairs and 
the Rector’s strategic thinking group PENSES, which drew high-level authorities as 
speakers and participants.  Most notably in attendance from government agencies were: 
Vicente Andreu Guillo, President of ANA; Rui Brasil Assis, Coordinator at the state 
SSRH; and Dr. Alexandra Faccioli Martin and Dr. Sandra Akemi Kishi, justice 
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prosecutors from the state and federal levels of the Ministerio Publico, respectively.  
Water resources coordinator Prof. Jose Tundisi, of the Brazilian Academy of Science, 
was a notable attendee from the non-state sector.  Also present was Prof. Margaret Keck, 
from the Political Science department at the Johns Hopkins University, and an expert in 
Brazilian water institutions and water reform.  The event drew some government 
representatives, but SABESP and DAEE were notably missing, and the SSRH 
representative limited his participation to a generic presentation and a brief session of 
questions and answers before departing.  Their absence undermined any potential 
influence a participatory effort could have, since the legitimacy of the model depends on 
validation and usefulness for real decisions.  
 
Given the new leadership in the state water agencies, there was some optimism, but the 
severity of the situation was growing.  We viewed the second workshop as a second 
chance to assess the possibility of SVP in São Paulo.  The SVM presentations featured a 
second version of the model with new drought recovery functions for the Cantareira 
system to evaluate potential strategic actions based on drought indicators and triggers.  
The focus of the model presentation was to highlight the usefulness of virtual drought 
exercises. The model was updated to include more critical scenarios experienced in 2014-
2015 and to assess trade-offs based on recovery drought plans given optimistic and 
pessimistic future rainfall scenarios.  Palmer presented other drought examples, such as 
California’s response to the 2012-2015 drought, to showcase how drought monitoring 
and established drought indicators, triggers points, and responses had mitigated the 
impacts for those specific situations.  The second workshop was successful in providing 
 138 
an assessment of the ongoing drought but, like the first workshop, it was not successful in 
generating the core changes necessary to make the process more inclusive of other 
stakeholders.  
 
Question and answer sessions and small group discussions at the workshops showed that 
attendees could imagine a better outcome from a transparent process. However, attendees 
also recognized that there were several issues at play that could undermine the process, 
including growing demonstrations against president Rousseff.  It was simply not in the 
best interest of all parties involved to have a more collaborative decision-making 
platform such as the one offered by SVP.  The notable absence of state authorities had the 
result of limiting a collaborative action and shielding their decisions from an open public 
debate.  As others have recognized, lack of engagement is not uncommon, and “it is 
unclear how nonparticipation can be dealt with beyond repeated and sensitive invitations, 
given that participation [is] voluntary and any pressure would [be] counterproductive” 
[Chan et al., 2010, p.10]. 
 
3.5.3 Stage Two: designing a model and intervention to help building credibility, 
salience, and legitimacy 
This section applies the concept of boundary objects (described in Section 2.5.1) to 
explain how the computer SVM and workshops were designed to function.  Model 
effectiveness is described by three criteria: 1) credibility—accurate and reliable model 
inputs that build an accurate system description (from participants’ point of view), 2) 
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salience —flexibility and relevance to stakeholder’s needs over time, and 3) legitimacy—
participants’ trust in the neutrality of model information in spite of opposing interests.  
 
Credibility—Providing accurate information in an open forum of diverse stakeholders 
was a central motivation for the proposed SVP.  Although we were not part of all the 
relevant dialogues, it was possible to identify the knowledge gaps and discrepancies in 
information available among parties. The inputs for the SVM came from official data 
provided by ANA during the permit negotiations process, and validation data was 
acquired from SABESP’s website.  The Excel modeling platform was accessible and 
could be downloaded from our website and adapted by anyone, since the database was 
included. We do not know if parties not present at the workshops found the system 
representation to be accurate from their point of view.  The model was acceptable to 
those present, but they did not get to interact with it beyond the workshops.  
 
Salience—The issues and relevant variables to include in the model came from the six-
months between August 2013 and February 2014 that I spent doing fieldwork.  This 
included attending over two dozen meetings and conducting 33 interviews with primarily 
técnicos (see Methodological notes in Appendix B).  As we built the model, we relied on 
key collaborators and interviews to ground the information and identify crucial gaps.  
However, in a real participatory model, stakeholders need to provide direct feedback to 
increase the relevance to the issues they care about.  The SVM did not become a channel 
for frequent communication.  There were no follow-on efforts after the workshops to 
encourage participation, given the failure to gain traction from main decision makers.  
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The model failed to gain greater saliency, and the research team did not deem it 
appropriate to continue to engage stakeholders when their time and efforts were not going 
to change decisions.    
 
Legitimacy—The direct outputs of the model were never used for making decisions.  We 
are aware that a small group of stakeholders used the information and momentum created 
at the workshops in other platforms.  These uses included two legal actions, testimony, 
and additional model development as follows:  
• the university made a formal request to water authorities to create an open 
database of the Cantareira system;  
• GAEMA filed a request for hydrological data on the Cantareira system via the 
Freedom of Information Act;  
• Palmer (supported by Falconi) provided expert testimony at a public hearing for 
state and federal prosecutors; and 
• GAEMA’s technical advisor developed modeling capability for internal use.  
These four uses all fell outside of the participatory effort and were not the direct, intended 
purpose of the SVM.  The intention of bringing participatory modeling to the workshops 
was to use models as tools to reason through complexity. 
 
This research argues that participatory models are valuable to governance for several 
reasons.  First, participatory modeling identifies information gaps and reduces 
information asymmetries. Second, the incremental and iterative nature of building a 
model helps build trust, which fosters cooperation and facilitates the strengthening of 
networks. Third, participatory efforts give stakeholders a voice in the agenda and in what 
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will be included for analysis, which is important because modeling is by necessity a 
simplification of reality. In non-participatory settings, decisions about problem and model 
formulation fall to the modelers themselves.  Finally, participatory models provide 
stakeholders a platform for coming to terms with the real tradeoffs necessary to reach 
negotiated decisions, even when these are contentious.  Our workshop interventions, 
however, did not produce all of these benefits.  We explore some of the reasons they fell 
short in the next section. 
 
3.5.4 Challenges to collaboration and limitations of the SVP effort  
The São Paulo case study illustrates that participation is an arduous process, hard to 
define, harder still to operationalize, and requiring far more than a ‘seat at the table.’  Past 
efforts by CBHs in São Paulo and elsewhere in Brazil to mobilize people and resources 
provide examples of successful participation that built political power [Abers and Keck, 
2007].  The CBH-PCJ and CBH-Alto Tietê created a platform for debate even prior to the 
1991 reform.  The PCJ basin in particular leveraged political support to make institutional 
arrangements real.  Practical actions and concrete practices that forced people to work 
together were one such political construction of power.  By working collaboratively in 
small projects, the CBHs demonstrated their capacity to build and strengthen their 
network, and by extension, to nurture trust [Abers and Keck, 2007].  This makes the 
failure to garner collaboration all the more disappointing. 
 
The efforts over a year and a half to engage SABESP and state water authorities failed as 
the drought worsened.  During that time period, SABESP cut water deliveries to the 
MRSP to as little as 14 m3/s on February of 2015 under an undisclosed drought plan.   
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From the workshops and the failed participatory efforts, I conclude that there were non-
water issues (such as the state and partisan politics), that sidelined the water conflict, and 
that state authorities had pursued alternative ways to resolve the water management 
situation.  Most alternative resolutions left out the regulating bodies that were established 
by federal and state laws, and all sidelined the platforms created by the CBHs.  These 
“non-water” issues and their relations to access to water information were difficult to 
untangle at the time of the workshops, both for our research team and for all those 
involved.  With hindsight, it is possible to deduce what prevented a collaborative 
solution.   
 
It became clear in the workshops that it was not in the best interest of SABESP (and, 
indirectly, the São Paulo state authorities) to partake in an open and transparent process 
like SVP.  There must be clear gains to each of the parties if collaborative efforts and 
decisions are to succeed.  In this case, not every stakeholder stood to benefit equally from 
engagement and cooperation; some found it advantageous to remain inactive.  Those with 
more power to make decisions did not want other parties to have open and transparent 
access to information because it would weaken their positions, open the door to scrutiny, 
and legitimize platforms – such as those created by our workshop interventions, among 
similar efforts – where people could openly question their motivations.   
 
Indeed, what participation means in a place as large and complex as São Paulo is not self-
evident.  There are some successful examples of collaborations like the PCJ consortium 
that formed a coalition of companies, municipal governments, and engineers to garner 
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support for solving longstanding pollution problems in the Piracicaba river, and the CBH 
that created formal representation of various pre-defined sectors in a formal deliberative 
body.  Notably, farmers were absent from this procses.  This progress in participation was 
long and ardeous process that should not be taken as insignificant.  Nevertheless, several 
lines of evidence allow us to infer that the extent of participation and the authority of São 
Paulo’s water institutions were much more limited than the reputation had it prior to the 
drought.  First, access to information was unequal.  Unequal information can significantly 
undermine the bargaining power of different parties to negotiate water allocations. 
Information asymmetries include delays or omission of important information, and can 
provide advantages in negotiations that benefit some parties over others [Pfaff et al., 
2013].  Second, SABESP and state authorities were able to derail the system, as seen in a 
previous analysis of how powerful players can circumvent the rules and seek other 
platforms to resolve their problems [Abers and Keck, 2006].  The timing of the drought 
(in terms of socio-political climate) only made this more obvious.  The CBHs’ inability to 
change policy outcomes further legitimized decisions that were being made elsewhere; 
indeed, it appeared as if the CBH agreed with those decisions, when in fact they had 
raised several concerns.  Third, despite the CBHs’ prior track records mobilizing 
resources, the CBH platform failed to bring different actors and sectors during the São 
Paulo drought to build on existing institutions and collaborative experience.  Unable to 
strengthen their cause by building on collaborations, several water institutions saw their 
role and authority eroded.  In the case of ANA, for example, its regulatory role was 
minimized after it had no other choice than to leave GTAG.  In short, while some forms 
of participation did take place in São Paulo’s river basins, it is also true that key 
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institutions and actors carried very little authority to shape the agenda.  The larger and 
more pressing nature of the drought crisis merely served to make the limited extent of 
participation more apparent. 
 
In light of state and national elections, the World Cup, and many other political battles 
underway, it appears that SABESP felt that shielding their decisions from public scrutiny 
lowered the risk that they would look incompetent in tackling the crisis.  After all, 
SABESP and state regulatory bodies answer to the governor of São Paulo, who also 
appoints their high-level administrators.21  Water authorities might also have believed 
that the situation was too urgent and necessitated rapid technical decision that need not be 
debated in an open forum.  This would be consistent with Brazilian técnicos’ perspectives 
on the technocratic and insulated manner that decisions have been made in the past. It 
does técnicos of this generation.  This however, does not explain why ANA and other 
agencies were excluded from taking part in these decisions.  Given the political climate, 
transparency as to how technical decisions were actually being made would have 
intensified the public’s negative perceptions of SABESP and of the Governor, at least in 
the short run.  In the long run, however, lack of transparency might hurt public opinion of 
these institutions and undermine their authority to carry out their duties.  The immediate 
political crisis meant that short-term consequences were the primary consideration for the 
government ignoring any long-term consequences it may have on institutional 
governance. 
                                                 
21 Aside from the accountability to the Governor, SABESP also had private-sector restrictions, e.g., loan 




This chapter has focused on a case study of the São Paulo drought of 2013-15, with 
special emphasis on participation and on the complex institutional challenges that impede 
adaptive governance.  Over the past 20 years, São Paulo has worked to implement 
ambitious state and national reforms, codifying and institutionalizing joint water 
management of the Cantareira system.  However, the unprecedented drought revealed 
both the limitations of the current system and the institutional challenges that must yet be 
overcome if São Paulo is ever to realize the IWRM promise of participatory water 
governance.  The gap between IWRM’s theory and practice in São Paulo’s case provides 
four important lessons: 
 
1) Participation in the CBHs was limited even before the crisis, and a fact that became 
apparent as the drought worsened.  As the situation escalated and deliberation actually 
started to matter, decisions were centralized rather than debated, effectively undermining 
several of the institutions that had experience solving problems and brokering solutions 
with diverse societal groups.  In some cases, even an informative level of participation 
was lacking. The CBHs, and the public, heard of decisions only after the fact.  
 
2) Publication of important, basic facts and technical information was delayed or omitted 
outright. This was the case not only on the matter of dead storage (or so-called “technical 
reserve”), but also for critical scenarios that were never discussed, contingency plans that 
went undisclosed for months, and water banks that turned out to exist only on paper.  
Other information was muddied – deliberately made confusing – to the point that the 
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courts had to mandate clarifications months later.  
 
3) Unable to strengthen their cause by building on collaborations, several water 
institutions saw their role and authority eroded.  Even SABESP, at times, lacked the 
autonomy to manage its own operations.  Moreover, by shielding decisions from other 
players, authorities eroded whatever trust had been built among various water 
management institutions.   This was apparent in the lack of consensus within the 
representatives of GTAG (ANA, DAEE, SSRH) and in the water permit negotiations that 
were subsequently postponed.  The state not only weakened existing institutions, it also 
undermined the possibility of future cooperation and shared responsibility.  The net result 
was a growing concern of the role and authority of different water institutions in general 
(not only during droughts).  
 
4) Finally, water governance and adaptive capacity require an understanding that extends 
beyond technical know-how to the social and political challenges that institutions must 
face.  Technical information and models can improve management decisions; they can 
also help build on small and concrete actions, but their adoption by and transfer in the 
policy arena are not automatic.  The role of models in decision-making is embedded in 
social and political processes, and these in turn are subject to the institutions and people 
involved.  
 
Efforts to frame IWRM as a purely technical discourse are misguided, given that 
participation and decentralization require the (re)distribution of power over water 
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decisions. Adaptive capacity comes from institutions that have autonomy, problem-
solving capabilities, and a certain level of authority and decision-making power that is 
earned only through experience. The IWRM framework argues for participation, which – 
if implemented as a change from the status quo – means that decision-making power will 
naturally shift to new arenas and new players.  During the unprecedented drought, the 
state government could have enlisted existing institutions and basin committees to play 
an active role in solving the problem. It could have enabled them to act. But the state 
government chose to centralize decisions because it viewed participatory decision making 
as politically harmful (due to larger, non-water political conflicts) and unnecessary for 
managing the drought.  
 
Questions of water quality and water quantity – like inflows and outflows or supply and 
demand – are technical matters that can be addressed by appropriate monitoring, 
measurements, and modeling. But questions of water allocation and water access – like 
how to institute water use restrictions and who bears the burden under circumstances of 
water scarcity – are political questions.  The rain that began to fall in February 2015 
eventually resolved the water crisis in São Paulo, but the lessons from this case study 
remain: a broader perspective on the underlying drivers of the technical and political 
challenges of water will be necessary to address future water crises. 
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 A SHARED VISION MODEL AND DROUGHT PREPAREDNESS: THE SÃO 
PAULO CASE STUDY22 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Providing safe, reliable, and inexpensive water to the world’s megacities poses 
challenges that extend beyond engineering and hydrology.  Water conflict resolution 
involves many competing demands and interests. Deliberation platforms are needed for 
comprehensive analysis and negotiation that incorporate stakeholders’ concerns for 
                                                 
22This chapter is based on the academic collaborative effort initiated by Falconi in 2013 with Richard 
Palmer and William Werick for the purpose of developing and presenting a participatory model in São 
Paulo’s case study.  The post-workshop analysis starting in August 2014 also included the collaboration of 
master student, Grace Cambareri.  This will be submitted to the Journal of Environmental Science & 
Policy, Falconi, S.M., Cambareri, G., Werick, W. and Palmer, R.N. (forthcoming).  Falconi wrote initial 
and revised drafts of the paper and this chapter.  
Contributions to the modelling workshops and post-workshop analysis of Section 4.5-4.6 are as follows:   
 
Stefanie Falconi—all fieldwork in São Paulo was done 6 months ahead of time to determine what questions 
the model needed to address, document mining and gather data to build and validate model results; Falconi 
also mobilized local partners and solicited their participation at the two workshops. Falconi organized and 
presented the model at both workshops, and worked directly with Cambareri, Werick, Palmer on the 
parameters used to build the Shared Value Model (SVM) and Drought contingency plans. While the SVM 
was not participatory, the extensive fieldwork was intended to help improve the salience and credibility of 
the model.  
 
Grace Cambareri updated and improved the SVM and developed R code to automate and streamline all 
aspects of SVM runs. Cambareri also developed and compared drought contingency plans based on several 
drought indicators, triggers, and action options.  
 
William Werick formulated the SVM used at both workshop including reservoir and shortfall features, 
positions analysis, and virtual drought exercises. He led SVP exercises during both workshops, and recoded 
the SVM model post-workshops and worked with the team to validate the water balance, and include 
features such as position analysis, etc. for strategy analysis. 
Richard Palmer oversaw the work by Falconi (pre- and post- workshop analysis) and Cambareri (SVM and 
DSR analysis).  He led the SVP exercises at both workshops. Palmer also spent time in the field to work 
with local collaborators. He developed the concept of days of supplies remaining (DSR) and worked 
collaboratively with team to apply the concept to develop the Drought Planning contingency plan options.  
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public health and safety.  Utility companies must bear public safety in mind and guard 
public good and wellbeing as they carry out system operations.   
 
This chapter analyses the technical and supply challenges encountered by São Paulo in 
coping with one of the most significant droughts in the past 100 years. São Paulo’s 
drought event displayed a combination of three major underlying drivers observed in the 
global water crisis: a gap between demand and supply, advanced infrastructure and 
technical capacity, and improved governance systems [Srinivasan et al., 2012].  The 
previous chapter explored in detail the challenges that São Paulo must solve to overcome 
problems of governance; this chapter examines how São Paulo dealt with the remaining 
two drivers during an unprecedented drought.  SABESP, the most significant water 
provider in the State of São Paulo, estimated that the drought was a 1 in 250-year event 
based on a calculated 0.004 probability of an “annual inflow equal or smaller to inflows 
actually observed in 2014”23 [SABESP, 2015].  However, robust planning accounts for a 
wide range of possible futures and should provide several management options when 
drought occurs.  We examine the actions taken in São Paulo in response to the drought 
based on the operations of the Cantareira system, and we further summarize a 
collaborative computer model that was presented at two public workshops to assess the 
possibility of applying a shared vision approach for (virtual) drought exercises in São 
Paulo. 
 
                                                 
23 The Climatic Group at the CPTEC (Center for Weather Forecasting and Climate Studies) provides a 
different estimate based on accumulated rainfall records, they calculate this event to have a reoccurrence of 
76 years given the probability of accumulated rainfall actually observed in 2013-2014 rainy season.  
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We build on the concept of models as boundary objects, presented in the previous two 
chapters, and we develop and test different policy alternatives.  Although we were not 
successful in applying shared vision planning, we asked how drought planning could 
have been performed differently if a participatory process in São Paulo had been possible. 
In a second line of inquiry, we create system performance measures to calculate the 
impact of management policies on the reliability of São Paulo’s water system, including 
consideration of costs to both users and the utility company.  Given that São Paulo was 
affected by a drought of historical proportion, it was important to assess multiple plans to 
understand the reliability of the Cantareira under different management alternatives.  
Each plan incorporates different drought indicators, triggers and actions.  
 
The chapter begins with Section 4.2 introducing background information on water 
challenges in megacities, with Section 4.3 focusing specifically on São Paulo.  Section 
4.4 analyzes São Paulo’s drought event from the technical perspective of reservoir 
operations and the policies adopted to deal with the drought.  Section 4.5 describes the 
mock SVM model prepared for the two public workshops to then illustrate in Section 4.6 
how a collaboratively-developed model could support a formal and disciplined approach 
to assessing policy alternatives and tradeoffs.  The development and formulation of this 
computer model is described in Section 4.6.1.  In the absence of full public participation 
in São Paulo, our purpose is to provide a methodology for future collaborative drought 
contingency planning based on the use of a model.  Hence, in Section 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 we 
establish a set of metrics for analysis as a proof of concept, and apply the model to 
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compare drought action plans.  Finally, Section 4.7 discusses conclusions and lessons 
learned.  
 
4.2 Background to water problems in megacities 
More than half of the world’s population currently resides in cities. Forecasts suggest that 
this number will rise to exceed 66% by 2050 [UNPD, 2014].  Currently, 35 cities in the 
world exceed 10 million people, and the world’s ten largest cities have populations of 
more than 25 million people.  Despite decreases in per capita water demands in 
megacities in developed countries, total global water demands are forecasted to increase 
by 55% by 2050, even considering decreases in demands associated with irrigation 
[OECD, 2014].  The largest increases are anticipated to be in domestic water, water used 
in manufacturing, and water associated with power production [UNPD, 2014].  
 
The ability to provide safe, reliable, and inexpensive water to large urban centers in 
developed countries was one of the marvels of the 19th and 20th centuries, but challenges 
still remain for expanding megacities both in developed and developing countries.  
Although many large cities reliably provide water to their residents during periods of 
normal climate and rainfall, most megacities (including Beijing, New Delhi, Mexico 
City, Cairo, Tokyo, São Paulo, and Istanbul) still face the specter of drought and its 
associated impacts.  The authorities responsible for water supplies in these rapidly 
growing megacities must seek sustainable management strategies that can cope with 
growing water demands while addressing environmental challenges that place water 
supplies and public safety at risk.  This chapter focuses on drought, one of the many 
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potential threats to water supply in megacities, and on one city in particular, São Paulo, 
Brazil.  However, to provide further background and context for our analysis, the next 
subsections explore the role that models have played in drought planning in the United 
States.  
 
4.2.1 US drought and use of simulation models for planning practices  
In the northeastern US, the drought of the 1960s was the largest on record, with 
significant impacts for most cities in that part of the country, including the major 
metropolitan region from Boston, Massachusetts to Washington, D.C.  This and other 
major droughts in the 1980s had major impacts on water resources planning in the US. 
Water use curtailments were implemented throughout urban centers in the northeast, and 
a large portion of the population was exposed to management changes in an attempt to 
extend the water supply.  
 
The US Army Corps of Engineers embarked on the “National Study of Water 
Management During Drought” in the late 1980s, with the goal of changing the way water 
supplies would be managed in the future.  A significant contribution of the National 
Drought Study was the framework it provided for developing plans and drought action 
alternatives.  Combining water planning principles, interactive systems analysis models, 
and collaborative planning, the National Drought study showed the effectiveness of using 
collaboratively-built computer models to quantify planning objectives and constraints so 
as to illustrate the tradeoffs between alternative plans.  These plans can provide a 
consistent framework to prepare for and respond to drought events [Shepherd, 1998].  A 
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drought contingency plan provides clear guidelines on how best to manage the demands 
and supplies of water during drought periods.  Drought contingency plans are designed to 
minimize the impacts of water shortages on public health, consumer activities, recreation, 
economic activity, and the environment.  
 
The National Drought Study framework described drought management measures as 
strategic, tactical, or emergency.  Strategic measures include water supply planning, the 
building of storage capacity, long-term plumbing retrofits or system water loss 
reductions.  Drought contingency plans are tactical measures, designed and evaluated 
prior to the drought but implemented when drought occurs.  Emergency measures are 
taken when drought impacts exceed expectations, but some emergencies can be avoided 
with proper strategic and tactical planning.  Examples of emergency actions include 
temporary water transfers, tapping into previously unused water sources, and water 
delivery with water trucks.  These activities involve coordinating the roles of different 
stakeholders, including government, agencies, experts and the public, each of whom have 
different preferences and objectives. 
 
4.2.2 The use of simulation models in drought planning   
In the last century, inter- and intra-annually variability and uncertainties in water 
availability forced water professionals to develop concepts such as “safe yield” to ensure 
that water would be available when it was needed [McCrodden et al., 2010].  In the 
1980s, researchers used computer models to explore a variety of complementary metrics.  
They applied the concepts of reliability (the probability of system failure), resilience 
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(how quickly a system returns to acceptable performance), and vulnerability (the likely 
magnitude of a system failure) to measure water supply performance [Hashimoto et al., 
1982].  These and other metrics characterize the variability of water availability and the 
extent to which systems at risk might fail in attempting to meet a constant water demand 
[Hirsch, 1979].  Whereas previous analysts assumed that past streamflows were a good 
predictor of future water availability and that streamflow statistics calculated from 
historical records would remain constant over time (stationarity), it is now recognized 
that the mean of (past) streamflow does not alone provide an accurate representation 
continued water availability because of changes in underlying physical phenomena such 
as climate (non-stationarity) [Milly et al., 2008].  Rather than focusing on system yield or 
average streamflow measures, droughts water managers now understand that events more 
extreme than those seen in the past are possible.  New York City, for example, maintains 
a 25% reserve storage should “a period occur which is drier than that experienced in the 
past (i.e., drought of record)” [NYC-DEP, 2012, p.16].    We break down the 
components of New York City’s drought plan in more detail in Section 4.2.3. 
 
Numerous studies have explored the steps necessary to create a successful drought plan. 
These steps typically include: 1) define planning objectives, 2) engage stakeholder, 3) 
design alternative drought mitigation strategies, 4) identify drought indicators, triggers, 
and actions, 5) evaluate plans, 6) select and implement the preferred plan, and 7) adapt 
and revise management plans as circumstances change [IWR, 1995; Botterill and Hayes, 
2012; Starkl et al., 2013; Oertel et al., 2015].  A recent study of drought risk management 
reviewed the use of simulation models to assess performance metrics in drought planning 
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and improve drought management [Rossi and Cancelliere, 2013].  The review 
highlighted the need for early drought indices, proper risk and vulnerability assessment, 
and adequate drought planning instruments to improve drought preparedness.  As 
illustrated in the National Drought Study, the use of computer models can greatly 
facilitate drought preparedness.  In addition, role-playing exercises, such as virtual 
drought exercises based on computer model simulations, can be extremely effective in 
establishing the importance of maintaining and revising drought plans over time with 
stakeholders [IWR, 1994b].    
 
In short, droughts inhabit the intersection of diverse authorities, values, perspectives and 
needs.  The National Drought Study recommended the development of drought 
contingency plans using a collaborative approach, engaging relevant decision makers, 
experts and stakeholders to ensure the most effective results.  Environmental protection, 
health regulations, and safety risks may constrain the operation of water systems, thereby 
affecting reliability.  Federal, state, and municipal governments may be involved in 
pricing, allocation, zoning, and land management decisions that affect demand.  The 
primary role of water planners is to provide ample water to the public at an appropriate 
price and without compromising the long-term reliability of the water supply system.  As 
noted by Winz et al., [2009] in Chapter 2 discussion, many analysts favor incorporating 
simulation methods into stakeholder participation because simulations can provide visual 
displays of outputs and tradeoffs that, if well-designed, are intuitive and easy to 
understand.  Next we explore the role of models in helping stakeholders determine 
suitable plans.  
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4.2.3 Shared Vision Planning for establishing indicators, triggers, and actions 
 
One of the primary contributions of the National Drought Study was the development of 
Shared Vision Planning (SVP), a planning approach that engages stakeholders and 
decision-makers in building computer models to evaluate policy alternatives [IWR, 1995].  
SVP combines three elements considered essential for effective drought response: well-
tested planning techniques, effective public involvement, and a collaboratively built 
system model that integrates diverse knowledge from stakeholders involved in the 
process.  SVP has been used in water resources planning for over a quarter century.  It is 
an effective process for collaborative management, but all management parties must be 
committed to the collaboration.  There is little reason to expect collaboration if any 
parties believe they can achieve a better outcome through alternate strategies such as 
lobbying, adjudicating, or stonewalling to preserve the status quo [Werick and Palmer, 
2004].  
 
The National Drought Study, among others, noted the need for a detailed framework for 
implementing drought actions [IWR, 1995; Fisher and Palmer, 1997; Palmer et al., 
2002].  This framework typically has three primary components (drought indicators, 
drought triggers, and drought responses) and two supporting activities (drought 
forecasting and monitoring/enforcement of response measures) [IWR, 1994b].   Drought 
indicators can be defined as any single observation or combination of observations that 
contribute to one’s ability to identify the onset and/or continuation of a drought and to 
characterize its severity.  Examples of drought indicators include streamflow, 
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precipitation, reservoir storage, the Palmer Drought Severity Index, and other similar 
metrics [Fisher and Palmer, 1997; Hayes et al., 2011].  A drought trigger is a specified 
value of a drought indicator that initiates a drought response.  Drought triggers can be 
based on historical values, probability levels of past indicators, or points identified as 
optimal during the testing of response plans.  Drought actions are activities taken or 
policies invoked that either increase water supply or decrease water demands.  Water 
transfers, public drought awareness programs, water use curtailments, and changes in 
water pricing are all examples of drought actions.  The usefulness of the overall 
framework depends on the accuracy of the drought indicators, the selection of appropriate 
triggers (calling for action when necessary, but also not initiating programs unless they 
are needed), and a robust portfolio of effective drought actions.   
 
The New York City Drought Management and Contingency Plan 2012 is an excellent 
example of a plan that carefully identifies metrics, triggers, and actions [NYC-DEP 
2012].  In addition, the plan is available to the public so that the rationale for decisions 
and operational assumptions made within the plan are clear.  The plan contains a 
comparative analysis that is easily accessible to all those that are impacted.  In the plan 
(Table 4.1), the objectives establish actions and procedures for managing water supply 
and demand during drought.  The plan enables New York City’s Department of 
Environmental Protection to maintain essential public health and safety and to minimize 
adverse impacts on economic activity, environmental resources, and the region’s 
lifestyle.  The primary drought indicator is the estimated probability that either of its 
primary reservoir systems (the Catskill/Delaware Watershed Reservoirs and the Croton 
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Watershed Reservoirs) will refill by June 1.  The calculation of probability is based upon 
system storage, historical streamflows, real-time forecasts of streamflows, and forecasts 
of water demand.  The drought triggers action are specific values of the probability: when 
the probability of a reservoir refilling before June 1 drops below 50%, the system goes on 
Drought Watch; below 33% initiates a Drought Warning; and a “reasonable probability” 
of the reservoirs being drained triggers a Drought Emergency.  There are comprehensive 
actions associated with each of these drought levels (Table 4.1).  These actions range 
from the implementation of a public awareness program to the enforcement of strict 
mandatory water-use curtailments. 
 
New York City (NYC) has experienced a number of droughts of varying intensity over 
the last 60 years, including the years 1963-1965, 1980-1982, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1995, and 
2002.  NYC’s drought response planning is an example of how clear and well-defined 
metrics can guide both managers and the public to take mitigating actions before water 
problems escalate to a critical situation.  These clearly defined drought responses and 
mitigation actions can be observed in past Drought Contingency Plans [NYC-DEP, 1988].  
Such plans are indicative of the need for water authorities to act openly and transparently 
to elicit public support in minimizing drought impacts. 
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Indicator Trigger Action 
Probability of 
Refill (by end of 
water year) 
Less than 50% "Drought Watch" Declared 
- Communicate with partner agencies and stakeholders 
- Implement drought awareness media campaign 
- Begin utilizing alternate sources (incl. Croton subsystem) 
- Prepare alternate sources (incl. Queens well field) 
- Expand leak detection and repair in the city 
Less than 33% "Drought Warning" Declared 
- Communicate with partner agencies and stakeholders 
- Request voluntary water use restrictions by residents 
- Utilize alternative sources (incl. Croton subsystem and Queens well 
field) 
- Prepare additional alternative sources (incl. Chelsea pumping station 
on the Hudson River) 
- Expand leak detection and repair in the city 





reservoirs will be 
drained/shortages 
will occur without 
mitigating action 
"Drought Emergency" Stages I - III Declared 
- Communicate with partner agencies and stakeholders 
- Implement mandatory and increasingly conservative restrictions by 
residents (incl. vehicle washing and landscaping) and post 
conservation signs 
- Maximize alternative sources 
- Expand leak detection and repair in the city, including in private 
buildings 
- Minimize city outdoor water use for vehicle washing and landscaping 
- Implement emergency water utility rates  
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4.2.4 Stakeholder involvement in collaborative planning 
As detailed in previous chapters, Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) has 
emerged as the dominant paradigm for managing water worldwide and is practiced in 
some 95 developed and developing countries [UN-Water, 2008].  IWRM is meant to 
integrate equitable and efficient management of water for attaining sustainable water use 
[GWP, 2012].  Whether it has achieved this aim or not, IWRM continues as the 
“centerpiece of world debate on water policy,” and it has been said that IWRM “cannot 
be achieved without participatory processes” [Priscoli, 2004, p.226].  The EU Water 
Framework Direction, the National Drought Study, National Drought Commission and 
other major US federal standards acknowledge the important role of stakeholder 
involvement in water planning decisions.  These directives all stipulate that the success of 
water management is contingent on the integration of public participation and the 
transparency of information. 
It is widely believed that the complex and challenging exercise of creating and 
implementing of a drought contingency plan benefits from the informed consent and 
participation of those responsible for providing water, the individuals that are served by 
the water supply, and those that have regulatory responsibilities [Palmer et al., 2013].  In 
short, we posit that providing safe, reliable and inexpensive water to the world’s 
megacities poses more than an engineering and hydrologic challenge; it also requires 
early and sustained stakeholder involvement in a collaborative manner that allows them 
to work together during drought events to implement plans.  This requires creating plans, 
but also, exercising them so that some familiarity exists when plans are put into action 
during a real drought.  
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4.3 Setting:  The megacity of São Paulo 
4.3.1 Urbanization and population rates  
The population of the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (MRSP) grew from less than 
300,000 in the early 1900’s to over 21 million in 2015 (Figure 4.1) [Braga et al., 2006; 
UN, 2015].  The MRSP is the most populated metropolis in South America and among 
the most densely populated regions in Brazil, accounting for 10% of Brazil’s population.  
In the last century, urbanization in the MRSP grew over 75-fold, and from 1960-1990 it 
was among the top 5 megacities in the world [Angel et al., 2010; World Population 
Review, 2013].  The state of São Paulo is the economic engine of Brazil.  Its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) is greater than the sum of the next 4 Brazilian states combined 
[IBGE, 2015b].  Meanwhile, development of the region’s water supply has not kept pace 
with economic and population growth (Figure 4.2).  The last major reservoir was built in 
1982 for projected water needs in 2020 [SABESP, 1989].24  
 
                                                 
24 Groundwater is also an important source of supply in São Paulo, especially for large commercial and 
industrial users. However, a significant proportion of wells are unlicensed and permitting records are 
spotty, making them an unreliable source for analysis of water supplies. 
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Figure 4.2 Water Availability to the MRSP (1903-2014) (Compilation from [Whitaker, 














































































4.3.2 Water supply and the Cantareira system design 
São Paulo responded to increasing water demands in the 1960s by designing and 
constructing the Cantareira System, a reservoir system that spans 15,320 square 
kilometers (5,915 square miles).  The Cantareira System (Figure 4.3) was built in two 
phases between 1966-1982.  It is composed of five rivers flowing into the Jaguarei-
Jacarei, Atibainha, Cachoeira, and Paiva Castro reservoirs, with a total combined storage 
capacity of 981 cubic hectometers (hm3) (when the use of dead storage is authorized by 
regulatory agencies, the new storage totals 1,270 hm3). The system is a network of 
tunnels, a pumping station, and a small regulating reservoir.  Water flows primarily by 
gravity, but is pumped in the final stages more than 120 vertical meters at Santa Ines to 
reach the water treatment plant prior to release to the MRSP. 
 
Figure 4.3 The Cantareira system of reservoirs and tunnels* 
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*Note the rivers that are of federal and state dominion.25 
 
The system is typically responsible for supplying water to an estimated 15 million people, 
9 million people in the MRSP and 6 million people in the neighboring Piracicaba, 
Capivari, and Jundaí (PCJ) river basins [IBGE, 2015a, IBGE, 2015b].  The Cantareira 
system is the most significant contributor of the 8 water systems for the MRSP, supplying 
61% of its water.  The next largest system, the Guarapiranga and Alto Tietê, provide 
35%, while five other reservoirs (Rio Grande, Rio Claro, Alto Cotia, Baixo Cotia, and 
Ribeirão Estiva) provide the remaining water supply.  
 
4.3.3 Water laws and institutional setting 
Brazil’s National Water Resources Policy (NWRP of 1997) 26 provides the framework for 
the country’s water laws.  Water is defined as a public good and is recognized as a finite 
natural resource with economic value.  Water resource management must account for the 
multiple use of water and, in scarcity situations, must give priority to human and animal 
consumption.  The river basin is the territorial unit for implementing and operating the 
National Water Management System.  In addition, the NWRP states that water 
management must be decentralized and “rest on the participation of the public power, the 
users, and the communities.”  São Paulo’s state law (Water Act of 1991)27 was a model 
                                                 
25 State rivers are regulated by state agencies and are defined as rivers that start and end within a state’s 
boundaries.  Federal rivers are regulated by federal agencies and are transboundary rivers at state or 
national borders.   
26 National Water Resources Policy (1997), Lei Nº 9.433, de 8 de Janeiro de 1997, Art. 1. 
27 São Paulo State Water Act (1991), Lei Estadual Nº 7.663, de 30 de Dezembro de 1991. 
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for the NWRP of 1997.  In both state and federal water laws, the river basin is the 
territorial unit and the river basin committee (CBH) is the planning and deliberation unit 
for managing water.  The role of CBH is central in Brazil’s water laws.  As the planning 
unit, the CBH was envisioned as an institution where members would share information, 
resolve conflicts, and build consensus regarding allocation and proper use of water. 
 
Significant changes in water law resulted in water permit contracts being inconsistently 
negotiated in past years.   A permit for a thirty-year interbasin water transfer of 33 m3/s 
from the Cantareira system to the MRSP was granted in 1974 during Brazil’s military 
government.  The second water transfer in 2004 was negotiated under the new State and 
Federal Water Laws.  Water allocations and operational rules for the Cantareira system 
were negotiated between the PCJ basin and the MRSP and authorized for a ten-year 
period by the two granting bodies, ANA (the National Water Agency) and DAEE (the 
State Department of Water and Energy), reflecting the state and federal dominion of the 
rivers that flow into the Cantareira Reservoirs.  The agreement document, Decree 
1213/2004,28 determined monthly quantities and the operations of water transferred from 
PCJ to Alto Tietê (recall from Chapter 3 that the AT basin roughly corresponds with the 
MRSP).  The process considered operational rules based on past demands in the two 
basins.  When the allocations were made, it was estimated that the Cantareira system 
could provide water to PCJ and AT basins with 95% reliability.   
 
                                                 
28 DAEE Decree 1213 (2004), Portaria DAEE Nº 1213, de 06 de Agosto de 2004. 
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During the drought of 2013-15, the deliveries anticipated from this system could not be 
met, and on February 10, 2014, the state governor instituted the Technical Advisory 
Management Group (called GTAG).  The GTAG was required to convene at weekly 
meetings to advise how best to operate the Cantareira system during the drought.  The 
group included representatives from ANA, DAEE, SABESP, and the Secretaries of the 
CBH-PCJ and CBH-AT.  
 
4.4 Description of São Paulo drought planning process 
4.4.1 SABESP’s existing drought plans 
In a document published in January 2014, titled Rodízio do Sistema Cantareira 2014 
(Rotation of the Cantareira System 2014), SABESP’s technical team presented a plan “to 
implement water rotation in the areas covered by the Cantareira System.”  The plan 
defined rotation as “controlled shutting of water mains by sectors in a planned manner” 
and provided 3 rotation alternatives for water supply with the objective of “avoiding 
collapse” of the Cantareira system and to “ensure equitable services to the population” 
[SABESP, 2014d, p.4].  The plan proposed more than 10 operational and management 
actions, discussed operational logistics for emergency services, and identified the 
required tools and equipment.  Another operational action was the possibility of reducing 
operating pressures to reduce water losses in the distribution system.  The plan outlined 
the need to contact the municipalities affected by the drought, increase public awareness 
campaigns, engage the media, and respond quickly to legal complaints regarding 
economic losses to businesses.  The plan was never executed and was not made public 
until August 2014, when a local newspaper reported that the state government had vetoed 
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the measures identified in the plan [Leite, 2014].  As discussed in Section 3.3.2, state and 
national elections played an important role in the response to the drought.  The short 
explanation for the veto was the prospect of the 2014 gubernatorial election.  A more 
sophisticated and longer explanation involving continual denial of the drought was 
outlined in the previous chapter.  In late September, the Public Ministry Prosecutor 
(Ministério Público) made the plan available to the public after it sued the state entities 
for negligence in dealing with the water crisis [GAEMA-MP, 2014].  
 
A second plan titled Plano de Contingencia II (Drought Contingency Plan II), dated June 
2014, was presented to GTAG by SABESP on June 20th, 2014, two days after ANA 
requested a clear statement of the operating procedures for the Cantareira reservoirs 
[GTAG, 2014b].  The Plan outlined the actions taken to reduce water withdrawals and 
preserve the Cantareira reservoir levels [GTAG, 2014a].  The actions adopted were 
grouped into three general strategies:  1) supplement flows from the Cantareira by 
transferring water from the Alto Tietê and Guarapiranga Systems, 2) institute the “Bonus 
Plan” to incentivize reduced water consumption, 29  3) address water losses in the 
distribution system [SABESP, 2014c].  The most controversial action identified was the 
use of pressure reduction valves (PRV) to reduce pressure in the distribution pipes and 
reduce water losses (Section 3.4.2.3 details this strategy).  
 
                                                 
29 The Bonus Plan was in fact a discounted rate in future billing cycles.  It provided an incentive to 
domestic users to reduced consumption by giving a percent discount on their bill that would show as a 
“bonus” on the next billing cycle. 
 168 
In September of 2014, as the hydrologic situation worsened, ANA asked SABESP to 
supplement this plan with rules for operation.  Of specific concern was how to use the 
second dead storage volume that was to be made available in mid-October 2014.  
SABESP requested three postponements to deliver the updated document and eventually 
failed to meet the last deadline set for October 6 (for the implications of this action see 
Section 3.2.1).  The incident occurred just weeks after ANA had officially announced its 
departure from GTAG due to its inability to reach an agreement with state authorities 
over reduction of water deliveries.  
 
A final plan was released on April 30, 2015, titled Crise Hidrica, Estrategias e Soluções 
da SABESP (Water Crisis: Strategies and Solutions by SABESP for the Metropolitan 
Region of São Paulo) [SABESP, 2015].  The report reviewed the measures taken to 
reduce withdrawals from the Cantareira System.  The plan discarded the rotation option, 
given its risks and impacts to the population, and identified a series of alternative 
contingent actions.  This report included the measures from the Drought Contingency 
Plan II report as well as rules for the use of “Technical Reserves” or dead storage.  
Although the plan was not released until the end of April 2015, the success of achieving 
the 56% demand reduction observed between January 2014 and March 2015 was 
attributed to these actions.  The plan listed a number of emergency construction works 





4.4.2 SABESP’s responses and actions  
At the beginning of the drought, available water was defined and reported as the 
percentage of water in active storage divided by the total active capacity.  “Active 
storage” is the water available above the gravity-fed outlet that can be drafted from the 
reservoir without pumps.  The “total active capacity” is the total volume of active storage 
when the reservoir is full.  In the Cantareira system, the active capacity also refers to the 
water volume permitted by decree for use.  On October 2013, at the start of the rainy 
season, active storage in the Cantareira system was 363 cubic hectometers (hm3), or 37% 
of the active capacity.  Water deliveries remained at their full allocation amounts for 
several months.  During this time, record low inflows into the system resulted in 
extremely low storage despite entering what was typically the “rainy season.”  On 
January 2014, active storage had declined to 219.7 hm3 (22.4% of active capacity), and 
inflows registered roughly half of the historical minimum for that month.   
 
The first water use reduction measures were implemented in March 2014, when reservoir 
levels dropped from 163 hm3 to 131 hm3 (16.6% to 13.4%) of active capacity.  At that 
point, drought actions were taken including the implementation of a “Bonus Plan” for 
customers in the MRSP served by the Cantareira system.  This plan provided a “bonus” 
in the form of price reductions on future water bills for those who decreased their water 
consumption.  Water use reductions of 20% or more earned a 30% bonus, reductions of 
15-20% were given a 20% bonus, and a 10-15% reduction was worth a 10% bonus 
[SABESP, 2014a].  These billing reductions would be effective only during the time of 
the drought and were suspended in early 2016. 
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In May, average Cantareira withdrawals decreased to 23 m3/s and pumping of dead 
storage began in the Jacarei reservoir after ANA and DAEE issued a joint communication 
(ANA/DAEE nº 233)30 to formally authorize the use of water from dead storage.  As a 
result, storage jumped from 80 hm3 (reported as 8.2%) on May 15 to 262.5 hm3 (reported 
as 26.7%) on May 16.  The additional 182.5 hm3 were attributed to water that could be 
pumped directly from dead storage 1. This overnight increase in water availability caused 
some confusion, in part because plans for using dead storage 1 had been presented to 
GTAG in mid-March but had not been made available to the general public.  
Furthermore, SABESP reported percentages without actual volumes and calculated these 
percentages in an unconventional way by taking the total volume of water in active and 
dead storage divided by only the active storage (for a discussion on this confusion, see 
Section 3.3.1 in the previous chapter).  Months later, in April 2015 a court order would 
force SABESP to clarify the actual storage volumes in the reservoirs as opposed to 
percentages.31  Thus changes in reported water availability over time in the Cantareira 
system reflect three distinct factors: conservation actions, the actual amount of water 
taken from the system, and changes in both the amount of storage available and how it 
was reported.   
  
In May of 2014, the Bonus Program was expanded to other municipalities outside of the 
MRSP served by the Cantareira.  By August, ANA advised the dismantling of GTAG 
                                                 
30 ANA/DAEE 233 (2014), Communicado Conjunto ANA/DAEE Nº 233 de 16/05/2014. 
31 MP of São Paulo, Civil Action suits No. 1013197-21.2015.8.26.0053 deliberation based on Court of 
Justice of the State of São Paulo, Judge Doctor Evandro Carlos de Oliveira (Direito da 7ª Vara de Fazenda 
Pública). 
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after its new proposed limits for the Cantareira were rejected by the Secretary of Water 
Resources and Sanitation (SSRH).  Pumping of the second dead storage volume, which 
added 105 hm3 in the Atibainha reservoir, began October 24, 2014.  The percent storage 
reported again increased based on the newly available volume.  The rainy season in 
southeastern Brazil usually begins in October and ends in March, but rainfall was much 
lower than normal by January of 2015.  Given the situation, deliveries were reduced to a 
monthly average of 19.9 m3/s in October 2014 and less than 14 m3/s in several months in 
2015 (Figure 4.4), with the daily minimum falling to 10.5 m3/s on October 22, 2015. 
 
Figure 4.4 Monthly average water deliveries from the Cantareira system (October 2013-
March 2016) 
 
4.4.3 Transparency of the decision process 
Motivated by public outcry, the Ministério Público-GAEMA, the Consumer Protection 





































































the drought.  These investigations centered on SABESP’s imprecise characterization of 
the drought, the lack of transparency in its decision making, and the lack of public 
engagement and education.  The investigation conducted by the CPI of the municipality 
of São Paulo, for example, took over a year and included more than 60 meetings.  In 
October 2014, the then-president of SABESP, Dilma Pena, was summoned three times 
but fail to make an appearance on the first two occasions.  The CPI 2015 report 
concluded that SABESP neglected the population of São Paulo.  It charged that Pena did 
not provide convincing answers about the water crisis, misleading the Commission about 
the number and frequency of residential water cutoffs.  One conclusion of the 
investigation was that SABESP’s contract with the MRSP needed to be regulated by a 
municipal agency because of “risk of being coopted and compromised independence of 
regulation” given favoritism from a state agency [CPI, 2015]. 
 
An unanswered question is whether the water rotation alternative was fair and adequately 
reported.  The media and the public questioned whether it was possible to reduce pressure 
without turning water supply off completely.  Several accounts from SABESP’s 
technicians revealed that at many points in the city, adjusting the pressure was impossible 
and the only option was to turn the water on or off [Leite, 2015; Sorano and Garcia, 
2015].  There are several accounts of SABESP’s lack of transparency, but one revealed 
the large extent to which political interests at the state level played a role in the drought 
response: on November 18, 2014, the Washington Post reported how “the state 
government, which controls the water company, played down the crisis because of 
October’s elections, in which the state’s governor, Geraldo Alckmin, was reelected.  
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Critics say SABESP failed to keep the population properly informed and to introduce 
enough effective measures to reduce consumption”, and that, “residents across São Paulo 
complain of regular shutoffs to their water supply while the state government and the 
water company deny that rationing is going on” [Phillips, 2014]. 
 
4.5 Workshop interventions in São Paulo 
Uncertainty surrounding the drought and how São Paulo and regions supplied by the 
Cantareira would endure the 2014 dry season (starting in March) motivated Faculty from 
the School of Civil Engineering at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Brazil to 
host two public workshops.  Falconi, Werick, and Palmer were key to initiating and 
coordinating the International Workshop on Conflict Resolution and Water Scarcity in 
São Paulo (May 2014) and the Forum on Water Sustainability (March 2015), where they 
presented the principles of shared vision planning.  The goal of both workshops was to 
present a viable alternative illustrating how participatory modeling could be applied to 
São Paulo.  During the workshop, we identified several challenges to public participation 
as the drought worsened.  
 
4.5.1 May 2014 UNICAMP workshop 
Faculty from UNICAMP, Brazil organized the Workshop on Water Scarcity in São Paulo 
on May 15, 2014 to explore ways to increase public involvement in SABESP’s drought 
response.  The workshop opened with a panel composed of Paulo Sergio Barbosa 
(UNICAMP professor), Antonio Carlos Zuffo (UNICAMP professor), Alexandra 
Faccioli (MP prosecutor), and Francisco Carlos Castro Lahóz (PCJ Consortium 
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Executive Secretary), all of whom voiced their concerns about lack of public confidence 
in how the drought was being managed.  Lahóz, a long-time water activist and member of 
the CBH-PCJ since its beginning, said the major management institutions had failed to 
warn the public about the risk of shortages, even though many experts had predicted them 
a year before. 
 
Falconi, Palmer and Werick designed an exercise involving all workshop participants to 
determine whether shared vision planning (SVP) could be used to manage droughts in the 
Cantareira system.  We first presented the participants with examples of both successful 
and unsuccessful applications of SVP in and outside the US.  A ‘mock’ shared vision 
model 32 (SVM) of the Cantareira system was presented by Werick in English (and 
translated and presented in the afternoon session by Falconi in Portuguese) to illustrate 
how a SVM of the São Paulo system might be used.  Werick then asked participants to 
answer five triage questions [Werick and Palmer, 2004] designed to identify particular 
issues that could undermine a SVP process: 1) Can you imagine a better outcome – 
social, economic, environmental – from the use of SVP?; 2) Would SVP be undermined 
by the use of power by one party in another forum?; 3) Would all participants benefit 
from open discussion?; 4) Is there a non-water issue that must be considered along with 
water?; and 5) Could a competent team be assembled to do SVP, at least in a pilot study?   
 
                                                 
32 Mock models are often created before a true SVM can be built in a collaborative process.  Mock models 
are realistic, and they illustrate how expert, stakeholder, and decision-maker objectives and expertise can be 
connected, but they are not built collaboratively.  Mock models help stakeholders imagine the steps and 
usefulness of a collaboratively built SVM.  
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These questions were informed by Werick and Palmer’s 35 years of work in water and 
drought management and reflected a retrospective analysis of alternative dispute 
resolution techniques used in past case studies such as Boston, Seattle, Washington, D.C., 
and Portland in the US, and internationally, in Morocco, South Korea, and Peru.  The 
results from the workshop were clear: the negative responses to Questions 2 and Question 
3 indicated that participatory drought response was unlikely to be successful for 
Cantareira (the reasons for which are explored in Chapter 3).  Although participants could 
imagine better outcomes using SVP, they agreed that it was not in the best interest of 
every party involved to have a more open decision-making platform such as the one 
offered by the SVM.  These answers were reinforced by the notable absence of two main 
parties, SABESP and State water authorities, who had declined invitations to the 
workshop.  It should be noted, however, that several State employees from SABESP and 
DAEE were present at the event, attending as individuals and not on behalf of their 
respective agencies. 
 
4.5.2 March 2015 UNICAMP workshop 
Ten months later, conditions had worsened.  The UNICAMP’s Vice-rector advisory 
cabinet of strategic thinking, PENSES, organized the Forum on Water Sustainability, 
which was held on March 17-18, 2015 at UNICAMP and streamed live online.  At this 
second workshop, Werick proposed addressing the problems identified in the triage 
exercise from the previous workshop.  Werick, Palmer, and Falconi proposed the use of 
SVP to collaboratively design a recovery plan from the drought based on virtual drought 
exercises.  In this process, stakeholders could identify appropriate measures with the use 
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of a SVM.  The potential recovery of the reservoirs starting in March 2015 could 
gradually lead to restoring water deliveries as the drought subsided.  The presentations by 
Werick, Palmer, and Falconi noted that three changes since January 2015 provided some 
hope this might happen: it had started to rain again at the end of February 2015 and 
public criticism of the drought response was stronger since the last workshop. 
 
Moreover, two internationally respected academics who had long supported public 
participation and integrated water resources management had stepped into influential 
positions in the State of São Paulo in January 2015.  Dr. Jerson Kelman, the first 
president of ANA, was appointed president of SABESP, and Dr. Benedito Braga, the 
current president of the World Water Council, had become Secretary of State for 
Sanitation and Water Resources (SSRH) in São Paulo.  Kelman and Braga were 
professors of civil engineering with strong modeling backgrounds who had earned their 
doctorates in engineering at US universities.  Both had been strong advocates for public 
participation, though it is unclear what their vision of participation looked like.  Some 
contradictions between previous public statements and the way his position as World 
Water Council promoted shared responsibility is evident in Dr. Braga’s statement at the 
G7 meeting [Braga, 2015]: “With almost half of the world’s population facing water 
shortages, stakeholders and decision-makers across all sectors must assume shared 
responsibility to work towards water security.”  As shown in Chapter 3, the expressed 
views of shared responsibility did not lead to improved participation or transparency.  It 
is possible, however, that Kelman and Braga believed that given the emergency situation, 
participation could get in the way of making rapid technical decisions.  
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A modified SVM was introduced in the March workshop and used to test the risk of 
failure under different options for restoring full water service before the reservoirs 
refilled.  At the time, the water remaining in the Cantareira reservoirs was less than 152 
hm3 of the newly-defined active storage, which included the original active storage plus 
the two additional dead storages.  Position analysis [Hirsch, 1978] using historical water 
supplies as test data in the SVM illustrated that water deliveries could be increased to 25 
m3/s with only a small risk of failure if the drought persisted.  The model provided 
potential hedging strategies to manage the residual risk, but Palmer and Werick 
emphasized that public participation would be essential for these hedges to be successful 
because stakeholders would have to acknowledge and accept the risks involved.  Once 
again, neither the State authorities33 nor SABESP responded to repeated requests for their 
engagement in the workshop. 
 
4.5.3 A challenging environment 
Concepts of participation are principal tenets of Brazil and state of São Paulo’s water 
laws.  In fact, São Paulo’s state law specifically mentions that the PCJ and AT river basin 
committees were created in part because high levels of water conflict would require more 
integrated and coordinated management.  As noted earlier, strong participation by 
member institutions at these basins were central to São Paulo’s water reform [Abers and 
Keck, 2006; Castellano and Barbi, 2006].  Nevertheless, the workshop participants 
                                                 
33 One exception was the limited participation of a SSRH representative, who presented and then promptly 
left the meeting.  More details on this are provided in Section 3.5.2.  
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agreed that stakeholders essential to the drought response felt collaboration and 
transparency would not be in the best interest of all parties involved, making 
collaborative planning infeasible.   
 
News reports, official investigations, and testimonies reported at the workshops 
illustrated public concerns regarding lack of stakeholder involvement and 
misrepresentation of the drought in the MRSP.  Many decisions were simply not 
reported.34  SABESP drought plans that did surface eventually lacked specificity on 
reservoir operations and on the measures taken to reach agreement with other authorities 
as to official policies.  The discrepancies and lack of information prevented any 
independent analysts from assessing the effectiveness of the response.  The next section 
illustrates how an open, collaborative process can provide the opportunity for experts, 
stakeholders, and decision makers to test and improve the effectiveness of a wider range 
of plans.   
 
4.6 Illustrative example of a Shared Vision Model’s structured and disciplined 
approach to planning for the Cantareira system  
This section uses the mock shared vision model (SVM), a systems dynamics model, 
prepared for the two public workshops, to illustrate how a collaboratively developed 
model could support a structured and disciplined planning process.  The model was 
                                                 
34 During the drought SABESP provided very little information.  In several instances, the only reasons it 
released any information was due to a relatively new Freedom of Information Act, which allowed the 
public to demand information.  Even under these circumstances, demands for crucial information (e.g. 
neighborhoods being affected by PRV, large consumers “fixed contracts”, contingency plans for hospitals) 
was normally appealed all the way up through the courts.   
 179 
developed with official data from ANA based on 84.5 years of monthly inflows to the 
Cantareira System, and it simulates reservoir levels and potential shortfalls based on 
changing demands (detailed next).  Although the model was not developed in a truly 
participatory fashion, it was a prototype created to be shown to attendees at the workshop 
interventions.    
 
The mock SVM can represent operational alternatives and their impacts on streamflows, 
deliveries, and storage.  Because it contains both current and potential operating rules, it 
can illustrate the trade-offs between short-term management actions (such as 
curtailments) and longer-term system performance (systems storage and shortfalls).  The 
model was presented as a proof of concept.  In a real SVP model exercise, the public 
would be engaged in applying the model to identify operating policies and actions that 
reflected their priorities in water management.  Ideally, the public would be engaged in a 
“virtual drought exercises”, during which the choice of performance metrics and the 
particular tradeoffs were openly debated and revised.  Such exercises not only improve 
the formulation of drought response plans but also create public confidence because 
stakeholders can participate in the exploration of tradeoffs and know the impacts and 
risks of each alternative.  
 
4.6.1 Details of the mock SVM and post-workshop simulation model 
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The mock SVM used in the 2013-2015 workshops was developed by William Werick35 
to operate on a monthly time-step with estimated reservoir inflows from 1932-2016 
[ANA/DAEE, 2016] and show ending reservoir storage (S) in a given month (i):   
    𝑆𝑆(𝑖𝑖) = 𝑆𝑆(𝑖𝑖 − 1) + 𝐼𝐼( 𝑖𝑖) −  𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) − 𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖)    (Eqn. 1) 
where S(i) is storage at the end of month i, and I is inflow, R is downstream release and D 
is demand during the indicated period. 
 
The model was calibrated using the daily storage posted by SABESP for the period of 
1/2004-6/2016 [Coutinho et al., 2015].  To transform daily data to a monthly time step, 
storage volumes on the first of the month were taken, and monthly average inflows and 
releases were derived.  Some of the major assumptions of the model are:   
● Monthly rule curves for the two middle reservoirs, Atibainha and Cachoeira, were 
estimated based on observed storage levels over the calibration period.   
● The model allows incorporation of dead storage into the storage capacities of 
Jaguari-Jacarei and Atibainha except in drought plan model runs.  Although 
ANA/DAEE permitted the use of dead storage during the drought, on March 8, 
2015 these authorities prohibited its future use. 
● Base water demand is assumed constant at 33 m3/s throughout the year.  Water 
curtailments follow specified reduction scenarios for three levels of drought 
(Table 4.2). 
 
                                                 
35 Werick developed the SVM for the workshops and later worked closely with Cambareri, Falconi, and 
Palmer to ensure that all members of the team could run or change the model as needed for testing future 
policy options. 
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Table 4.2 Management actions with varying restrictions from very severe to very mild 




Reduction 23 m3/s 18 m3/s 13 m3/s 




Reduction 27 m3/s 21 m3/s 15 m3/s 




Reduction 28 m3/s 23 m3/s 18 m3/s 




Reduction 30 m3/s 26 m3/s 23 m3/s 




Reduction 31 m3/s 29 m3/s 27 m3/s 
% Reduction 6% 12% 18% 
 
4.6.2 Identification of indicators, triggers, and management actions 
As previously noted, drought indicators, triggers, and management actions should be 
selected in a collaborative process using the model as a boundary object to facilitate 
interactions between modelers, decisions makers, and other stakeholders.  The indicators, 
triggers and management actions used for illustrative purposes in this analysis provide 
suitable initial assumptions for collaboration and are based on case study experience.  For 
example, stakeholders working on the first state drought plan for Georgia generated an 
extensive list of potential indicators that represent various water uses, and decision-
makers and experts refined this list to identify the best indicators [Steinemann and 
Cavalcanti, 2006].  Trigger levels can then be defined based on percentiles of indicator 
values, representing the probability of occurrence.  The approach was described by water 
managers in Georgia as “quantitatively and intuitively appealing” [Steinemann and 
Cavalcanti, 2006].  Percentiles can be easily interpreted, relating triggers to concept that 
are familiar to people such as probabilities of occurrence, making them an appropriate 
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concept for use in SVP.  Other methods exist, such as relating indicators to impacts, but 
these links are difficult to identify quantitatively [Steinemann and Cavalcanti, 2006].  
The following indicators, triggers, and management actions represent an example of 
possible drought plan components for São Paulo, which could be tested and debated in a 
stakeholder engagement process.  
 
The drought indicator included in the mock SVM is “days of supply remaining” (DSR), 
which was developed by Palmer in past studies [Fisher and Palmer, 1997].   
DSR in a given month (i) is calculated by:  
 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) = �𝑆𝑆(𝑖𝑖)+[�∑ 𝐼𝐼(𝑖𝑖+1)
3
1 �+�∑ 𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖+1)31 �]
𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖)
�     (Eqn. 2) 
Where S is storage, I is inflow, and D is unaltered demand.   
 
DSR is a composite indicator measured in days. It considers current storage levels and 
three-month forecasts of inflows and demands to determine how many days of water 
supply are left in storage, assuming constant demand.  Three-month forecasts capture 
seasonal water availability for a given month; comparing the calculated DSR for the 
current month to percentiles from the 84.5 years of historical data captures how water 
availability in any month compares to long term availability in the past.  This composite 
indicator is appropriate for São Paulo because the balance of inflow and demand can vary 
greatly (Figure 4.5), impacting water availability. It is ideal for use in SVP because it is 
easily understood by decision-makers and water users [Fisher and Palmer, 1997].   
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Figure 4.5 Summed monthly inflows into the Cantareira system for the 84.5 years of 
record compared. Current demand of 33 m3/s is marked for easy comparison. 
 
The historical series of DSR was created by running the model at a constant demand of 
33 m3/s, the estimated demand for the Cantareira system, with no management actions.  
DSR was calculated at a monthly time-step over the 84.5-year period, and 10th through 
60th percentiles were taken for each month, resulting in monthly curves (Figure 4.6).  
Each drought plan has triggers defined at four decreasing percentiles that trigger four 
increasingly severe drought actions.  In the model, DSR for each time step is calculated 
and compared to the triggers to determine the level of drought in the system.  A range of 
percentile combinations was explored to select each drought plan’s triggers (Table 4.3).   
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Table 4.3 Monthly DSR Percentiles for use as drought triggers 
 Days of Supply Remaining (DSR) 
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Jan. 106 198 264 294 317 348 
Feb 110 198 267 304 320 347 
Mar. 102 185 260 297 320 347 
Apr. 95 176 248 287 309 321 
May 81 168 234 277 296 307 
Jun. 64 155 215 262 282 292 
Jul. 46 139 203 245 267 281 
Aug. 34 128 198 235 254 268 
Sep. 29 121 183 226 250 266 
Oct. 32 129 205 234 250 272 
Nov. 54 161 219 253 273 290 




Figure 4.6 Monthly DSR percentiles for use as drought triggers for alternative plans 
 
Management actions were characterized in the model as percentage reductions in 
demand.  In reality, management actions are combinations of water use restrictions and 
other policy initiatives (e.g., pricing structure, monetary incentives, etc.), for which the 
effect on demand varies depending on regional circumstances.  During the drought, actual 
deliveries were reduced by as much as 68% (to 10.5 m3/s in October, 2015).  The drought 
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responses modeled in this example are within the range of known deliveries from the 
Cantareira system (10.5 m3/s - 33 m3/s).   
 
Four levels of drought are included in each plan.  Under drought level 1 (“drought 
warning”), managers would make internal preparations for a pending drought declaration 
but would not notify the public, resulting in no reduction in demand.  Drought levels 2, 3, 
and 4 reduce deliveries with increasing severity, with the precise reductions varying by 
plan. Table 4.3 shows the restrictions associated with drought levels 2, 3, and 4 as they 
vary from very severe (23, 18, and 13 m3/s) to very mild (31, 29, and 27 m3/s).  
 
4.6.3 Metrics of performance 
Drought plans balance the severity of water reduction impacts against the frequency of 
preventative curtailments.  Providing less water than customers demand is acceptable if it 
is rare and it contributes to lowering the most extreme impacts during the worst droughts 
[IWR, 1994a].  While we acknowledge that the risk of system failure and the 
inconvenience of having water use curtailed are value-laden metrics which can be 
perceived differently by different actors, the team chose the following set of performance 
metrics to use in our modeling effort as an example of how drought plans could be 
evaluated:  
● System storage – minimum volume of stored water over the period of record and 
10th percentile December storage (December is typically the month with lowest 
storage due to seasonal demand patterns); 
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● Reliability – percentage of time (monthly or annually) that the system meets full 
demand;  
● Shortfall volume – the difference between the volumes of water demanded and 
delivered.  Shortfalls resulting from restrictions are curtailment shortfalls and 
those resulting from water shortages are shortage shortfalls; 
● Average months in drought – this represents the resilience of the system, i.e., how 
quickly it can recover from drought;  
● Economic impact – losses to the utility from lost billing revenue and to the 
consumer for the lost value of water (detailed description below).   
 
Minimal water use curtailments can be enforced without significant inconvenience, but as 
restrictions are intensified, the inconvenience grows.  The inconvenience to the utility and 
the consumer can be quantified by estimating the economic value of the water supplied.  
When demand is curtailed, there are economic losses to the utility in the form of lost 
billing revenue and to the consumer for the lost value of water.  Billing revenue loss is 
easily calculated as the volume curtailed times the price of water per volume.  Consumer 
loss is more complicated and is estimated from studies on the difference between water 
price and demand [Jenkins et al., 2003].  Following the methodology of Jenkins et al. 
[2003], demand curves are developed from an estimated price of water and assumed 
constant seasonal price elasticities that represent a change in quantity demanded for a 
change in price.  
𝑃𝑃 = exp [�ln(𝑄𝑄)
𝜂𝜂
�+ 𝐶𝐶              (Eqn. 3) 
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𝐶𝐶 = ln(𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) − {
ln(𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)
𝜂𝜂
}             (Eqn. 4) 
Where P is the price at which quantity Q is demanded, 𝜂𝜂 is the elasticity.  C is the 
integration constant based on an observed price (𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) and an observed level of water use 
(𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜). 
Integrating the demand curve from the quantity demanded given present water rates to a 
reduced delivery results in a total economic loss.  Calculating economic loss for a range 
of reduced deliveries yields a convex economic loss function, where the rate of economic 
loss increases as deliveries decrease.   
 
Information on price variability within São Paulo is limited.  The price of water assumed 
in this analysis is R$4.32/m3, based on average annual rates by sector from SABESP’s 
tariff structure, weighted by total sectorial water use from 2013-2015 [SABESP, 
2014e]. 36   Price elasticities were defined as -0.15, -0.25, and -0.35 for winter, 
intermediate, and summer months, based on estimates for urban areas in California, 
respectively [Jenkins et al., 2003].  Urban California price elasticities were used as 
representative of São Paulo price elasticities for illustrative purposes given that their 
demand and elasticities parallel São Paulo’s high and low rainfall season.37  The summer 
elasticity (-0.35) suggests that water users will reduce consumption more than twice as 
                                                 
36 Water rates do not vary year round, but rate structure does vary by sector (commercial vs. domestic) and 
with fixed-demand costumers.  For simplification of this analysis the average annual rate was calculated for 
all consumers. 
37 Summer and winter seasons are inverted in the southern hemisphere, but high demand corresponds with 
summer (low rainfall). 
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much in summer than in winter with the same price increase. This is based on the 
estimated winter (-0.15) elasticity.  São Paulo’s maximum economic loss to consumers 
per cubic meter of water, R$1,250/m3, was estimated from the price of bottled water in 
São Paulo, an R$25 cost for a 20 L container of water.  Other values, such as the unit 
price of water delivered by truck, could also be considered, but bottled water was chosen 
here to represent a likely maximum.  The resulting seasonal price and demand curves for 
the Cantareira system are shown in Figure 4.7.  The section of the curves with zero slope 
represents the maximum cost of water.  Integrating the demand curves for various 
reduced deliveries yields the economic loss curve in Figure 4.8.   
 
The model results are illustrative for the São Paulo setting, since more precise data for 
that region are elusive.  Several parameters (such as average prices, price elasticities, and 
economic losses) were derived from approximate values and are necessary proxies until 
better values can be determined.  Although imperfect, these metrics provide insights into 
the nonlinear nature of the economic loss resulting from shortfalls.  Further analysis 
could be conducted when improved estimates of alternative sources of water and price 
elasticities become available. 
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Figure 4.7 Price vs. demand curves for the Cantareira system reveal different price 




Figure 4.8  Economic loss for one month of reduced deliveries by season in three months 
representing winter, intermediate, and summer price elasticities  
 
4.6.4 Example of tradeoffs for different operational policies of the Cantareira system 
The goal of a drought plan is to balance the costs and inconveniences of seeking early 
curtailments in water demand against the public safety issues associated with imposing 
extreme water use restrictions to prevent the total depletion of a water supply.  The 
timing and severity of restrictions determine the drought plan’s effectiveness.  In a SVP 
process, tradeoffs can be explored in real-time with the aid of computer models in what is 
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known as a “virtual drought” [Werick et al., 1994; Keyes and Palmer, 1995].  Examples 
of tradeoffs that may be explored in a “practice decision” or “virtual drought” are 
illustrated below by comparing ten drought plans with varying triggers and management 
actions.  First, the effect of triggering restrictions early (at 50, 40, and 30 percentile DSR) 
or late (at 40, 30, and 20 percentile DSR) was calculated. Figure 4.9 shows a comparison 
of early and late actions based on different level droughts.  Second, drought plan 
performance is compared for different management actions that range from very mild to 
very extreme restrictions. Table 4.4 presents simulation results showing how system 
performance is affected by different drought response plans. 
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Figure 4.9 Comparison of early vs. late DSR drought triggers by month  
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- No Plan 0 46 36 1748 - 329 0.91 0.96 - 
1 late, very mild 0 425 12 3779 12 176 0.51 0.68 33 
2 late, mild 0 518 6 4461 12 118 0.53 0.71 29 
3 late, moderate 125 567 0 5195 12 56 0.54 0.74 26 
4 late, extreme 310 595 0 5589 10 90 0.55 0.76 24 
5 late, very extreme 399 627 0 6185 9 139 0.56 0.80 20 
6 early, very mild 0 513 11 4676 12 138 0.44 0.63 37 
7 early, mild 0 614 3 5715 11 96 0.46 0.66 34 
8 early, moderate 220 646 0 6586 9 74 0.47 0.70 30 
9 early, extreme 410 668 0 7002 9 116 0.47 0.72 28 
10 early, very extreme 518 685 0 7629 9 185 0.47 0.76 24 
 
Plans that initiate restrictions later (triggering curtailments when there are fewer days of 
supply remaining) increase reliability.  Drought plans that initiate restrictions later also 
result in total shortfall volumes (the sum of curtailment and shortage shortfalls over the 
entire period) that are approximately 20% lower than drought plans with the same 
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restrictions and early triggers.  Despite the lower total shortfall volume, postponing 
actions places the system at greater risk of reaching low reservoir storage levels or 
potentially driving storage to zero and endangering the entire city, as shown by the 
minimum storage and 10th percentile December storage metrics.  Early trigger plans 
maintain higher storage levels and recover from drought more quickly than the late 
trigger plans.  Economic losses for the early and late trigger drought plans fall within a 
similar range, while the magnitude of the economic impact is dependent on the severity 
of the restrictions.  
 
A comparison of these plans reveals tradeoffs that should be considered carefully.  
Drought plans with less severe restrictions have lower curtailment shortfall volumes, but 
result in very low (or empty) storage levels and, consequently, higher shortage shortfall 
volumes when these shortfalls occur.  Of the ten drought plans, the only plans that result 
in failure months (when the system is unable to meet even the reduced demand) are those 
with mild or very mild restrictions.  The system also recovers more slowly from drought 
when restrictions are mild, as seen by the higher average months in drought and percent 
time in restrictions, since storage levels will continue to fall until inflows substantially 
exceed deliveries.  Longer periods with low storage correlate with lower reliability.  In 
contrast, high restrictions levels help the system recover lost storage more quickly and 
have higher reliabilities and storage levels, but also cause high curtailment shortfall 
volumes.   
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An analysis of economic impacts helps identify the differences between very mild and 
very severe restrictions (Figure 4.10).  As shown in Table 4.4, plans with very mild 
restrictions have high economic losses because they result in system failure (zero storage) 
in some years, and the economic losses associated with very low deliveries from shortage 
shortfalls are high.  Economic losses are also high for very severe restrictions because, 
although planned, the deliveries are reduced significantly and frequently such that 
economic losses build from curtailment shortfalls even though no shortage shortfalls 
occur.  Moderate drought plans result in the lowest economic losses because they avoid 
large economic losses from severe restrictions, but also reduce demand sufficiently to 
keep storage levels above zero and prevent expensive shortage shortfalls.  It is important 
to note that the balance of economic losses from restrictions and shortfalls is dependent 
on the price and elasticity data used in the calculation of economic loss.  The balance is 
also a function of water demands, so if base water demands increase, a different drought 
plan is needed to minimize losses. 
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Figure 4.10 Tenth percentile storage in December vs. total economic loss 
 
4.6.5 Identifying preferred drought action plans 
Preferred drought action plans (that is, plans that are preferred by most stakeholders, 
plans that are not dominated by others) can be identified in a collaborative process that 
solicits stakeholder input.  The identification of preferred plans requires iterative 
stakeholder engagement to determine: 1) the criteria to be used for measuring risk (e.g., 
shortfall volumes and reservoir levels) and inconvenience of shortfalls (e.g., economic 
impact), and 2) acceptable tradeoffs between the performance metrics.  Other factors, like 
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social and health impacts, could and indeed should be considered.  In the absence of 
stakeholders, we chose the more easily quantifiable factors for illustrative purposes.   
 
Based on our analysis, it is suggested that drought plans 3, 4, and 8 are among the 
preferred plans because they provide a balance between failure and shortfalls.  These 
plans maintain over 10% active storage during the worst periods (Figure 4.11), much 
higher than the actual reported storage levels during São Paulo’s drought, which 
benefitted from the use of dead storage.  While ANA/DAEE permitted the use of dead 
storage from the Jaguarei-Jacarei and Atibainha reservoirs, the use of dead storage is 
prohibited in the future [Andreu and Daruiz Borsari, 2015], consequently this reserve 




Figure 4.11 System storage for preferred drought plans and no drought plan during the 2013-2015 drought 
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Drought plans 3 and 8 have the same set of “moderate” management actions.  However, 
by triggering restrictions earlier, drought plan 8 maintains higher storage levels than 
drought plan 3.  Drought plan 4 enacts restrictions later, but by using “severe” 
restrictions, is able to maintain higher storage levels during drought than both of the 
moderately restrictive plans 3 and 8.  These higher storage levels, of course, are due to 
larger curtailment shortfalls.  Although based on this analysis drought plan 3, 4, and 8 
appear promising, the optimal drought plan will depend on the tradeoffs and risks found 
acceptable by stakeholders and utility managers.  Consumers should consider:  Are they 
willing to accept the more severe curtailments of plan 4 if it means not facing more 
extreme and unplanned water restrictions and a lower risk of running out of water?  
Managers will make similar decisions, for example, one utility may be willing to accept 
more risk if they can minimize economic loss, whereas another utility may prefer 
economic losses to the risk of running too low on storage.  In a real SVP process, these 
tradeoffs would be explored during virtual drought exercises where decision can be 
“practiced” openly with stakeholders, so the ultimate tradeoffs to each sector are well 
understood and negotiated.  The more credible and legitimate the process, the more likely 
it is to succeed in an actual critical drought situation.  
 
The performance of these drought plans is also highly dependent on inflows and base 
demands.  Robust drought plans should consider impact of policies and operations over 
system performance in a wide range of possible futures, including increased demand 
(associated with household demands or population growth), changing regulatory 
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measures and water permit allocations, increased environmental flow targets, or 
decreased inflows associated with climate change.   
 
The length of the planning period will help guide the demands and inflows that should be 
considered.  Short- and long-term impacts of adopted policies will have effects on system 
performance.  To provide an example of planning for population growth, base demand 
was increased to 37 m3/s and to 40 m3/s and drought triggers were modified by 
multiplying DSR percentiles by the increased demand and dividing by the original 33 
m3/s demand, to determine DSR for the higher demand.  If the same drought plans are 
implemented (with triggers modified as described) and the base demand is increased, the 
result is an increase on the percent of time in restrictions, the total shortfall volume, and 
economic losses (Figure 4.12).  These results are significant since changes in starting 
conditions (supply or demand) mean changes in system operations to avoid greater risks.  
Moreover, minimum storage for each plan also increases with higher demand, likely 
because the lower DSR values cause more frequent restrictions (Figure 4.13).  Utility 
managers and stakeholders must evaluate the risks posed by factors like population 
growth (example provided), aging infrastructure, permit allocations, environmental 
regulations, and climate variability to create appropriate metrics that determine if system 












Figure 4.13 Minimum storage at three levels of demand for four management plan 
alternatives  
 
This illustrative analysis did not include other portions of the São Paulo water supply 
system, nor other water supply options such as groundwater.38  During the drought, 
SABESP was able to offset losses from the Cantareira to some degree by supplying water 
from the Alto Tietê and Guarapiranga systems: they reconfigured the distribution system 
so that gradually portions of the Northwest region of the MRSP normally served by the 
                                                 
38 Refer to footnote 21 for more information on groundwater. 
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Cantareira could get water from the other reservoirs.  Neither the benefit nor the cost of 
the non-Cantareira supply was considered in the above analysis.  If SVP was applied in 
São Paulo, utility managers with knowledge of water transfers and other tactics to offset 
Cantareira system losses would need to participate in model development so that model 
results would more accurately portray system-wide impacts of drought management.   
 
4.7 Conclusions and lessons learned 
Megacities in the developed and developing world must prepare robust drought plans so 
that managers can handle changing conditions like the possibility of frequent and 
prolonged droughts.  As in New York City’s drought plans, managers should take the 
driest years of the historical record into account.  The contribution of this chapter has 
been to analyze different management policies and their impacts on the performance of 
the Cantareira system during Brazil’s historic drought of 2013-2015, a system whose 
reliability has been diminished by growing water demands over the past 20 years.  
Drought planning necessitates coordination and transparent policies that can be 
understood by those affected, including utilities, regulatory agencies, and the public.  São 
Paulo’s experience with drought planning provides several lessons on the many 
challenges faced by megacities as they strive to provide safe, reliable, and inexpensive 
water to the public.  Many of these lessons are unique to São Paulo and are important 
given the critical situation it reached during the recent drought.  Other lessons are more 
generalizable to the needs of other megacities facing water crises.  
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Effective drought response plans must balance difficult tradeoffs associated with 
management actions during extreme events. Here, those tradeoffs were the reliability of 
water supply and the frequency and costs of water curtailments.  Processes like SVP have 
been used for 25 years in the US and abroad to allow decision makers, experts, and 
stakeholders to work together in determining the acceptability of tradeoffs as they build 
preferred plans.  Once a plan is developed, virtual drought exercises allow managers and 
stakeholders to practice and update plans on a regular basis so they do not become reports 
that sit on bookshelves collecting dust.39  In São Paulo, a series of management failures, 
including the lack of a clear, well-vetted drought plan and the absence of strong public 
engagement, resulted in a public that was misinformed about the risks.  Drought plans 
existed for the MRSP, but some were dismissed and others were not disclosed until 
months after decisions were made. Furthermore, the rapid depletion of reservoir storage 
raised the question of whether storages could have been maintained (providing greater 
public safety and less inconvenience) had drought mitigation efforts been implemented 
earlier.   
 
The time and effort required for stakeholder engagement mean that this type of 
participation fits best in the earlier stages of the planning process, rather than during the 
management of an evolving crisis.  Consequently, the mock SVM of the Cantareira 
system presented at the two public workshops was not sufficient to catalyze a more 
collaborative drought response.  The absence of immediate impact on drought 
management from the workshops may be explained, at least in part, by two factors.  The 
                                                 
39 Brazil is notorious for producing all kind of plans that never get implemented.  The joke among 
Brazilians is that desk drawers are a graveyard for well-crafted plans.  
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first was a breakdown of the participatory process.  The notable absence of SABESP and 
State water authorities from our workshops corroborated participants’ impressions that 
that some entities essential to the drought response felt collaboration and transparency 
would not be in those parties’ best interest.  As a result, collaborative planning became 
infeasible in São Paulo, and not just because water resource managers failed to engage 
the public in a meaningful way, but also because they refused to be engaged by an active 
public.  The second factor was a question of timing given a series of other non-water 
issues that converged to exacerbate the drought crisis (see Chapter 3 for institutional 
factors that exacerbated the drought).  Our suggested interventions based on shared vision 
and virtual drought exercises foster collaborative responses through open communication, 
feedback, and practice, but none of these factors were present at the time of the 
workshops.  The strength of virtual droughts is in their capacity to transform written 
drought plans into “working” and “evolving” documents, keeping these plans familiar 
during the years between droughts and allowing them to be adapted to changing climate 
risks and levels of demand.  This chapter has shown how virtual drought exercises could 
have been done in São Paulo to simulate drought responses with vetted policy 
alternatives.   
 
Finally, in a 2015 report, SABESP estimated (based on historic inflows) that the 
probability of experiencing a drought as extreme as that of 2013-15 was extremely low.  
It then suggested that managers could not realistically expect to find funding to build 
infrastructure capable of enduring such unlikely events [SABESP, 2015, p.11–12].  But to 
focus on infrastructure would be to miss the point. Water authorities in Brazil and 
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elsewhere might learn from this unprecedented event in São Paulo.  The water crisis was 
amplified by a lack of a vetted, tested drought plans with clear actions based on 
established indicators and triggers.  Even when a long historical record is available for 
infrastructure design purposes, hydrologists agree that past flow distributions may not 
apply in the future.  There is a plausible concern that the next drought may be more 
prolonged and severe than the 2013-2015 drought.  Rather than relying on dead storage 
or other water supplies to manage future droughts, it makes sense to lay a sounder 
groundwork for responsive and agile resource management during critical events.  These 
efforts will require improved communication channels for public engagement and vetted 
management response plans that do not simply rely on more supplies.  Given a drought of 
this magnitude, São Paulo water authorities need to consider the impacts of short- and 
long-term policies.  They need to weigh what timely actions may be taken to reduce risks 
and costs.  In addition, they need to provide more transparency and clarity to the public 





5.1 Summary of objectives and research findings 
At the core of this research are questions on how computer models support decision-
making, how technical knowledge gets translated into policy, and whether meaningful 
participation in model building can strengthen adaptive governance and institutional 
capacity.  Conventional wisdom holds that models are relevant to decision-making 
because better information helps reach better decisions.  Empirical studies show that this 
relationship is not straightforward because when and how information gets used to 
support decisions makes a significant difference.  Rather than assuming the utility of 
models, this study began from a different premise, working backwards to examine what 
makes models useful, when and how they are used to engage the public, and under what 
circumstances they are effective.  There is a long history of models supporting water 
resources decisions.  But to understand the impact of models and of the science and 
technical information they convey, one must understand the role of models in real 
settings, and that includes gauging how stakeholder engagement with a model based on 
local experience and realities, may provide more acceptable planning scenarios.   
The research pursued the following objectives: 1) Characterize what makes models 
effective in engaging stakeholders in a participatory policy process; 2) Examine the case 
study of the Cantareira system joint water management in São Paulo to identify the 
institutional challenges to achieving improved participation and water governance; 3) 
Examine how collaboratively developed models can support a formal and disciplined 
approach to drought planning that incorporates stakeholders’ concerns.  To this end, two 
public workshops were organized to engage local stakeholders to showcase what 
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collaborative modeling framework could look like in São Paulo.  The objective and 
findings of each chapter are summarized below.   
Chapter 2 introduced the five dimensions of participation and identified mechanisms for 
improving model effectiveness in public participation.  It outlined a two-stage evaluation 
framework that provides an assessment of the mechanisms by which participatory 
computer models may be used to improve public engagement. In the two-stage 
framework, effective models were judged based on the concept of boundary objects.  The 
analysis of models as boundary objects showed that diverse groups of people and 
organization can learn to talk to each other through models, building a new and shared 
syntax and improving understanding and interactions.  The implications for model 
developers are that building flexibility and transparency into a model may help avoid 
artificially constraining the analysis. This research suggested that engaging stakeholders 
in model building is a process of constructing policy alternatives that are acceptable and 
binding.  This is an approach that allows for accountable and transparent solutions and 
that involves the public in vetting policy alternatives. 
Chapter 3 examined the case study of the Cantareira system joint water management in 
São Paulo, Brazil to identify the institutional challenges exposed during the 2013-15 
drought.  Since the passing of state and national water reform laws, river basin 
committees have created a platform for discussions and deliberations, a marked 
improvement over previous management approaches.  However, the drought in São Paulo 
revealed the shortcomings of a water management paradigm that fails to take into account 
the political nature of water decisions.  This chapter identified several institutional and 
structural challenges to fulfilling IWRM’s promise of participatory water management.  
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The water supply system’s reliability had grown vulnerable over decades of negligence 
and risky management decisions.  Given the pressures and demands of a prolonged 
drought, a lack of transparency and information asymmetries limited the role of active 
participatory management in mitigating the crisis.  Subsequently, state authorities 
concentrated decision-making power, and the more powerful players found ways to 
resolve their issues outside of the designed governance system.  This situation eroded the 
role of the existing institutions that govern the Cantareira system.  The undermining of 
their authority could have important effects in their ability to mitigate future water crises. 
Chapter 4 provided an assessment of São Paulo’s drought event based on documented 
data gathered through fieldwork and on a shared value model (SVM) of the Cantareira 
system.  We analyzed the operation of the Cantareira system with the mock SVM under 
different drought indicators, triggers, and action management options.   The analysis was 
based on a comparison of the tradeoffs between minimizing drought impacts to the 
system, the users, and the utility company.  The findings were as follows.  First, the 
system is stressed at the current demands, and higher water allocation permits could 
result in water conflicts in future dry years.  Second, the nonlinear relationship between 
reduced deliveries and costs suggests that mitigating actions taken earlier in a drought are 
more effective. Third, any alternatives based on earlier but less stringent actions would 
preserve the reliability of the system but would also require stakeholder engagement at 
early stages.  As a result, we concluded that drought planning requires defining – openly 
and transparently – what indicators will be used for systematic, early identification of 
drought onset, and what triggers will set management actions in motion to mitigate 
negative impacts.  
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Next, the conclusions are taken all together to analyze what we learned in terms of 
IWRM and water resource management based on São Paulo’s case study.   
 
5.2 Conflicting objectives in the era of IWRM  
The level of disillusionment from key reformers was notable in the São Paulo case study.   
I interviewed and interacted with numerous players who had played an active role in 
promoting decentralized and participatory water reforms in federal (Brazil) and state (São 
Paulo) water laws.  Progress had been made: rules and regulations had been written into 
law, governing and regulating institutions had been established, and yet, the frustration 
pointed to a vision of an improved water management that had not been realized.   This 
can best be explained as a kind of disenchantment with the results of years of struggle 
and hard work to rewrite the rules of the game.  My observation is best summed up by 
one particular interviewee who, when pressed for an explanation on why the current law 
was not working as intended, concluded that participation simply does not work in a 
country like Brazil.  The underlying implication is that persistent political meddling over 
crucial decisions is a major reason for the failure of the reforms.  To understand this 
disillusionment better, we must revisit the questions that motivated this work on the 
conflicting objectives of IWRM and the concept of water governance from two 
seemingly contradictory disciplinary perspectives.  
 
The disillusionment observed in the São Paulo case study is evidence of one of the 
numerous contradictions found within the theory and practice of IWRM.  The drought 
exposed the major shortcomings of placing complete faith in a technical paradigm that is 
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devoid of political realities.  The research presented in this dissertation has focused on the 
contradictions that stem from two seemingly inconsistent narratives of governance based 
on either techno-rational norms or local experience. For many experts, the worldview 
from a management and planning perspective stood in sharp contrast with the local 
autonomy required to implement the new water management paradigm.  
As the conceptual framework of IWRM gains traction for institution building at all levels 
of the water dialogue, we must pause to analyze its limitations.  The elusive concepts of 
the IWRM framework comes from a very linear and simplistic—almost naïve—view of 
how institutions gain authority over decisions.  The depoliticized perspective of IWRM 
tends to emphasize the technical problems of managing water, thus generalizing the water 
problem to one of scarcity, striping water of its local context and geographical setting, 
and ignoring underlying historical and sociopolitical issues.  The local experience 
provides a different perspective on IWRM, one rooted in structural and institutional 
problems that involve more than laws and regulations.  These are things like the power to 
define the problem, the political weight to negotiate alternatives, and the authority to 
decide outcomes.  IWRM acknowledges the growing importance of participation and 
water governance, but still is vague about the practical aspects of what governing means 
for managing water resources. 
In much of the IWRM literature, the process and outcomes of policymaking are 
confounded.  The result is two characterizations of policy, which tell different stories 
about who and what is involved in the decision-making process.  The findings of this 
work provide important distinctions between policy as a process and policy as 
(prescribed) outcomes.  A linear perspective assumes that policymaking has sequential 
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steps from problem formulation, to evaluation of alternatives, to implementation.  
Findings from Chapter 2 on effective participatory models challenge that perspective.  
Policy as a process recognizes that stakeholder participation creates an iterative policy 
process where negotiations, diversity in opinions, and previously unidentified solutions 
are possible, even if contentious [Mackintosh, 1992; Gordon et al., 1997; Merrey et al., 
2007].  Chapter 3 explored how technical perspectives of water governance can exclude 
concepts of political struggles and the (re)distribution of power, thus failing to address 
underlying factors that prevent participation and weaken governance.  Finally, Chapter 3 
and 4 together described policy as a process muddied by different perceptions and 
interests that need to be debated and contested in order to produce new bargained 
outcomes.  
 
5.3 Broader impacts 
Water governance provides a space where the two narratives of global norms and local 
experience may overlap.  As argued in Chapter 3, water governance is best understood 
through more than one disciplinary lens.  The lens chosen for this study was participatory 
models and the ways they engage diverse knowledge and participants in developing 
realistic policy scenarios.  We explored what models for policy look like in a process in 
order to show how technology could be useful in building adaptive governance.  
Governance as a process questions how realistic it is to create grand objectives since 
circumstances can make new policy alternatives more or less acceptable.  Technology 
itself is a sociopolitical process, often fraught with the very same problems it is trying to 
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address.  More work is necessary to carefully assess the mechanisms and conditions in 
which models work.  
Water governance combines the laws and regulations within institutions, but also deals 
with the complexities of political and power struggles.  The São Paulo case showed how 
models and technical information are not apolitical and can create insulated “technical” 
decisions.  Participation was constrained by delayed or absent information which limited 
further scrutiny by all parties involved.  During the unprecedented drought, São Paulo’s 
state government could have enlisted the existing institutions and basin committees to 
play an active role in solving the problem.  It could have enabled them to act as the 
national and state water laws had intended them to.  It did neither.  This was not a 
question of laws, technical know-how, or proper planning.  The existing institutions 
lacked the kind of authority, brokerage, improvisation, and decision-making power that 
strong water governance demands.  This kind of “practical authority” comes from 
experience rather than laws and regulations [Abers & Keck, 2006; 2007].  
Good governance is fluid and requires institutions that have autonomy and problem-
solving capabilities to create adaptive policies as needed.  Participatory models provide 
stakeholders a platform for coming to terms with the real trade-offs necessary to reach 
negotiated decisions even when contentious. Under new circumstances, like droughts, 
governing institutions need adaptive capacities that cannot be codified or generalized, 
because most circumstances are not predictable.  The effectiveness participatory models 
needs to be evaluated more systematically in practice as they become extremely relevant 
to how issues are defined and framed in the policy process.  
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As the São Paulo case study showed, the ideals of a decentralized and participatory 
management paradigm contradict the tacit assumption that rational decisions and 
technical solutions will remain apolitical in the policy process.  The participatory process 
opens “technical solutions” to discussion, introducing the possibility of political 
bargaining.  For some, the idea of participation was less attractive since it would open the 
door to scrutiny.  Reformist ideals were put to test when the local experience did not fit 
the neatly packaged plans and objectives of IWRM.  
 
5.4 Future research needs 
Given the interdisciplinary nature of global water issues, I have contended from the start 
that the best thinking in resource management comes from the interdisciplinary 
collaboration between academics, non-technical experts, and water management 
practitioners who bring different experiences from the frontlines of real world problems.  
More applied research is needed to deal with the disconnect between generating scientific 
and technical information and translating that information into policy.  The findings 
outlined in this dissertation have raised questions to guide future work. There are many 
distinct narratives that could serve as a prism for examining the challenges faced in 
global water problems both of management and governance, and to look for areas of 
overlap. The following questions are related to the institutional implications of the 
present study, which need to be better understood: 
1. In what ways can we think about resource management problems as problems of 
collective action and improve understanding of the role of trust? 
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2. What are useful ways to think about the individual and the collective? How can 
institutions change to incentivize the individual to act in the benefit of the collective?  
2. How does our understanding of collective action improve mechanisms for creating 
trust, reciprocity, cooperation and accountability in institutional building?   
3. How do we create or revise institutions to reward collaboration rather than favor a 
small group of well-positioned stakeholders whose interests are not aligned with the 
general social interest? 
4.  With water sustainability in mind, how do we define the multiple dimensions of 
science and technology adoption for new policy alternatives?  
 5. What steps are necessary to translate findings on governance into the context of other 
global norms for resource management, such as sustainability? 
Society influences the creation of science, which questions are deemed important, and 
which problems become relevant.  Therefore, an interdisciplinary perspective is needed 
to answer these questions.  Many of these questions do not seek hard and fast rules but 
rather new perspectives to shine a light going forward.  The need to engage technical and 
non-technical actors is necessary and it will be possible by reaching across disciplines to 
overcome the language, cultural, and rhetorical barriers that prevent new solutions from 
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APPENDIX A  
A.1 Rigor of Evidence  
Chapter 2 analyzes five case studies based on the evidence the authors provided.  This 
appendix lays out the spectrum of evidence used to assess the methods presented by each 
author to substantiate their claims.  This spectrum is one of the limitations of the evidence 
available for case study analysis 
Spectrum of Rigor 
Most Intermediate Least 








  Any physical 
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model and database 
available for 
download) 
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APPENDIX B  
B.1 Methodological Observations 
Below, I provide a list of the 33 interviews carried out between December 2011 and Dec 
2015.  The number of interviews exceeds the number of interviewees given that some 
people were interviewed on more than one occasion.  Measures are taken to protect the 
interviewees’ confidentiality.  Interviewees are identified by their job title or association 
with the water basin committees, which reflects their function at the time the interview 
was carried out.  
 
Interviews were complemented by participation and observations in formal and informal 
meetings at the national, state, and river basin level.  These were invaluable sources of 
information that allowed me to contrast the participatory approach as depicted by the 
books and interviewees with the real participatory practices.  Finally, document analysis 
was a third source of information used to triangulate interviewee’s accounts and 
observations.  Document analysis provides primary evidence of dialogues and decisions 
made between institutions at different moments of the process as recorded in their formal 
reports or documents.  Documented sources are central to verifying events and aligning 
different perspectives or recollections of the same event.  Meeting attendance allowed me 
to observe the mechanisms of participation and deliberations; documental analysis 




Identifier # Date Interviewee Location 
1 1/11/11 Water resources engineer Curitiba, PR 
2 & 3 
1/14/11 Water resource university 
professor São Paulo, SP 
9/25/13 
4 1/17/11 University professor São Paulo, SP 
5 1/19/11 University researcher São Paulo, SP 
6 & 7 
1/19/11 Water resource university 
professor São Paulo, SP 
3/28/14 
8 1/20/11 Water resource university professor São Carlos, SP 
9 1/21/11 Water resource university professor São Carlos, SP 
10 1/21/11 Water resource university professor São Carlos, SP 
11 1/21/11 Water resource university professor São Carlos, SP 
12 9/17/13 Public Prosecutor Jundai, SP 
13 9/17/13 Piracicaba River Fisherman Club Jundai, SP 
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14 12/3/13 PCJ Consortium Americana, SP 
15 12/5/13 PCJ Consortium Americana, SP 
16 & 17 
2/28/14 
Technical Analysts Piracaia, SP 
3/25/14 
18 3/9/14 Water engineer Americana, SP 
19 3/21/14 Water resource técnico-State Piracicaba, SP 
20 3/27/14 National Water Agency Political Appointee Valinhos, SP 
21 4/10/14 Water resource técnico  -Federal Phone Interview 
22 4/11/14 Water resource técnico-State Piracicaba, SP 
23 4/11/14 Water resource  técnico -State Piracicaba, SP 
24 4/28/14 Social science university researcher Phone Interview 
25 5/12/14 University professor Campinas, SP 
26 5/30/14 SABESP Employee Atibaia, SP 
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B.3 Meeting Attendance: 
1. 1st PCJ Committee Inter-chamber meeting September 17, 2013 
2. PCJ Consortium— September 27, 2013 
3. Ministério Público Public Hearing—October 3rd, 2013  
4. PCJ Consortium— December 2, 2013 
5. PCJ Committee 127th Câmara Técnica de Monitoramento Hidrológico (CT-
MH)—November 29, 2013 
6. PCJ Committee 129th CT-MH—January 31, 2014 
7. ANA Public Hearing for Cantareira Water Permit Renewal—February 10, 2014  
8. PCJ Committee 57th Ordinary Câmara Técnica de Integração e Difusão de 
Pesquisas e Tecnologias (CT- ID)—February 17, 2014 
9. PCJ Committee 130th CT-MH—February 28, 2014 
10. PCJ Committee Water Management Framework Seminar—March 19, 2014  
11. PCJ Committee 13th Ordinary Meeting—March 27, 2014 
27 5/30/14 SABESP Employee Atibaia, SP 
28 6/15/14 National Water Agency  Técnico Brasilia, D.F. 
29 6/15/14 National Water Agency   Técnico Brasilia, D.F. 
30 6/15/14 National Water Agency   Técnico Brasilia, D.F. 
31 6/15/14 National Water Agency Political Appointee Brasilia, D.F. 
32 4/8/15 Water Alliance Phone Interview 
33 8/21/15 National Water Agency   Técnico Phone Interview 
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12. PCJ Committee 131th CT-MH—March 31, 2014 
13. PCJ Committee 58th Ordinary CT- ID—March 14, 2014 
14. Institute Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Water Governance, Management, and 
Challenges—April 18, 2014 
15. PCJ Committee 132th CT-MH—April 30, 2014 
16. PCJ Committee 2nd Ordinary Meeting, Drought Technical Group—May 14, 2014 
17. International Workshop in Water Scarcity and Conflict in São Paulo—May 15, 
2014 
18. PCJ Committee 133th CT-MH—May 30, 2014 
19. PCJ Committee 134th CT-MH—June 27, 2014 
20. PCJ Committee 135th CT-MH—July 31, 2014 
21. PCJ Committee 136th CT-MH—August 29, 2014 
22. PCJ Committee 137th CT-MH—September 30, 2014 
23. ANA and DAEE meeting to consolidate water restriction in PCJ—October 18, 
2014 
24. PCJ Committee 138th CT-MH—October 31, 2014 
25. PCJ Committee 139th CT-MH—November 30, 2014 
26. Forum of University Rectors—February 10, 2015 
27. Sustainability Forum—March 18-19, 2015 
28. Braudel Institute of World Economics. The Water Crisis after the Rain—June 2, 
2015  
29. Institute Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Facing the water crisis: A debate with 
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APPENDIX C  
Interview Sample Questions 
Interviews were semi-structured and were most often open ended.  These questions are 
only a small sample of questions that any interviewee could have been asked.    
 
Participation Group: Technical council members  
Questions 
1. Where you present during the 2004 Cantareira Negotiations? 
If so, what was the nature of your participation?  
If not, when did you become a committee member? 
2. How are [CT-MH/CT-ID] Technical Council members informed of technical matters 
in the basin?   
3. Is this information readily available and where does it come from? 
4. Who determines what information to requests from [consultants/researchers]?  
5. Did you participate in the use of Decision Support Systems (DSS) in the past? When 
and how often?  
 If yes, continue to Model Use and Model Effectiveness section. 
 If no, have you heard of DSS? In what context? (Skip section on Model Use) 
6. What other information did you use to help you make decisions allocation decisions? 
 
Model accessibility: 
7. What was the nature of your participation (When/where/what did you participate in)? 
8. How is the DSS actually used? All its functions are used or it is only used for some 
functions? Why?  
9. Is the DSS use properly diffused within the institutions/users for which it is intended?  
10. Was training provided for use of the DSS model use was provided?  
11. Is there a detailed user manual with practical examples demonstrating the usefulness 
of DSS for solving concrete problems of everyday life of institutions/DSS users? 
12. In your opinion, what is the usefulness of the DSS as a tool?  
13. In your opinion, what are the main benefits of the DSS (specify indicators: average 
processing time for cases, number of water permits awarded etc.)? 
14. What are the main problems / shortcomings of the DSS? 
 
Model effectiveness: 
15. Did the availability of the model (a) enhance your understanding of the system or (b) 
help advance your agenda?  
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16. Did you use [any of DSS] model or did [name of consulting/research group] use it on 
your behalf? (Describe to interviewee what the term “use” here is intended to mean 
running the model and interpreting results) 
17. Did the DSS help drive or inform the decisions?  
18. Was the interactive negotiating sessions with the model helpful or a hindrance to the 
process? 
19. In your opinion, did the DSS change any aspect of the negotiations? 
 
Participation Group: Government Agencies  
Questions 
1. What is the role of the agency on day-to-day bases in the management process? 
2. What type of technical support does the agency provide to the water basin committees? 
4. How often do basin committees make use of this technical support? 
 
Model accessibility: 
5. What was the nature of the agencies participation (When/where/what did it participate 
in)? 
6. Was training provided for use of the DSS model?  
7. What are the main benefits of the DSS? 
8. What are the main problems / shortcomings of the DSS? 
 
Model effectiveness:  
9. Did the availability of the model (a) enhance understanding of the system or (b) help 
diversify the agenda?  
10. Did the DSS help drive or inform the decisions?  
11. In your opinion, did the DSS change any aspect of the negotiations? 
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